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SOCIAL FORCES

A Scientific Medium of Social Study and Interpretation

BIRTH RATES AND SOCIAL CLASSES BY W. F. OGBURN

ROOTS OF RELIGION BY RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE

THE VERIFICATION OF SOCIAL MEASUREMENTS BY STUART A. LEE

WHY SYSTEMATIC ECONOMIC THEORY? BY PAUL T. HOMAN

MENTAL HYGIENE IN THE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY BY
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A Scientific Medium of Social Study and Interpretation

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SOCIAL FORCES

September, 1929

BIRTH RATES AND SOCIAL CLASSES

W. F. OGBURN AND CLARK TIBBITTS

THE United States Bureau of the Census has recently published some very interesting figures showing the number of births to mothers according to the occupations of the fathers. This information, given in the report called "Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics for 1925" is illustrated by a few selected occupations in the column below. The figures represent the average number of children ever born to women, 40 to 44 years of age who reported themselves as mothers in 1925.

| NUMBER OF CHILDREN | OCCUPATION OF FATHER |
|--------------------|--|
| 3.9 | Dentist |
| 4.3 | Physician |
| 4.5 | Banker |
| 6.3 | Clergyman |
| 6.7 | Plumber |
| 6.9 | Carpenter |
| 7.2 | Semi-skilled operative (manufacturing) |
| 8.0 | Farmer |
| 8.3 | Laborer (manufacturing) |
| 8.6 | Laborer (farming) |
| 9.1 | Miner |

These data are published for 139 occupations or occupation classes in the registration area of the United States. Similar data, showing the average number of children born to mothers of 1925, as well

as the actual number of mothers and the total number of children ever born are given according to the occupation of the father for all age groups throughout the child-bearing period.

If these data were the average number of children ever born to *all* the wives of the men engaged in a particular occupation, they would be a most significant contribution to differential fertility according to social classes. But they are not. They show only the average number of children ever born to that selected group of wives who reported themselves as having a child born in the year 1925. The question arises as to whether this selected group of mothers of 1925 is a fair sample of the total number of wives whose husbands are in a particular occupation. It probably is not a fair sample, chiefly because the mothers reporting in 1925 would include a larger proportion of those who do not use contraceptives, or who are more fertile. The average number of children ever born to the mothers of 1925 is thus probably larger than the average number of children ever born to all the wives.

We should expect, therefore, that the occupation with the largest number of children ever born per mother of 1925 would also have the largest percentage of

wives becoming mothers in 1925. Thus according to the figures presented above, bankers would likely have a smaller proportion of wives becoming mothers in 1925 than printers.

Now the proportion of mothers (15 to 44 years inclusive) is the same as the birth rate as measured by the number of children per 1000 married women 15 to 44 (except for the births of twins and triplets, which are of course small in number). We anticipate, then, that the wives of dentists will have a lower birth rate than the wives of plumbers. The problem before us is to discover whether the average number of children ever born to mothers of 1925 according to the occupations of their husbands is an index of the birth rate according to occupations. Our theory based upon the logic advanced in the preceding paragraph seems reasonable, but it needs to be tested by facts.

If such a correlation could be established it would at once make possible many social interpretations of these interesting figures published by the United States Bureau of the Census. The problem is to measure the relationship between the average number of children ever born and the percentage of wives reporting themselves as mothers, i.e., the birth rate.

This question is now to be examined. The first step is to try to find the percentage of the married women 15-44 who became mothers in 1925 according to occupations. It has already been stated that this census report gives the number of mothers in 1925 (and the number of babies born in 1925) according to occupations. There is, however, no report which tells us the number of wives according to occupations for the same year. They are known for 1920 and can be estimated by the usual formula ($P_n = P_o(1 + r)^n$) for 1925, but we do not know what percentage of them are of child-bearing age.

The nearest estimate that we have been able to find is for the year 1890. In the reports of the census of 1890 there is given for five great occupation classes (and several sub-classes) the number of married men who are from 15 to 24 and 25 to 44 years of age. The number of married men is somewhat smaller than the number of married women for this age group. (The percentages in the urban and rural sections of different states seems to vary from 80 to 87.) Also the year 1890 is a third of a century separated from the year 1925. However the proportions married have not greatly changed, indeed only about 3 or 4 per cent for the age group, 15-24 years, about 4 per cent; and about 2 per cent for the group of 25-44 years. It is possible therefore to make an estimate of the number of married women in certain occupational classes in 1925.

The procedure followed was to estimate on the basis of 1910 and 1920, the number of males, 15 to 24 and 25 to 44 years of age in each of the great occupation classes for the registration states in 1925. These figures multiplied by the percentages married in the same age groups in 1890 gave the estimated number of married men for the year 1925. Increased to represent the number of married women rather than the number of men, the resulting figures were estimates of the number of wives, 15 to 44 years old, of men in six great occupation classes in the registration states for 1925.¹

The next step was to discover how the figures showing the average number of children ever born to mothers of 1925 is

¹ It was possible to divide Agriculture into Mining and Agriculture for 1890, but it was necessary to combine Trade, Transportation, and Clerical Services for 1920. Public Service was divided between Domestic and Personal Service and the Professions on the basis of earlier sub-classifications which indicated where the separation should be made. "Government Officials" were thrown with the Professions.

correlated with these ratios of births of 1925 to these crude estimates of the number

of wives 15 to 44 years old. For six great occupation classes the relationships are shown in Table I.

TABLE I*
OCCUPATION GROUPINGS AND FERTILITY

| OCCUPATION CLASS | AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN TO MOTHERS OF 1925 | BIRTH RATE: NUMBER OF BIRTHS DIVIDED BY THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MARRIED WOMEN 15-44 |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| Mining..... | 4.1 | 17.2 |
| Agriculture..... | 3.9 | 16.7 |
| Manufacturing..... | 3.2 | 15.9 |
| Domestic and personal service.... | 2.9 | 14.4 |
| Trade and transportation..... | 2.6 | 13.9 |
| Professions..... | 2.3 | 13.0 |

* The birth rate for domestic and personal service is a revision of the estimate as calculated by the procedure previously mentioned. The calculated but unrevised rate was 12.6. Detailed examination of the reported births for the occupations making up domestic and personal service gave some indication that the number of births to wives of "servants," "waiters," and of those following "other pursuits" was under reported. For instance the number of births for all the other classes of domestic and personal service was 12.8 per cent (in the registration area) of the total number of males occupied in the United States, while for "servants," "waiters," and "other pursuits" it was only 6.6 per cent. There was no such difference between the average number of children ever born, these being 3.0 and 2.6 respectively. Neither were the percentages married among "servants," "waiters," and "other pursuits" greatly different from the other occupations in the domestic and personal service group. The ratio of the total number of births to the total number of males should be not 6.6 but 10.5 as estimated from the criteria above. Employing this new ratio we get 52,172 births instead of the reported 44,103 and the birth rate is 14.4 and not 12.6.

The method of arriving at the number engaged in agriculture was not strictly according to the compound interest formula. Corrections were made on the basis of the census figures of 1920 being an underestimate due to the taking of the census as of January first when many agricultural laborers were probably not counted. The estimates of Truesdell in his study of "Farm Population in the United States" (Census Mono. No. VI) were followed.

The diagrams in Chart I show how closely the movement of the birth rates (estimated) follows the movement of the average number of children ever born to mothers of 1925. Diagram A is constructed from the data showing the average number of children ever born to mothers 40-44 years of age reporting in 1925. In the construction of diagram B data giving the average number of children ever born to mothers of all ages is used. In both diagrams the dots fall very close to a straight line. The equation for the straight line best describing the course of the dots in diagram A is $Y = 7.095 + 1.15X$. In the equation Y represents the birth rate (or the estimated percentage of wives becoming mothers in 1925) and X, the average number of children ever born to mothers of 1925 who were 40 to 44 years of age.

In the same way the equation for the movement of the dots in diagram B is found to be $Y = 7.836 + 2.28X$ where X represents the average number of children ever born to women of all ages reporting themselves as mothers in 1925.

In calculating the equation for this line the values for the open dot representing manufacturing were omitted. Occupational trends, since 1920 as shown by the Census of Manufacturers, indicate that the values for manufacturing should fall closer in line with the other dots. The statistical material, however, with which the approximation should have been made is not very suitable for the purpose. The line might have been fitted to all six dots instead of to five (in which case it would have been only slightly lower). But since the purpose was to obtain an equation for predicting, it seemed better to use the line through the five dots only.

Now it is possible to substitute in the equation the average number of children ever born to mothers whose husbands are in a particular occupation class and predict the birth rate. How closely this prediction may be made is seen from the closeness of the dots to the line in diagram B. The line represents the predicted values and the dots the actual estimated values. The correlation between the birth rate and the average number of children ever born to mothers of all ages in 1925 for five great

for 1925 had to be estimated. Consequently there is no unwarranted desire to claim that the equation predicts birth rates with any great degree of accuracy.

These birth rates may be consistently too high or consistently too low, due to the difficulty in estimating the number of married women 15-44 in the occupation class. That the differentials, however, from one large occupation class to another show the proper rankings seems to be true from the foregoing chart. In the rankings




CHART I. ESTIMATED BIRTH RATE CORRELATED WITH THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO MOTHERS OF 1925

occupation classes is almost perfect, it being expressed by $r = +.999$. With the values for "manufacturing" included (represented by the open dot) the correlation is found to be $r = +.981$.

The results of the calculations are statistically very good. The reader must remember, however, that the estimates are crude because the number of wives was calculated for 1925 on the basis of proportions existing in 1890, and because the number of men in the occupation classes

of smaller occupation groups, on the basis of the prediction of the foregoing equation there may be some error. There may of course be some error in the smaller occupation groups due to the fact that the reporting of the occupation of the father, by the doctor, let us say, on the birth of the infant will not be the same sort of reporting as that done by a census enumerator. In large groupings, however, such error would be less: for instance a farmer would not be reported as a worker in

manufacturing or a miner, no matter who reported.

Therefore, while it is evident that these figures cannot be taken as representing exact birth rates, we do believe that the births per mother which the census publishes can be taken as an index of the fertility of the occupation class.

With the foregoing analysis in mind let us look at Table II which shows for the nine great occupation divisions used by the United States Bureau of the Census,

TABLE II
FERTILITY BY OCCUPATION CLASSES

| OCCUPATION CLASS | AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN TO MOTHERS OF 1915 | AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN TO MOTHERS OF 1915, 40-44 YEARS OF AGE | ESTIMATED BIRTH RATE PER 1000 MARRIED WOMEN 15-44 YEARS OF AGE |
|--|---|---|--|
| Mining..... | 4.1 | 8.9 | 17.2 |
| Agriculture..... | 3.9 | 8.1 | 16.7 |
| Manufacturing and mechanical industries..... | 3.2 | 7.4 | 15.1 |
| Transportation..... | 2.9 | 6.8 | 14.5 |
| Public Service..... | 2.9 | 6.6 | 14.5 |
| Domestic and personal service.. | 2.9 | 6.5 | 14.5 |
| Trade..... | 2.6 | 6.1 | 13.8 |
| Professional service..... | 2.3 | 4.9 | 13.1 |
| Clerical service..... | 2.1 | 5.2 | 12.6 |

the number of children born per mother and the birth rates estimated from the preceding formula.

It is readily apparent from this table that the most fertile class is Mining, next Agriculture, and third Manufacturing. Transportation, Public Service, and Domestic and Personal Service are all about the same. Trade is a little less fertile, and the Clerical occupations and the Professions are the least fertile. This is very interesting but we should like to go further.

These census classifications do not yield much information about fertility according to social classes or with respect to income groups.

For instance manufacturing includes capitalists and common laborers, and domestic and personal service includes hotel managers and bootblacks, individ-

TABLE III
THE FERTILITY OF SOCIAL CLASSES

| SOCIAL CLASSES | AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN TO MOTHERS OF 1915 | AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN TO MOTHERS OF 1915, 40-44 YEARS OF AGE | ESTIMATED BIRTH RATE PER 1000 MARRIED WOMEN 15-44 YEARS OF AGE |
|---|---|---|--|
| Agriculture..... | 3.9 | 8.1 | 16.7 |
| Urban pursuits..... | 3.1 | 7.2 | 14.9 |
| Farmers..... | 4.0 | 8.0 | 17.0 |
| Foremen and overseers (agricultural)..... | 3.3 | 6.8 | 15.4 |
| Laborers (agricultural)..... | 3.7 | 8.6 | 16.3 |
| Laborers (non-agricultural).... | 3.7 | 8.3 | 16.3 |
| Declining old skilled..... | 3.5 | 7.1 | 15.8 |
| Semi-skilled..... | 3.3 | 7.9 | 15.4 |
| Skilled..... | 3.0 | 6.8 | 14.7 |
| Foremen..... | 3.3 | 6.9 | 15.4 |
| Servants, etc..... | 2.5 | 6.3 | 13.5 |
| Petite bourgeoisie..... | 2.2 | 5.3 | 12.8 |
| White collar laborers..... | 3.0 | 6.6 | 14.7 |
| Bourgeoisie..... | 2.8 | 6.2 | 14.2 |
| Managers..... | 2.6 | 5.3 | 13.8 |
| Capitalists..... | 2.3 | 4.5 | 13.1 |
| Professions..... | 2.3 | 4.9 | 13.1 |

uals with all degrees of income and intelligence. It seems impossible to classify on the basis of income, for even the most minute divisions of the census include persons of quite varying degrees of wealth.

It is possible, however, to attempt a division on the basis of the social classes.

It should be noted that these social classes based upon the census classifications represent a very heterogeneous society, and the reader should not attempt to rank them in one social scale.²

² These social classes are not defined as rigid classifications with a high degree of definiteness. They are rather attempts to conform to what is thought to be the popular opinion, which is itself a variable and loose. No doubt other writers would make somewhat different classification. The census classifications which are grouped to compose the foregoing social classes are listed here.

Agriculture. Farmers, farm foremen.

Laborers. Agricultural laborers, all other laborers.

Old skilled. Blacksmiths, cabinet makers, coopers, glass blowers.

Skilled. Bakers, boiler-makers, brick masons, carpenters, compositors, electrotypers, stationary engineers, engravers, filers, loom fixers, machinists, molders, painters, paper hangers, pattern makers, plasterers, plumbers, pressmen, stonecutters, structural iron workers, tin smiths, locomotive engineers, shoemakers and cobblers, telephone and telegraph linemen, telegraph operators.

Semi-skilled. Semi-skilled operatives in manufacturing, longshoremen, draymen and teamsters, boiler washers, miners, firemen in manufacturing, furnace men, janitors, locomotive firemen, laundry operatives, dyers.

Foremen. Foremen in manufacturing, builders and contractors, garage keepers, mine foremen, foremen in transportation.

White collar laborers. Jewelers (manufacturing), tailors, upholsterers, baggagemen, conductors, motor-men, mail carriers, city firemen, guards, watchmen, policemen, barbers, cleaners, elevator tenders, brakemen.

Servants. Servants, porters, chauffeurs, messengers, bootblacks, waiters.

Petite bourgeois. Ticket agents, express agents, marshalls, sheriffs and detectives, bookkeepers, stenographers, clerks.

Bourgeoisie. Real estate agents, insurance agents, commercial travelers, wholesale and retail dealers, undertakers, government officials and inspectors, agents, hotel keepers and managers, restaurant keepers, billiard and poolroom keepers.

Managers. Officials and superintendents in manufacturing and in transportation, operators and officials of mines.

Capitalists. Bankers, brokers, and moneylenders.

Professions. Actors and showmen, architects,

This table shows that the population is being recruited at a faster rate from those in agricultural pursuits than from those in urban occupations. Similarly the laborers have a higher rate of increase than the semi-skilled, and the semi-skilled a higher rate than the majority of the skilled and the white collared. The bourgeoisie and the managerial classes have lower rates than the white collared workers. The servants, the capitalists, and the professions are quite low, while the petite bourgeoisie such as clerks, bookkeepers, ticket and express agents are lowest of all.

The actual numbers contributed to our population depends not only on the rates of increase but also upon the absolute numbers of these groups in our population. Thus while the rate of increase is greater in agricultural pursuits than in non-agricultural pursuits, the actual numbers added from the farming group would be a great deal less because only a little more than a quarter of the occupied males are farmers. Further and more definite estimates cannot be made as the classes listed above are only samples. The census divisions do not lend themselves, along more definite or rigid lines, to such a grouping of social classes as recorded above.

Another classification, however, is possible, namely one according to the intelligence ratings of the occupational classes. During the war when the drafted men were rated according to their ranking in the intelligence tests they were classified among other things according to the occupation pursued in civil life. Consequently it was found that the intelligence

artists and sculptors, authors, editors and reporters, chemists, assayers and metallurgists, dentists, clergymen, designers, draftsmen and inventors, lawyers, judges and justices, musicians and teachers of music, photographers, physicians and surgeons, teachers, technical engineers, veterinary surgeons, other professional pursuits.

rating of engineers according to the Alpha scale was 113.5 and that of carpenters, 59.8, and so on through a long list. Now the list of occupations for which intelligence scores are given is in part the same as our list showing the average number of

TABLE IV
MENTAL ABILITY AND FERTILITY BY OCCUPATIONS

| OCCUPATION | RANKING BY ARMY ALPHA MENTAL TEST | ESTIMATED BIRTH RATE MOTHERS, 1925, 15-44 YEARS OF AGE |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| Stenographer and typist..... | 115.0 | 12.2 |
| Mechanical draftsmen..... | 114.0 | 12.2 |
| Civil and mechanical engineers..... | 113.5 | 12.6 |
| Accountants and bookkeepers..... | 106.1 | 12.4 |
| Clerks..... | 96.3 | 12.9 |
| Photographers..... | 85.7 | 13.1 |
| Telegraph operators..... | 84.8 | 13.5 |
| Electricians..... | 80.8 | 13.1 |
| Veterinary surgeons..... | 72.8 | 14.0 |
| Policemen and detectives..... | 69.3 | 14.4 |
| Laundrymen..... | 66.5 | 14.0 |
| Plumbers and pipefitters..... | 66.0 | 14.2 |
| Chauffeurs..... | 64.7 | 13.5 |
| Machinists and tool makers..... | 64.3 | 14.0 |
| Locomotive engineers..... | 64.0 | 16.3 |
| Railroad conductors..... | 64.0 | 14.7 |
| Telegraph and telephone linemen..... | 63.8 | 13.1 |
| Railroad brakemen..... | 63.0 | 14.4 |
| Carpenters..... | 59.8 | 15.6 |
| Bakers..... | 58.7 | 14.2 |
| Painters..... | 58.7 | 14.9 |
| Barbers..... | 54.6 | 14.7 |
| Tailors..... | 53.3 | 15.1 |
| Teamsters..... | 49.7 | 14.7 |
| Miners..... | 48.9 | 17.4 |
| Farmers..... | 48.3 | 16.7 |

births per mother. The relationship is shown in Table IV for twenty-six occupations. It is clearly seen that the occupations with the higher intelligence ratings are the ones where the average number of births per mother are lowest and vice versa.

In interpreting this table we do not attempt to define what is meant by intelligence, other than to say that it was the ability to pass the Alpha tests given. That such tests measure heredity—that which is passed on to these children born—is very doubtful. That they accurately measure general intelligence—both inherited and acquired combined—may be a question as is indicated by the abundant critical literature on the subject. No doubt a certain type of ability or intelligence is measured. And such ability even if not passed on by heredity is no doubt of influence (environmental) in determining to some extent the mental ability of children.

The rate of recruitment of children is, therefore, much smaller from those occupation groups which have a probably greater force in producing intelligence, so defined, in the children.

The relationship is seen somewhat more clearly in Chart II which shows the course of the fertility estimates according to the rankings of intelligence of these occupations.

The equation for the line expressing the movement of the points shown in the chart is found to be $Y = 24.01 - .2085 X + .000932 X^2$, when Y represents the estimated birth rate or the fertility rate, and X the intelligence ratings according to the Alpha tests for the drafted men classified according to occupations. A correlation ratio computed to determine the extent of the relationship between these two variables is found to be .88.

There are still two further points to be observed by way of notes before closing. One of these points is that the same comparative fertilities hold true for all the age groups in a particular occupation. That is to say, in an occupation where the average number of children ever born to the older mothers, as from 40 to 44, is

large, then invariably the average number of children ever born to young mothers, say 20 to 24, whose husbands are in that occupation is large. And similarly if the average number of children ever born to mothers 40-44 is small, as 3.9 in the case of wives of dentists, the average number ever born to mothers 20-24, whose

expect a small average number of children born to young mothers and a large number of children born to older mothers whose husbands are in a given occupation. One may infer that age (within the limits of the child-bearing period) is not much of a hindrance to the diffusion of birth control methods.




CHART II. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE FERTILITY RATE AND INTELLIGENCE RATINGS
(Army Alpha tests on drafted men)

husbands are dentists will be small; in this case 1.1. This very close relationship is shown in Table V where the correlation is $+ .9$.

The condition does not seem to exist that one would expect if the younger women in an occupation were using contraceptives, but the older women were not. If this condition were true we should

Another point of some slight interest is that the occupations with the lowest birth rates have a larger percentage of mothers reporting during the age periods of 20-24 and 25-29, than do the occupations with higher birth rates. As is to be expected, in the occupations with low birth rates, these births tend to be concentrated into a short span of the

child bearing period. Thus in occupations with very low birth rates about 30 per cent of the mothers reporting in a given year will be in the age group 25-29 years. The point of particular interest is that these births tend to be concentrated in the age period of the mother, 25-29 years, particularly, but also

For the age period 25-29 years $r = -.62$
 For the age period 30-34 years $r = .0$
 For the age period 35-39 years $r = +.58$
 For the age period 40-44 years $r = +.70$

If low birth rates mean extensive use of birth control then the operation of the use of contraceptives tends to be such as to concentrate motherhood in the younger

TABLE V

THE CORRELATION OF BIRTHS TO MOTHERS, 20-24 YEARS OLD, WITH BIRTHS TO MOTHERS, 40-44 YEARS OLD, BY OCCUPATIONS

The average number of children ever born to mothers, 40-44 years old, by occupations

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Average number of children ever born to mothers, 20-24 years | 2.5 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2.4 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2.3 | | 2 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2.2 | | 1 | 3 | 3 | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2.1 | | 1 | 1 | 4 | 2 | | | | | | | | |
| | 2.0 | | | 4 | 3 | 3 | 1 | | | | | | | |
| | 1.9 | | | | 3 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 2 | | | | | |
| | 1.8 | | | | 2 | 1 | 11 | 5 | 4 | | | | | |
| | 1.7 | | | | 1 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 3 | | | | |
| | 1.6 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 5 | 2 | | | | |
| | 1.5 | | | | | | | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 | | | |
| | 1.4 | | | | | | | | | 1 | 7 | 1 | | 1 |
| | 1.3 | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | |
| | | 8.8 | 8.3 | 7.8 | 7.3 | 6.8 | 6.3 | 5.8 | 5.3 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 3.3 | 2.8 |

in the age period 20-24 years. This fact is shown clearly by the following coefficients of correlation, between the average number of children ever born to mothers of 1925 and the percentage of mothers reporting in the different age groups, among the 139 occupation groups.

For the age period under 20 years $r = +.02$
 For the age period 20-24 years $r = -.25$

ages, particularly in the age period between 25 and 30.

SUMMARY

We have no official statistics for birth rates by occupations or by social classes in the United States. The Bureau of Census does publish annually however by occupations the number of children ever

born to mothers of that particular year. This paper claims to prove that these statistics of the number of children ever born to mothers of a particular year are so highly correlated with the birth rates in the larger occupation groups that they may be used as indexes of the birth rates. The error is greatest in small occupation groups where the occupations may not be listed accurately. The error is least when comparing large occupation groups where there is not likely to be many mistakes in classifying and recording the occupations. These indexes are better for comparisons and differentials than for determining the exact birth rate (due to the difficulty in estimating the number of married women 15-44 years old). Having shown then that the census figures on the number of children ever born to mothers of a particular year may be used as indicators of the birth rates, these census figures are thus

opened to a much broader interpretation and use.

They show, for instance, which social classes, as farmers, city dwellers, professional classes, skilled workers, common labor, have higher or lower birth rates. The specific rates were shown in a preceding table. It was also shown that the classes with the highest scores on psychological tests for general intelligence were also the classes with the lowest birth rates, the correlation ratio was .88.

Corollaries of the study are that age appears not to be a barrier to the spread of birth control within the limits of the child bearing period, and that apparently classes with the greatest use of birth control concentrate their child bearing within the age period 20-29 years, and more particularly in the age period 25-29 years.

ROOTS OF RELIGION

RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE

EVERY organism, from an amoeba to a human being, seeks to maintain with his environment an essentially dynamic relation. Both the inner nature of the living creature and the external conditions of the environment undergo constant change. This brings about a tension in the organism which appears sometimes as a formless impulsion but normally as a specific response to a concrete situation. In the simplest organisms as well as in those highly developed, life is maintained fully and characteristically only through such tension and the corresponding organic adjustment. Different orders of organic behavior,

tropisms, instincts, or voluntary actions are but ways in which this tension or unrest seeks release. The release may come sometimes from a physical object, as when a hungry dog obtains its plate of flesh, or from a situation as when a soldier performs a heroic act amidst the applause of his comrades, or a lover seeks the beloved in a moonlit drive, or, again, from images and ideas as when a poet or an artist finds solace for his divine discontent in a form of beauty that never was on sea and land.

Religious objects are particular types of ideas and images. The tension that finds relief in these is a particular collocation

of normal human drives. Religious objects have sometimes been defined as those that inspire fear. Thus Hobbes says: "The feare of things invisible is the natural seede of religion." Similarly Ribot finds the fear motive in all religions, "from profound terror to vague uneasiness, due to faith in an unknown, mysterious, impalpable Power, able to render great services, and, more especially, to inflict great injuries." The difficulty of such a definition of religion arises from the fact that even in totemism, we find an effort to establish a close affinity between men and the totems. Plants and animals or whatever the totem may be are regarded often as friends or relations, man's brothers, fathers and so forth. This fact of an ideal kinship is, indeed, far more important than the impulse of fear which the totem may excite. Freud over-emphasizes the fact of fear in order to subsume totemism under his generalization of the Oedipus Complex. In primitive religious observances the communion with the religious object that is sought as well as the boons and gifts received from it do not seem to imply the exclusive play of the fear impulse. This fact becomes more obvious in higher forms of religion where the mystic seeks communion with his god, who stimulates the most tender feelings of filial devotion and even of man-woman love.

Again, religious objects recently have been sought to be explained as sublimations of the sexual desire. Sex, more than any other human impulse, continually changes in its direction and aim. It thrives on variety and seeks its object in ever new situations. Religious objects, on the other hand, are remarkably stable in their qualities, and the emotion that they excite maintains a sameness, which cannot be accounted for by the play of

particular human drives with their incessant fluctuations.

Similarly, intellectual and moral perplexities have also been considered as the potent source of religion. Man is believed to be in perpetual quest of causes of things in order to attain a conception of a rounded off universe. When this quest fails, man manages to fill up the gap with the objects of his own creation which yield him not only quiet but also a feeling of relief from bewilderment. Both Shand and McDugall seem to regard curiosity as one of the principal roots of both science and religion. It is hardly consonant with observation that ordinary human beings are so much obsessed with the search for causes. The more imperative problem for man is to adjust himself to his physical and social surroundings, and to introduce harmony among his conflicting inner urges. When nature and society fall short of the organic needs, an ideal world shaped by man's imagination comes to his rescue. Gods and angels, heaven and hell extend the bounds of the universe and lend order and coherence to our responses to human beings and to the exigencies of existence. The conflict of impulses also resolves itself in the ideas of, for example, the transcendent and immortal self, the belief in Karma, the trail of a long past, or, again, in the faith in an immutable cosmic justice. It is thus that man frees himself from the bewildering experience of a variety of moods, joys or sorrows, or from the inner dissatisfaction due to bafflement of elemental drives. Man thus seeks stability and immutability because it is easier to adjust oneself to a uniform than to a changeful type of behavior. The former involves less expenditure of energy. It is for this reason that a person whose store of organic energy has run short, as in case of illness, has to abstain

from all social intercourse in order to recover what he has lost. The perplexities of the world similarly force persons to adopt the life of hermits and to live with nature which is less changeful than the human environment and ultimately with the changeless God. The same reason accounts for the conceptions of immortality and eternity in all religious systems. Probably this also serves as the unconscious motive of all forms of philosophic monism. The world of chaos yields its place to God's universe. Religious objects and beliefs thus ensure satisfaction and enjoyment, and guidance to action. The hypothesis of the genesis of religion as a causal explanation is hardly adequate.

Whatever human contrivance simultaneously fulfils a variety of needs attains stability, and elicits a fairly unchanging quality of emotion and a uniform mode of behaviour. The family, for instance, satisfies the impulse of sex, food, protection, self-assertion, etc., and the emotions that it excites among the different members continue to be the same in their nature even with the lapse of years.

We must similarly look for the psychological roots of the religious object in a blending of a variety of impulses. The larger the number of impulses which blend together the more real is the object worshipped. Such blending takes place in the ordinary person at rare moments under an intense stimulation as, for example, when a physical catastrophe overwhelms him, or under the shock of, for example, a great sorrow or happiness. In these moments all the impulses drain through a single channel, and experiences obtain a stability through a narrowing of the responses. In the religious person as in the case of the artist, the welter of opposed and conflicting impulses is resolved, and order and stability in experience brought about without any

independently adequate stimulus being required. The reorganization of impulses is here the result of gradual inner co-ordination. The latter process which involves mental preparation and discipline yields the most stable religious objects and beliefs. The process of imagination here constructs ideal objects which may or may not have reference to the stimulus; and these weave the impulses into a more satisfying fabric and bring about a mental poise. Man seeks fellow-man, and in his conception of God he reaches a cosmic gregariousness. Love which has its roots in sex impulse similarly reaches out to an all-encompassing source of Love. Man fears the mysterious powers of evil and darkness and in the conception of the Primordial Mother to whom bloody sacrifices are offered finds solace and guidance. Out of the raw materials of love, gregariousness or self-preservation, or out of all of them combined together religion fashions a stable attitude and feeling, stable through its power of inclusion. Such coalescence of impulses is brought about at emotional crises when man is beside himself with grief, joy or fear and it may be complete or partial. In partial blending one of the impulses gains an upper hand and dominates over the rest. Thus we are familiar with the religion of fear, sexual religion, or militant religion. With many people strongly endowed with the impulse of self-preservation religion promises gifts and rewards fulfilling the baulked desires in another world. With many others religion is coloured by the disturbances of the repression of a strong sex-attachment.

Sometimes, again, the irrepressible impulse of aggression seeks satisfaction in bloody fights for the spread or defense of religion, sect or creed. In such cases the religious object and belief are coloured by the dominant drive. As the set of

impulses breaks loose or makes up a new order with one another, such religions, however yield no satisfaction and become imperative. Sometimes, however, the dominance of a particular impulse or set of impulses persists in such manner that an all-inclusive mystical note is found in the religious experience, though this latter must be regarded as somewhat abnormal and limited. In a similar manner a great deal of poetry and art, of which the content is the ordered development of a special and limited experience or a specific set of impulses, does not endure or afford lasting satisfaction. A complete blending of impulses is manifested only in the higher types of mysticism in which the animal impulses withdraw from their outward aims, and completely interpenetrate with one another and turn inwardly to the ideal object. As the Hindu scripture, the Bhagabat Geeta puts it:

"As the tortoise withdraws all its limbs
Let the wise man also do the same
Withdrawing sense from worldly things
This is the sign of the poised mind."

In both these cases (1) the coalescent group of impulses remains constant, (2) the object which satisfies the impulses assumes a character of stability, (3) the emotion that arises in the adjustment of these impulses to the ideal object comes to possess a specific unchanging quality, and (4) the complete integration of impulses and sentiments serves as the basis of a progressive simplification, of the realization of the unity and harmony of life in their fullness.

In all forms of great art, we have a similar coordination of man's discordant impulses and their reconciliation in an ordered single response. By imaginative experience, the thousand inhibitions

which prevent the full working out of our responses disappear, and man accordingly finds rest as well as a new awareness of existence. It is thus that great literature or art by bringing into play a large number of motor tendencies, which do not overtly take place, brings about an adjustment, and interpolating with and organizing the rest of man's experience gives sanity and joy. Thus Aristotle defined tragedy long ago as "an imitation of an action effecting through Pity and Terror the correction and catharsis of such passions."

In religious experience the coördination and systematization of the impulses reach the furthest lengths. Here sets of impulses which in ordinary, non-religious experience would be inhibited to give unarrested scope to others are blended and reconciled with one another, and when all rivalry or conflict is dissolved man feels that his contact with actuality has increased. Along with a new vitality the mystic develops a sense of immutability and all-inclusiveness of his experience bestowing a feeling of freedom, of relief and sanity. The mind ceases to be oriented in one particular channel, but simultaneously and coherently responds through many channels. Herein lies the disinterestedness of religion, which serves as the basis of the mystic's clarity of vision. The mystic on account of his detachment does not see things only from one aspect or standpoint. He thus 'sees into the life of things' and there arises in his consciousness a complete certainty of his insight or inner vision. It is this feeling of insight, the sense of revelation which is similarly characteristic of the greater kinds of art. The consciousness which arises in ecstasy lends itself inevitably to transcendental descriptions as in the case of the religious mystic. Thus, as Richard observes, "This Extasie doth unperplex, we seem

to see things as they really are, and because we are freed from the bewilderment which our own maladjustment brings with it.

The heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world
Is lightened.

"Wordsworth's pantheistic interpretation of the imaginative experience in Tintern Abbey is one which in varying forms has been given by many poets and critics."¹

The blending or reconciliation of opposed impulses or sets of impulses is thus the ground-pattern of the most valuable aesthetic and religious responses. Indeed, in forms of religion which show a process of coördination through the influence of one dominating set of impulses, a distinct emotional tone is present, and we have a more or less complete identification of aesthetic and religious responses. Thus the mystic passes like the poet through the whole gamut of intensive feelings, joy and sorrow, love and longing, hope and melancholy, and his devotional hymns may pass for lyrics of human passion. But the forcefully inquiring mind would gradually overthrow all self-reference, which the emotions like the overt or incipient responses must imply. It is only when religion passes into the activity of the intellect rising above all relativities that we meet with the highest phase of consciousness. It is then that man's vision is perfect and he has clear and impartial awareness of the world, independent of all attitudes and beliefs which are the conscious accompaniment of his successful adjustment to life.

We thus see that there are distinct stages of the development of religion as there are

distinct phases of the organization of impulses. In ordinary non-imaginative experience, if an impulse be isolated or inhibited, it brings in allied sets of impulses and there ensue bafflement and bewilderment. In all forms of imaginative experience, the impulses are ordered and accepted, and the state of mind involves the least conflict, strain or inhibition. In great kinds of art and emotional mysticism, the impulse systems are modified and selected by one predominant thought or feeling. Thus Coleridge observes: "That synthetic and magical power, to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination . . . reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite and discordant qualities . . . the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar objects, a more than usual state of emotion with more than usual order; judgment ever awake and steady self-possession and enthusiasm and feeling, profound or vehement." In the familiar types of religious mysticism, imagination selects and orders the impulses and combines them into a stable poise in much the same manner. Thus outbursts of song during states of rapture are common among religious mystics amongst whom, as in the case of the poets, "the sense of musical delight" is evident. It is here that we find a similarity of the workings of the poet and the religious mystic's mind. But the religious mystic has a superior power of organizing experience. Like the true poet, the religious mystic is impersonal and detached, but his integration of the impulses is more complete. This engenders a stronger feeling of acceptance and certainty in the case of religion. In art the symbols are mere symbols, while in religion these are both real and figurative. Religion thus forces upon the mind the distinction between this world and the

¹ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 252-53. The analysis has proved useful in interpreting the relations between art and religion.

ideal world, and categorically affirms the reality of the latter. While art is indifferent to the distinction between the real and the unreal, religion is a conscious effort to seek the reality that underlies the symbols. Unlike the artist, the religious mystic does not live in the realm of his own imagination; he lives in the realm of essence. The field of suppression in his case is diminished, the field of stimulation which he accepts is wider and he can make a more complete response.

In the highest types of mystical experience, the emotions and sentiments which have a local and organic import play an unimportant rôle. The sense that the accidental and adventitious aspect of life has receded is much stronger, and the mystic sees whatever it is as it really is. Thus his attitude-adjustment is the most plastic, neither a set emotion nor an intellectual formula can damage the wholeness and the integrity of his experience. His mind responds more freely, more fully, more finely to all possible situations than the ordinary mind. Hence the supreme place and function of religion in human life, for it is from religion that the ordinary person obtains his mode and pattern of responses.

All forms of imaginative experience, song or dance, magic or ritual, seek to order or fulfil some system of impulses not ordinarily in adjustment within itself or adjusted to the world. Each of these induces an attitude or elicits a form of behaviour indispensable for life and its expansion. The development of the arts shows that song or decoration, myth or observance spring from man's imaginings in hours of a great joy or grief, an upheaval of the emotions, in critical situations, which lead to the organization of the individual's attitude and experience.

There thus follows a new response based on a new ordering of the impulses, and this reacts upon the rest of the organization of the individual. A more delicate adjustment or blending of impulses in any one field tends to promote it in others, inducing a feeling of increased competence and command of life. Secondly, the evolution of the arts follows a general trend. A great deal of epic poetry, massive art or primitive religion is content with the full ordered development of comparatively special and limited experiences with a definite emotion. The maturer forms of poetry, art, and religion, are built out of impulses and interests which no longer run in the same direction. Opposed and discordant sets of impulses here blend together. Man's responses in higher forms of imaginative experience bring into play far more of his personality than is possible in experiences of a more defined emotion.

In lower forms of religion the harmony of impulses is only partial and the cult or ritual exhibits the natural expression of the dominant urges. This explains not only the multiplicity of spirits but also their transient character in primitive religion. Thus the primitive conception of spirits is far different from the religious conception of a soul or spirit of mature peoples. The spirits are ascribed to an infinite number of objects and situations which draw together a group of impulses. Thus tools and implements, plants and animals, whatever centre round the life-interests, attract a group of impulses and elicit an affectionate and sympathetic regard, and the primitive man shifts his allegiance no sooner than he finds that a conflict has arisen between his daily routine of life and some feature of his environment. In higher religion it is discipline and elevated meditation which

bring about a complete blending of the urges and realizes a superior harmony. Thus in elevated mysticism the coalescence of impulses is the basis of an intuitive perception of Unity. There is, first, the ordering of the world into the unity of an idea. Secondly, the mystic does not merely conceive but realizes in sentiments and action the unity of life. Such is the distinction between philosophy and mysticism. In primitive mysticism, the conception of *mana* or spirit is extremely vague and confused though it underlies some sort of confused unity of life. Thus the *mana* is attributed to men and animals, to plants and even to inorganic objects. The primitive mind is less capable of broad generalisations and conceptual schemes, and yet the idea of unity emerges, though uncertain and ill-defined. In higher forms of mysticism the experience of an eternal mode of existence which

transcends space and time, and in which a final and complete unification is postulated is fundamental. Here the emotions are calm and subdued, the ecstasy is blank, and the conception of identity is clarified. In lower forms of mysticism, on the other hand, along with a blurred conception of unity of life, due to feebleness of abstraction or generalisation, the emotional excitement which the religious object elicits is more intense though unstable and erratic. The sense of mystery is here distributed among a vast number of spirits, each of which excite for the time being the greatest awe, reverence, and affection. Anything that is remote or mediate is disregarded; and the objects of worship are characteristically determined by the region and occupation, moulded by the original patterns set by the every day interests of life, or by the unusual experiences and situations.

THE VERIFICATION OF SOCIAL MEASUREMENTS INVOLVING SUBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATIONS

STUART A. RICE AND W. WALLACE WEAVER

THERE can be no doubt of the prestige possessed by quantitative methods in the minds of social scientists of the present generation. We are not concerned in the present paper with examining the causes of this prestige, with the advocacy or discouragement of measurement as a type of method, or with discussing its general limitations or possibilities in social science. Our purpose is to point out the inevitable subjectivism of a certain type of so-called measurement, and to present a partially developed technique for determining the extent of variations among separate investigators

who attempt to measure the same material. This technique relates, that is, to the problem of verification, and permits the calculation of a coefficient which will throw some light on the validity of the measurements.

As illustrative of the field of inquiry to which our argument relates, we have conducted an experiment in the measurement of newspaper content, employing the methods developed by Professor Malcolm M. Willey in his noteworthy study of the country press in Connecticut.¹

¹ Willey, *The Country Newspaper: A Study of Socialization and Newspaper Contents*.

Of numerous attempts to measure the content of newspapers, Willey's is the most thoroughgoing, and the most adequate in the perfection of technical method.

He has made every effort to achieve objectivity and he has covered an extensive range of newspaper material.² His work, in fact, represents the culmination of a series of experiments in newspaper measurement conducted for a number of years by students of Professor A. A. Tenney at Columbia University. Professor Willey had the advantage of building upon these earlier efforts, and he brought to his immediate task an intimate understanding of Connecticut journalism acquired by actual experience on a newspaper staff in that state.

The importance of the attempt to classify news has been widely recognized³ and requires little attention here. It rests upon the assumption that newspaper content is a reflection of the interests and attitudes of readers, or a stimulus thereof, or both. That is to say, measurements of news, if they can be scientifically made, are in effect measurements of one important type of "social force."⁴

Nor is it difficult to see the importance of measurements of other similar materials in which the same types of problems are encountered. Some analogous attempts with which we chance to be familiar may be mentioned: Mr. H. G. Loomer, one of our colleagues, has attempted to determine trends of interest among social workers over a period of several decades by classifying according to subjects the papers presented at successive annual

² Every country newspaper in the state during alternate months for one year.

³ Cf. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, pp. 61-63.

⁴ Professor Willey, in the book cited, has succeeded very effectively in showing the relationship of newspaper content to the socializing process and has thus brought the topic clearly into the realm of sociological inquiry.

meetings of the National Conference of Social Work.⁵ Mr. Howard Becker, another colleague, has arrived at some indications of trends of interest among American sociologists by classifying articles published in the *American Journal of Sociology*.⁶ For this purpose he employed the classification established some years ago by that publication for the arrangement of its abstracts of current literature. The development and use of this classification is itself a further illustration of the type of inquiry being cited. Professor Donald R. Young, also a colleague, has given considerable attention to the possibility of measurements of content of moving picture films.⁷

Still further afield from newspaper measurement, but nevertheless involving the same essential difficulties, are studies which require the classification of individuals according to social type, in which completely objective criteria are unavailable. An important illustration of this kind is the paper on parole violation by Professor Ernest Burgess, appearing elsewhere in *SOCIAL FORCES*, and there discussed by one of the present writers.⁸

In all of these inquiries, and others which they represent as types, the central purpose has been to replace subjective appraisals by objective measurement. For example, instead of estimating (subjectively) that a given newspaper "devotes half of its space to sensational news" Professor Willey seeks to give us a depend-

⁵ Unpublished.

⁶ Publication forthcoming in the *American Journal of Sociology*.

⁷ The project stage has not been reached. Cf. Young's *Motion Pictures, A Study in Social Legislation*.

⁸ "Is Prediction Feasible in Social Work? An Inquiry Based upon Sociological Study of Parole Records," by Ernest W. Burgess; "Some Inherent Difficulties in the Method of Prediction by Classification," by Stuart A. Rice. Vol. VII, 533-545, 554-558.

able percentage resulting from the application of a ruler. The actual scientific accomplishment of these various efforts, then, depends essentially upon the degree to which they are free from those same personal and subjective influences upon judgment which they were developed to remove. It is a cardinal principle of scientific method that its results should be verifiable. That is, the same results should be procurable by two or more competent investigators working independently under the same conditions; allowing, of course, for a margin of error. Two land surveyors should arrive, within reasonably narrow limits, at the same statement concerning the area of a field. Two diagnosticians should be able to start a patient toward the same general division of the hospital. Would another investigator be likely to give a parole violator the same personality classification as does Professor Burgess? Does Professor Willey's technique lead to a close correspondence between the measurements of the same newspapers obtained by different investigators? These questions are empirical. The answers are to be obtained by trying them out.

We will first describe the parts of Professor Willey's technique which pertain to our problem; second, we will examine some of the theoretical assumptions which underlie his procedure; next, we will present a technique of our own for measuring the amount of concurrence obtained by independent investigators in using his classification; lastly, we will present some results of using this technique by members of graduate classes at the University of Pennsylvania.

Professor Willey's method is simple in its main outlines. He classifies all printed matter exclusive of advertisements in the papers analyzed, placing each news item

in a single category. The classification is based upon "the what" contained in each item. He says:

"In the newspaper offices there is recognized in each story a feature known as 'the what.' This is the fact of chief concern; it is the detail or cluster of details that makes the editors believe the particular news story will be of interest to readers. It is the fact that is stressed in the opening paragraph of the account; hence it is oftentimes called 'the lead.' It is the fact or phase usually featured in the headlines. It is an invariable rule in newspaper writing that 'the what' should be placed in the first line or two of the first paragraph. If the news story is telling of a murder, murder ('the what') is stressed at the head of the column; if the fact is robbery, robbery must be introduced at the outset. The modern editor pushes his news tidbits to the fore. This is of tremendous importance and value in analyzing newspaper content, because it gives the basis upon which any item or news story can be assigned to its proper category. The procedure in classifying newspaper content is to ascertain 'the what' in each item, and upon the basis of this make the assignment of the item to the classification category."⁹

The system of categories that he has developed contains ten major headings and 49 minor or sub-categories into which the content of any newspaper may presumably be fitted.¹⁰ This classification includes, it may be noted, a major category of "miscellaneous" and a sub-category of "unclassifiable." The latter includes "items 'the what' of which cannot be determined, and the content of which does not make it possible to place definitely in any of the other categories."¹¹ In his Connecticut study, Willey ascertained the variations in the relative amount of space given to particular types of subject matter by different newspapers, and by the

⁹ *Op. cit.* pp. 32-35.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 134-141.

¹¹ Willey believed that the main structure of his classification will be found adequate for any analysis of newspaper content, if suitable subdivisions of categories be made to meet the purpose in hand.

same newspapers over different months of the year. This involved the establishment of norms among the papers included in his inquiry.¹²

Some of the theoretical difficulties underlying this procedure will now be examined: Unless we accept the position of the extreme behaviorists the essential entities in which social scientists are interested are subjective in character. Thus psychologists are interested in "intelligence" and social psychologists in "attitudes." Neither of these concepts are susceptible of direct measurement by any known means. Their existence is inferred from behavior to which, presumed, they give rise. Obversely, in measuring behavior the psychologist is ascertaining something concerning hypothetical subjective realities back of the behavior. He infers that these subjective entities are variable as between individuals because their behavior is variable, and he may even posit a mathematical curve expressing their presumed mode of variation.

The behavior measured in these cases, whether verbal or otherwise, is objective. By this is meant that it impinges upon and stimulates the investigator's sense receptors. The data appear to have their sources in objects (other persons) of the investigator's "outside world," and they reach him by means of such material agencies as light and sound waves. Moreover, the measuring process is objective. That is, the meaning given to the data for the purpose in hand, by a previously agreed-upon system of relation-

ships between sensations and their interpretation, is definite and precise. No room for personal judgment on the part of the mental tester need be left in the testing process, so long as all persons concerned understand and concur in this system of relationships. If the relationships between sensations and their subjective interpretation are not precise, on the other hand, the measuring process is no longer regarded as objective and becomes subjective. It is doubtful whether it should any longer be called a "measuring process."¹³

Now the news content of a newspaper, as data, is also objective. It reaches the individual's sense receptors by means of light waves. Moreover, the purpose in hand, and the relationships between the data and the interpretations placed upon them in reference to this purpose, may be such as to permit an objective measuring process. For example, Professor Niceforo has classified the epigrams of Martial according to their length and the odes of

¹² The distinction between "objective" and "subjective" is a difficult one, and our use of these terms is without pretense of epistemological system. We have been influenced by an interpretation given one of us by Professor E. L. Schaub, who kindly elaborated in a letter a viewpoint first presented in conversation. A part of this letter is as follows: "I ventured the question whether there is not a more fruitful way of conceiving 'objectivity' than the usual one which seeks to arrive at it by stripping off, or eliminating, or abstracting from certain phases of experience which are supposed to be 'subjective,' the aim being to get free from the 'personal equation' and everything attributable to the 'psychological' characteristics and the 'biases' of the experiencing or thinking individual. An alternative interpretation would construe as objective any element or fact that has found place in some more or less comprehensive, intelligible system of relations, the *degree* of objectivity depending upon the *comprehensiveness* of the system of relations. . . . Meaning and intelligibility constitute, for this point of view, the essence of 'objectivity.'"

¹³ As a result, country newspaper proprietors in that state have been able to ascertain the directions in which their own papers have been atypical with respect to others of the same general scope and with similar clientele. In a number of instances they have made adjustments in the emphasis given to certain types of news as a consequence.

Horace according to various criteria with respect to the strophes of each,¹⁴ developing a number of frequency distributions in each instance. These measurements are objective. Similarly, if it should be agreed that all news appearing on a newspaper page headed at the top by the word "Financial" is to be classified as "financial news," the measuring process is reduced to calibration, and is objective. But there is usually no agreed-upon relationship between newspaper items and the interpretations required for classification in one of Willey's categories. The meaning of a news item, for the purpose in hand, is not precise. It becomes a matter of opinion or judgment whether it should go in one category or another. When this is the case, the "measuring process" must be regarded as subjective.

For example, a certain newspaper story may refer to a lease by the American government of certain oil fields to a commercial interest. Whether I shall place this item under Willey's category one, "political news, domestic" or under his category eight, "industry, commerce, finance and transportation" seems to depend upon the significance which the item has for me individually. If I have previously been interested in the oil scandals at Washington and see in the present item a continuance of Republican policy which will give campaign material to the Democrats, the item will impress me as belonging in category one. If on the other hand my attention is centered on the effect which the new development will have upon the present competitive situation in the oil industry, and in the price of securities in the stock exchange, I will think of the news as primarily economic and place it

in category eight. The difficulties which this illustration presents are not dependent upon the particular items in Professor Willey's system of categories, but would appear in any similar system, however minutely it might be sub-divided, unless one were to resort to the unlimited number of classes involved in some system of combinations.

The distinction with which we are dealing is analogous to that between a "true-false" and an "essay" type examination. In the former the proposition which the student makes (i.e., "this is true" or "this is false") is limited to a form where it may be arbitrarily adjudged correct or incorrect. In the latter, the student's propositions fall within no prescribed forms, and must be graded by the instructor by some process of individual, that is subjective, appraisal.

The unreliability which attaches to the results of classification because of its subjectivism is in certain respects reduced, though not eliminated, when all of the work has been done by a single skilled investigator. This is clearly indicated by Willey's own study. We can assume that he employed the same subjective standards in measuring paper A as in measuring paper B. Comparisons between these papers therefore have validity, because we assume that the investigator's bias is a constant. The difficulty would arise should we attempt to compare a classification of paper A by one investigator with a classification of paper B by another. Or, to take a case which might arise, suppose another investigator should make a study similar to Willey's of the country press in Pennsylvania, and should attempt to compare the proportionate space devoted to certain types of news in this state with those which Willey found in Connecticut. The variations between

¹⁴ Alfredo Niceforo, *La Méthode Statistique et ses Applications aux Sciences Naturelles aux Sciences Sociales et à l'Art*, pp. 50, 78 and passim.

the two sets of measurements might not be due to actual differences in the newspaper content, but rather to the differing subjective standards of the two investigators with respect to the process of classification.

It will be evident, if this type of inquiry is to develop, that some means are required for determining the amount of variation between or among the results obtained by different investigators in classifying the same material. It may be assumed that investigators of American newspapers will have the same general cultural background with respect to social values and the same general familiarity with public affairs.¹⁵ If empirical tests indicate that such investigators can so familiarize themselves with a given technique as to arrive at measurements which, within a narrow range of error, may be treated comparatively, then cooperative labor becomes a possibility in situations where, on theoretical grounds, it seems unsafe to compare the results attained by more than a single investigator working independently.

The technical problem confronting us then is two-fold: First, may the variability among the class distributions of the same news items by different investigators be measured? Second, will the variation, if ascertained, be sufficiently low as to indicate the existence of comparability in their results, if applied to different material? In our endeavor to answer these questions the members of two graduate classes at the University of Pennsylvania were asked to classify a

series of newspapers in accordance with Willey's 49 categories.

The measures of variability in general use among statisticians did not, of themselves, seem adequate for our purpose. The *average deviation* (symbolized by A.D.) and the *standard deviation* (symbolized by σ) are both measures of dispersion from a single norm.¹⁶ Since the norm, or average, may itself be great or small, the size of deviations from this norm have comparative significance with reference to the size of the latter.¹⁷ Pearson, therefore, developed a *coefficient of variation* (symbolized by V) which expresses relative variability by relating any of the measures of absolute variability (such as A.D. or σ) to its respective average.¹⁸ But again,

¹⁶ Consult any standard textbook in statistics. The *average deviation* is the average of the deviations of individual measures in a series from a selected average of the series, the deviations being summed without respect to sign. The average, in both cases, is usually the *mean*, although any other average might be substituted. The *standard deviation* (σ) permits the summation of deviations algebraically, and consists of the square root of the arithmetic mean of the squares of the deviations from the average of the distribution. Or

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{\sum d^2}{N}}$$

where Σ represents "the sum of," N represents the total number of cases, and d represents an individual deviation from the average of the series.

¹⁷ For example, deviations from the average in the height of pine trees will be measured in terms of feet. Deviations from the average in the length of stem of buttercups will be in terms of inches. We cannot conclude therefrom, however, that pine trees are more variable in height than buttercups.

¹⁸ $V = \frac{100 \text{ A.D.}}{M}$, where M represents the Mean of the series. The standard deviation (σ) may be substituted for the Average Deviation (A.D.) in this formula, and any other average of the series might be substituted for the Mean. Cf. Rugg, Harold O., *Statistical Methods Applied to Education*, pp. 175 ff.

¹⁵ A similar assumption is made in intelligence testing, where it is recognized that the current accredited tests are inadequate to determine the comparative intelligence, for instance, of children with cultural backgrounds so diverse as those of the United States and native Africa.

this coefficient refers to dispersion from a single norm, whereas we were seeking a single composite coefficient of variation with respect to 49 mutually exclusive categories which together exhaust a constant total.¹⁹

It was in the latter fact that the difficulty of expressing the aggregate variation was found. Each single investigator was dealing in the case of each newspaper with a fixed number of inches of material. If a news item were classed by an investigator in one category, it was *not* classed in another. If it were taken from one category, thereby affecting the mean and the measure of deviation in that category, it was at the same time placed in another category, thereby likewise changing the mean and the measure of deviation in the second category as well. Not one of the 49 categories, in other words, could be assumed to vary in volume (as among individual investigators) independently of the variations among all of the other 48 categories.

A composite measure of variation should be directly responsive to changes in classification which decrease or increase the aggregate agreement among the investigators. That is, if one investigator reclassifies an item in such a manner as to decrease the total amount of agreement among a group of investigators, the coefficient of aggregate variation should increase *proportionately*. Conversely, if his reclassification should increase the total amount of agreement, the coefficient should decline proportionately. Coefficients of variation for each of the 49 separate categories are useful in comparing the ability of the investigators to reach

agreement as between individual categories. But they do not aid us, for example, in discovering whether the investigators as a group are in closer agreement in measuring today's paper than they were in measuring yesterday's. The conditions for a composite measure of variation are not fulfilled by a simple average of the 49 individual coefficients of variation, because the amount of material in the separate categories varies greatly, and reclassification of an item in one class would have greater proportionate influence in the composite coefficient than would reclassification of the same item in another class, the proportionate distribution in each by the several investigators being the same. If the coefficient of variation in each category be *weighted* by the mean of the category, however, and if the sum of these weighted coefficients be related to the sum of the means of the categories, we seem to have a measure which fulfills the required conditions. We will call this a *coefficient of aggregate variation* and give it the symbol V_A . Since the coefficients of variation of the individual categories are functions of their respective means, the calculation of V_A can be made directly by summing the average deviations and the means of the categories. Thus

$$V_A = \frac{\sum \left(M \frac{100 \text{ A.D.}}{M} \right)}{\sum M} = \frac{100 (\sum \text{A.D.})}{\sum M}$$

That is, *the coefficient of aggregate variation is equal to one hundred times the sum of the average deviations of the separate categories divided by the sum of the means of the separate categories*. Since the sum of the means will be a constant no matter what the distribution within the several categories may be, V_A will fluctuate up and down responsive to any increased or decreased

¹⁹ The total in inches is constant for each investigator. It is actually not constant among investigators, as variations were found here as well as in the distributions among categories.

variability in any one of the categories, and do so proportionately to the mean of the category. The transfer of an individual news item from one category to another may lower the coefficient of variation (V) of both categories, may raise it in both categories, or may lower it in one and raise it in the other. In any of these situations, the coefficient of aggregate variation (V_A) will reflect the importance of the reclassification with respect to the total amount of agreement among the investigators.

We feel that the first of our two technical problems, therefore, may be answered in the affirmative: the variability among the class distributions of the same news items by different investigators can be measured. We present next the experimental results already referred to.

The students of two graduate seminars in sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, both under the direction of Professor Rice, were set the task of measuring each of a series of five newspapers in accordance with Professor Willey's system of categories. The students numbered twenty-two. Of these, nine were instructors or assistants on the staff of the University. Several others were teachers and social workers in responsible positions. Of the five newspapers, three were daily editions of Philadelphia evening papers, one a daily edition of an evening paper in the smaller adjacent city of Camden, New Jersey, and one an edition of a suburban paper serving two residential communities outside of Philadelphia, but within the metropolitan area. Each student was provided with a detailed description of the Willey categories, reproduced from the appendix of his Connecticut study, and the newspapers were distributed at weekly intervals. A discussion

of the problems which arose was held at the end of each week.²⁰

In addition, Professor Willey kindly coöperated in the experiment by measuring papers numbers one, three and four, in order to afford a basis for comparison. No quantitative computations of deviations from his measurements by the group were made, but his marked copies served as a guide in answering certain questions which arose with reference to the technique.

The five papers distributed, the number of students measuring each, the mean of the total news space measured in column-inches, the average deviations from the mean and the coefficients of variation are shown in Table I.

In spite of the general high competence of the investigators participating, various gross errors were indicated on the reports submitted. The total number of inches of space reported gave a first check, and doubtful reports were checked over with the individuals concerned. That is, striking deviations from the mean total of column-inches seemed to indicate either an omission of certain material, the duplication of measurements, the inclusion of extraneous materials, or marked carelessness in some other direction. In one case where deviations were large it was

²⁰ The laborious nature of the task of measurement requires mention. A metropolitan newspaper is a bulky affair. This is shown in an interesting fashion by the Evening Bulletin of Philadelphia, which has published in book form the contents of a single day's issue of that paper, namely, the Night Extra Edition of June 4, 1928. "All advertising has been omitted. All else has been reproduced here, not in the size in which it appeared in the newspaper, but in a type and form normally used in books. Photographs and cartoon in most cases have been reduced in size. . . . Nothing has been added, nothing eliminated, except the advertising." Yet it required 307 octavo size book pages to print all the reading matter. Cf. *The Day*, Philadelphia, 1929, Bulletin Co.

found that a student had omitted one section of a paper. In another instance, measurements which were excessively high revealed that the student had used a ruler containing both centimeters and inches, confusing the two at times. Another student included advertising material in his first measurements. All such results were discarded in all calculations. It may be pointed out that in general the grand totals of each investigator agreed better on the last three papers than on the first two.

In tabulating the reports of the individual students, we found it necessary

persons who measured papers numbers two, three, four and five, and Group C includes five students who measured all papers. It was assumed that the *coefficients of aggregate variation* for Groups B and C would disclose any tendency toward improvement (decreased variation) in the course of the experiment. *Coefficients of variation from the mean* within each category $\left(\frac{100 \text{ A.D.}}{M}\right)$ were calculated for Group A for each paper, but were not calculated for Groups B and C. Table II presents for group A, and for each of a selected number of categories with large

TABLE I
SUMMARY OF MEASUREMENTS BY ALL STUDENTS

| NUMBER | NAME OF PAPER | NUMBER OF STUDENTS SUBMITTING REPORTS | MEAN OF TOTAL NEWS SPACE IN COLUMN INCHES | AVERAGE DEVIATION (A.D.) FROM MEAN OF TOTALS IN COLUMN INCHES | COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION (V) |
|--------|--|---------------------------------------|---|---|------------------------------|
| 1 | <i>Philadelphia Evening Ledger</i> , November 11, 1926 | 7 | 2,451.0 | 111.0 | 0.045 |
| 2 | <i>Philadelphia Evening Bulletin</i> , November 12, 1926 | 16 | 2,070.8 | 77.9 | 0.038 |
| 3 | <i>Philadelphia Evening Ledger</i> , November 19, 1926 | 17 | 2,657.3 | 70.4 | 0.026 |
| 4 | <i>Camden Courier</i> , November 30, 1926 | 18 | 1,674.6 | 34.9 | 0.021 |
| 5 | <i>Bala-Cynwyd News</i> , December 3, 1926 | 18 | 308.6 | 10.8 | 0.035 |

to recognize the fact that the members of the group were not constant from paper to paper. While calculations which included reports from the entire number of readers did provide a basis for comparing variability among news categories in any single newspaper, they did not give comparability with respect to the *coefficients of aggregate variation* as between newspapers. We therefore divided the readers into three groups. Group A contains the variable number of "all persons" submitting measurements in the case of each paper. Group B contains thirteen

deviations, the Mean in inches (M) the Average Deviation in inches (A.D.) and the Coefficient of Variation (V). Table III presents the corresponding data for a selected number of categories with low deviations.

A *coefficient of aggregate variation* was calculated for each paper in every group, according to the method previously described above. These are shown in Table IV.

An examination of data summarized in Tables II and III indicates that the most marked relative variability is found in the

TABLE II
SELECTED CATEGORIES WITH LARGE DEVIATIONS IN GROUP A

| CATEGORY: NUMBER AND TITLE | | PAPER NO. 1 | | | PAPER NO. 2 | | | PAPER NO. 3 | | | PAPER NO. 4 | | | PAPER NO. 5 | | |
|----------------------------|---------------|-------------|------|-------|-------------|------|-------|-------------|------|-------|-------------|------|-------|-------------|------|-------|
| Number | Title | M | A.D. | V | M | A.D. | V | M | A.D. | V | M | A.D. | V | M | A.D. | V |
| 6 | Political | 18.1 | 13.8 | 76.2 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 106.5 | 13.1 | 15.4 | 117.6 | 17.7 | 19.2 | 108.5 | 8.1 | 12.6 | 116.1 |
| 9 | Economic | 37.2 | 19.7 | 53.0 | 11.3 | 15.5 | 137.2 | 16.0 | 18.4 | 115.0 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 100.0 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 150.0 |
| 10 | Economic | 4.1 | 5.8 | 141.5 | 13.5 | 23.8 | 176.3 | 14.4 | 22.8 | 158.3 | 4.8 | 7.2 | 150.0 | 0.9 | 1.7 | 188.9 |
| 11 | Cultural | 33.1 | 7.3 | 22.1 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 115.0 | 19.9 | 13.6 | 68.3 | 5.1 | 5.8 | 113.7 | — | — | — |
| 13 | Cultural | 12.1 | 14.4 | 119.0 | 17.3 | 22.2 | 128.3 | 42.6 | 20.7 | 48.6 | 85.1 | 13.6 | 16.0 | 3.6 | 4.4 | 112.2 |
| 23 | Sensational | 34.4 | 16.8 | 48.8 | 6.0 | 7.5 | 125.0 | 9.3 | 11.1 | 119.4 | 12.6 | 14.1 | 111.9 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 160.0 |
| 27 | Sensational | — | — | — | 10.6 | 13.0 | 112.3 | 7.0 | 5.5 | 78.6 | 5.9 | 6.0 | 101.7 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 160.0 |
| 33 | Personal | 16.4 | 8.5 | 51.8 | 14.4 | 11.7 | 81.1 | 15.6 | 9.3 | 59.6 | 14.2 | 10.2 | 71.8 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 200.0 |
| 46 | Miscellaneous | 3.0 | 4.1 | 136.7 | 26.2 | 15.1 | 57.6 | 18.7 | 19.0 | 101.6 | 13.8 | 9.4 | 68.1 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 93.3 |

TABLE III
SELECTED CATEGORIES WITH LOW DEVIATIONS IN GROUP A

| CATEGORY: NUMBER AND TITLE | | PAPER NO. 1 | | | PAPER NO. 2 | | | PAPER NO. 3 | | | PAPER NO. 4 | | | PAPER NO. 5 | | |
|----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------|------|-------------|-------|------|-------------|-------|------|-------------|------|------|-------------|------|-------|
| Number | Title | M | A.D. | V | M | A.D. | V | M | A.D. | V | M | A.D. | V | M | A.D. | V |
| 8 | Economic | 639.8 | 149.9 | 23.4 | 196.2 | 34.0 | 17.3 | 330.3 | 78.9 | 23.9 | 43.5 | 38.1 | 87.6 | 26.9 | 8.6 | 31.0 |
| 21 | Sensational | 263.2 | 15.7 | 6.0 | 195.5 | 37.7 | 19.3 | 405.8 | 33.0 | 8.1 | 162.3 | 22.6 | 13.9 | 4.6 | 0.6 | 13.0 |
| 28 | Sporting | 260.5 | 19.7 | 7.6 | 213.7 | 30.2 | 14.1 | 345.2 | 37.0 | 10.7 | 295.6 | 36.4 | 12.3 | 87.4 | 8.5 | 9.7 |
| 32 | Personal | 151.9 | 20.7 | 13.6 | 143.6 | 35.0 | 24.4 | 116.3 | 38.9 | 33.4 | 143.9 | 45.7 | 31.8 | 30.5 | 6.9 | 22.6 |
| 42 | Magazine | 90.1 | 27.5 | 30.5 | 464.4 | 143.5 | 30.9 | 424.9 | 153.7 | 36.2 | 238.1 | 60.4 | 25.4 | 2.9 | 4.8 | 164.8 |
| 45 | Magazine | 200.4 | 57.3 | 28.6 | 230.0 | 111.8 | 48.6 | 283.6 | 107.2 | 37.8 | 87.1 | 60.1 | 69.0 | — | — | — |

categories with the smallest means while the smallest relative deviations are to be found in those categories with the largest means. It is probable that the lower variability in the categories with large means is due, in part, to the composite character of their content, which permits many of the variations which might be noted in a detailed statement to cancel out in combinations. Such an explanation certainly applies to category Eight into which most students have thrown almost the entire section on financial news and category Twenty-eight, in which the entire sporting section has been placed as a unit. There is seldom any evidence to

size of the mean in the case of large and small categories.

It was anticipated that there would be a progressive diminution in variability within the several groups with each succeeding paper. It was assumed that the discussion each week of the difficulties encountered would tend to bring about greater uniformity. The evidence on this matter contained in Table IV, however, is not wholly satisfactory. Groups A and C show a marked improvement between the first and second papers, but thereafter an opposite tendency, so that the greatest deviation appears in the final paper. This may be due in part to the smaller size of

TABLE IV
COEFFICIENTS OF AGGREGATE VARIATION FOR ALL PAPERS FOR GROUPS A, B, AND C

| GROUP | PAPER NO. 1, <i>Evening Ledger</i> | PAPER NO. 2, <i>Evening Bulletin</i> | PAPER NO. 3, <i>Evening Ledger</i> | PAPER NO. 4, <i>Comden Courier</i> | PAPER NO. 5, <i>Bala-Cynwyd News</i> |
|--|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| Group A—All readers of each paper..... | 26.41 (7 readers) | 38.74 (16 readers) | 34.34 (17 readers) | 40.08 (18 readers) | 47.31 (18 readers) |
| Group B—Thirteen readers of four papers..... | | 39.87 | 34.71 | 39.39 | 41.73 |
| Group C—Five readers of all five papers..... | 30.64 | 27.10 | 28.82 | 29.20 | 32.63 |

indicate a detailed analysis of the sports pages.

The high rates of deviation in the categories with low means may be explained in part by the fact that frequently no entries are made by one or more students for a given category, while others assign certain articles to those categories on the basis of different subjective attitudes. Strict comparability between the *coefficients of variation* in categories with large and small means, in fact, could only be secured if the number of separate items were in each case the same. That is, the average size of the individual news items would have to bear the same ratio to the

the latter, as it has been seen that small categories are accompanied by proportionately large relative deviations. Group B likewise reveals an improvement between the first and second paper for this group, with a subsequent progressive increase in variability. It may be that this result, contrary to the expectation, results from an increase in carelessness on the part of the readers, incident to the laborious and uninteresting nature of the task, once its novelty had passed. On this point consult footnote 20 above.

With these illustrative results before us, we next take up the second technical problem referred to above. Do the coeffi-

cients of aggregate variation have significance as indicators of the presence or absence of comparability in the work of separate analysts of different newspapers? First of all, at this point, we wish to reiterate that the question is essentially empirical. But our own findings are exceedingly meagre and the conditions under which we obtained them were inadequately controlled. We do not wish to draw conclusions from them. Nor have we been able to solve some of the theoretical questions involved.

Many indices of variable functions are useful for comparative purposes without providing a measure of comparison with the limits of possible variation. For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports *fluctuations* in employment, but cannot state the absolute number of unemployed. Psychologists have been perplexed by uncertainty concerning the "zero" of intelligence at one end of their scale of mental measurement, and its upper limit at the other. Our own perplexity is not altogether dissimilar. Our coefficients of aggregate variation seem useful comparatively, but they do not provide an uncertain answer to the question raised in the preceding paragraph, which seems to require knowledge, first, of the possible limits of variation of V_A , and, second, of the V_A which would be most probable on a chance distribution of news items among categories.

The possible lower limit of V_A is of course 0.0. The latter would represent the aggregate variation if all of the investigators placed exactly the same percentages of news space in each of the categories.²¹ There would then be no

deviations from the mean in the several categories, and the numerator in the equation for V_A would be 0.0.

The possible upper limit of this coefficient, however, varies with the number of investigators and, under certain conditions, with the number of categories. It appears to approach, but never under any circumstances to reach, an asymptote of 200.0.

The maximum possible amount of variation (or disagreement) is reached in any given case if each investigator classifies 100.0 per cent of the news in a category in which all other investigators classify 0.0 per cent. This condition may only be obtained when the number of categories is at least as numerous as the number of investigators. When this condition is met, and letting the number of investigators be symbolized by G , it has been observed that

$$\text{Upper limit } V_A = 100 \left(1 + \frac{G-2}{G} \right).$$

Thus,

- If $G = 2$, the upper limit of $V_A = 100.0$
- If $G = 3$, the upper limit of $V_A = 133.3$
- If $G = 4$, the upper limit of $V_A = 150.0$
- If $G = 5$, the upper limit of $V_A = 160.0$
- If $G = 6$, the upper limit of $V_A = 166.6$
- If $G = 10$, the upper limit of $V_A = 180.0$
- If $G = 100$, the upper limit of $V_A = 198.0$
- If $G = 1000$, the upper limit of $V_A = 199.8$, etc.

This raises the question whether, in our own findings for example, the coefficients of aggregate variation procured from a group of four investigators are comparable with those procured from a group of five. It is our opinion, since the upper limit of the possible range is wholly theoretical and not actually approached, and since, further, the difference in personnel of the two groups introduces variables of undefined character, that no greater error is

²¹ It would not be necessary for the same items to be classified in the same way by all, provided there were counterbalancing of items which would leave the percentages the same.

introduced when such a comparison is made.

If the number of categories were to be less than the number of investigators, the possible upper limit of the coefficient of aggregate variation would be reduced, as compared with its limit if the number of investigators remained the same, and the number of categories were equal or greater. The upper limit might then be considered as a function of two variables, the absolute number of investigators and the absolute number of categories.²² The equation which would represent the variable upper limit in this circumstance has not been developed.

Even greater perplexity attached to the rôle of chance in the distribution of news items by investigators among categories. Since a coefficient of 0.0 indicates complete "success," and since the upper limit of the coefficient would indicate a maximum degree of "failure," fully as improbable as maximum success, the *scale of relative success* should seemingly start from a V_A which would represent the most probable chance distribution of items and hence have a relative position of 0.0 (in the scale of "success"). The analogous theory of a "true-false" examination may again be cited for illustration: If a grade be given for all correct answers and no deduction be made for wrong answers, then the average student who "guesses" would be right half of the time, and start with an initial probable grade of 50 per cent, even though he knew nothing of the matters involved.²³ It is obviously fairer

to arrange the grading system in such a way that a grade of 50.0, representing the chance distribution of answers, (on the basis of marking named) will be counted as 0.0. The other end of the scale would of course be 100.0.

But in the case of newspaper measurement, the most probable distribution of items for each investigator would seem to be, in theory, one in which equal proportions of the total were placed in each category. Such a distribution, for all investigators, would result in a coefficient of aggregate variation of 0.0, which by definition we regard as maximum "success." In other words, the most probable distribution seems to be one in which all investigators agree, and the scale of "success" for which we were seeking seems to vary between 0.0 and 0.0! It is obvious that the degree of "success" (relative agreement in classification by investigators) cannot be deduced from the coefficient of aggregate variation by this line of reasoning, unless some more realistic interpretation be given to the concept of "chance distribution" for the present purpose. This we have been unable to do.

What we feel ourselves to have accomplished in this article, therefore, is to raise an important problem concerning a promising and growing field of research, and to suggest a partial means of dealing with it. We should welcome criticisms of our argument and further suggestions, especially from mathematically-minded readers.

²² But not the simple ratio between them.

²³ One of the present writers recently "took"

such an examination without being shown the questions. His "grade," on the system of marking just referred to, was 54.

WHY SYSTEMATIC ECONOMIC THEORY?

PAUL T. HOMAN

OF WHAT use is economic theory? Some such slightly despondent question almost inevitably occurs at some point in their studies to those who pursue economic studies sufficiently far to discover the range of warm disagreement between economists. To students of the other social sciences it must also occasionally present itself when, upon attempting to discover some succinct statement of the present state of economic thought and knowledge, they are confronted with a confusion of tongues.

Usefulness, in a subject with scientific pretensions, may mean either of two things. It may mean the service of a body of scientific knowledge in facilitating the accomplishment of certain external ends. Or it may have a purely intellectual meaning, with reference to those processes of thought and analysis whereby one is enabled to understand what would otherwise be unintelligible. There is a certain type of students of the social sciences which demands of knowledge that it be applicable to the amelioration of social conditions. It is quite likely, indeed, that most of us tend to lose interest in whatever lacks something of this instrumental quality. There seems, however, to be a proper priority for the task of understanding the structure of society and of the operation of the forces which play through its complex institutions. It is, indeed, difficult to see why the two views of usefulness should be other than complementary, since one's desire to "do something about" almost any social situation might be expected naturally to wait upon an adequate understanding of the situation.

Nevertheless, the alternative ideas of

"understanding" and of "controlling" social processes do present a rather subtle problem for the student of society, in the sense that they affect the *locus* from which he examines his data. The dilemma is one that does not submit to a definite solution, since the observer, wishing to achieve a position of scientific detachment, is incapable of physical or spiritual withdrawal from his social environment. It is nevertheless worth pointing out on two counts, first, that one may be explicitly conscious of the peculiarity which is inherent in contemporary social studies in contrast to other scientific disciplines, and, second, that one may be put in a position to mitigate so far as may be the influence of his own social bias, prejudices or traditions.

The dilemma presents other implications, not so much inherent in the social processes studied as brought to them in the interpretative thought of the student. Social processes may be regarded as operating by their own innate forces and according to their own laws, and as being beyond the range of conscious control, whereupon the student's task becomes that of observation and understanding only. Or these processes may be interpreted as the expression of relatively conscious social purposes, whereupon the control of means to ends may appear to be the principal subject-matter of the student of society. It is unnecessary to pursue these subtle questions of social interpretation further here. I have wished to introduce them merely to make plain what the particular intellectual task is with which economic theorists of the more orthodox sort are concerned. They are embarked upon a voyage of "under-

standing," in the sense of attempting a generalized statement of the operation of certain forces which are presumed to act with relative uniformity in animating our economic activities. But they are also engaged in a study of "control," in the sense of laying bare the elements of orderliness and mutual adjustment as they exist in our given society. They are not directly concerned with "control," in the sense of abetting a conscious re-ordering of economic institutions. But their findings may be regarded as a partial foundation for such re-ordering, to the extent that they make more intelligible the processes of our existing system.

The foregoing remarks will doubtless appear somewhat barren, until related to a more explicit definition of the type of economic theory which we propose to examine. Economic theory has a number of aspects and facets. The phrase is a general one which may include an interpretation of the development of institutions, and ramifies into the analysis of special topics such as taxation or money. We shall be concerned in the following discussion with that body of "general economic theory" which mainly comprises an analysis of price-relationships. The subject is one which merits a little careful thought, since "systems" of theory have in recent years been subject to extended criticism. They have undergone a variety of strictures, such as that they depend upon a hedonistic psychology, deal with a hypothetical and unreal competitive system, give an untenable mechanistic and automatic interpretation of the economic system, imply a reactionary blessing upon individual freedom and initiative, and so on. They survive, nevertheless, and one may profitably inquire into the uses which underlie their tenacious vitality, as well as into the limitations of their usefulness.

What is commonly called "systematic" theory—that is to say a body of principles or doctrines bound together in a logically congruous relationship to one another—has depended for its existence upon the initial assumption of certain institutional facts and uniformly acting economic forces, mainly in the field of human motivation, wherefrom it is possible to arrive, by a process of logical deduction, at a system of economic principles. Such principles are, in design, generalized statements of the relationships existing between various economic phenomena, as for example, between the quantity of money and the general price level, or between wage rates and the product of labor, or between human desires and the directions in which human energy is applied. In their totality they aspire to give expression to the total process of economic co-ordination.

Any intellectual "system" is constructed by logical processes. It is the element of rationality, of the logical congruity of each part with every other, that constitutes the systematic quality. In this a system of economic theory is in no sense different from a system of philosophy or of ethics or of mathematics. Whether the result of systematic analysis shall be the discovery of elusive truths plainly depends upon two things, the correctness of the initial assumptions and the accuracy of the subsequent logical processes. There are, for example, systems of philosophy entirely unassailable on the side of their internal integrity which are nevertheless unconvincing because of the undemonstrable character of their assumptions. What differentiates a "scientific" system from a merely speculative one is the existence of adequate evidence to support the initial assumptions.

The necessity for a set of initial assumptions constitutes at once the weakness and

the strength of systematic economic theory. On the one hand the assumptions may be of a somewhat arbitrary character, they are of necessity incomplete in the sense of being abstracted from concrete reality, and they almost necessarily reflect the personal view of the theorist with regard to general economic categories and relationships. On the other hand the construction of a system of economic doctrines demands a very careful creation and use of economic concepts. No aspect of economic analysis is more important than the general concepts used. Such concepts are not arrived at by a deductive process, nor do they spring full-blown, by special inspiration, into the mind of the economist. They emerge as the result of reflection upon concrete phenomena, and are acceptable in the degree that they crystallize to the mind's satisfaction the common quality of numerous separate phenomena. Thus, no economist can make progress without a capital-concept. Individuals disagree over what is the best capital-concept. The fact, however, that any single economist must have one and carry it consistently through his entire system is conducive to its careful definition in the first instance. That another economist may have a somewhat different concept is not evidence of the fruitlessness of the creation of concepts. It may better be supposed to represent a healthy attempt to construct adequate conceptual tools for the analysis of recalcitrant and complex data.

There has been in recent years a good deal of criticism of systematic economic theory on the grounds, not merely of the diversity of the concepts used, but of the incorrectness or unreality of the initial assumptions. There is an element of strength for the theorist, against such criticism, that his assumptions must stand the test of expert inspection, and his in-

fluence will be regulated by their ability to undergo such inspection. In other words, no system of theory can achieve any intellectual importance unless its postulates are convincing to a great many critical minds. I need not repeat here what I have said elsewhere concerning the modes of thought which led to differences of opinion concerning what constitutes a satisfactory conceptual apparatus for analyzing contemporary economic phenomena. It should, however, be pointed out that the complexity of the concrete data is a conditioning cause, and that no economist whose concepts and postulates are not closely, or plausibly, related to the data can secure a following.

The fundamental institutional postulate of systematic economic theory has been the relative freedom of individuals in pursuing and spending their incomes, in producing and disposing of their valuable goods and services, under the aegis of a juridical system which protects them in their possession of property. Such, briefly, is the meaning of "the competitive system." The general analytical problem which emerges from this view of economic relationships is that of explaining how, without external or superior coercion or regimentation, an orderly system of producing and distributing goods is maintained, how economic energy is allocated, how money incomes are determined. The appearance of orderliness creates a presumption of uniformly operating forces, mutually limiting and regulating the operation of one another. Thus the central preoccupation of systematic theory comes to be the determination of the conditions of economic equilibrium, a concept imported from physical science because of its seeming applicability to the operation of economic forces.

When it becomes necessary to examine the forces at work in an economic

order, the primary axiom is that they are the forces of human motivation. In this sense, any systematic theory is "psychological" theory, whatever the customary tag. What makes it possible to derive a logically congruous body of economic generalization from human motives, working under conditions of personal freedom and of the limited resources of nature's provision, is the assumption that these motives respond in a fairly uniform way to the opportunities for personal gain. To prefer the greater gain to the lesser, the lesser effort to the greater, whether the concepts be psychic or pecuniary, is the essence of the idea of a personal "economy," and the idea of a social "economy" may be derived from the aggregation of such individual "economies" operating within a given set of "rules of the game." The usual system of economic theory is thus essentially a type of rationalism, wherein the rational quality is that of the individuals concerned. I know of no way in which a system of theory running in terms of economic equilibrium can be constructed except upon a basis of individualistic rationalism.

No economist, however orthodox in his methods of analysis, really believes in the existence of the ideal situation of freedom and rational choice which his system of theory crystallizes. At the most, he will only claim that these conditions sufficiently predominate in our present economic order to furnish the basic explanation of the general fact of the orderly operation of an undirected economic order, and the basic explanation of economic phenomena in detail, such as commodity prices, rates of wages and interest, the allocation of economic effort, and the size and character of business organizations. Such generalized explanations, it is conceived, can then be amended

or corrected in specific problems of analysis by allowance for circumstances not included in the premises, such as influences leading to monopoly, special cases of bargaining strength or weakness, elements of coercion, defects of knowledge, intelligence, and foresight, and the like.

The aim of systematic theory is scientific generalization,—a generalized statement of the inter-relations of economic phenomena, a generalized tracing of economic results back to the forces which conditioned or "caused" them.

What is likely to cause workers in the other social sciences to look askance at systematic economics is the fact that it proceeds on the basis of social concepts that are not familiar or acceptable to them, and by methods not available to them. At an earlier period those branches of "social philosophy" which derive from Utilitarianism attained a certain unity by reason of that common point of reference. Systems of ethics, politics, economics, and law, all based upon the idea of an individualistic rationalism which was identical with social rationalism, attained a high degree of unity and congruity. The present social sciences have, however, put a tremendous gap between themselves and such types of social philosophy. Such remote philosophical roots as they still possess run more to such sources as Comte or Hegel or "historism." But in general their conceptual apparatus is the fruit of the era of evolutionary theory. Their concern is with the more organic phases of social structure, and with social processes of an essentially organic character. The mechanical concept of equilibrium, which stands at the center of systematic economic theory, is not only foreign to their manner of apprehending social data, but is liable to violate their most fundamental tenets as to the nature of a social group. Like economists, they

may attempt to arrive at generalized statements of their conclusions, but they do not arrive at "doctrines," nor create "systems," by methods of logical deductions. Like economists, they are concerned with the psychological aspects of their data, since they are concerned with human beings, but their psychology includes usually a smaller element of rationalism. Like economists, they are concerned with social organization and social processes, but they do not mean by social processes aggregated individual lines of action. Such processes are to them at once more vague, more general, more organic, and the individuals concerned are less important and more decisively the creatures of their social environment.

In contrasting economists with other social scientists, it should be said that a considerable number of economists are committed to the more organic and functional view of society and to a less rationalistic psychology, some of them to the point of denying the possibility of a valid rational system of economics. Even those economists who are known for their systematic theory have mostly shaken off any general mechanistic theory of society. They understand quite well that many social studies can best be forwarded in an orientation of evolutionary preconceptions, or in the light of the principle of function. Their defense of their method is primarily that in economic relations they are furnished with a unit of measurement, money, not available to other social scientists, that money furnishes the basis for an economic rationalism, and that in fact economic activity proceeds to a very large degree upon the plane of the rational pursuit of money incomes. Or if, as some economists prefer, the attempt is made to go back of the money denominator to the presumably

more fundamental plane of the pursuit of psychic income, it may plausibly be presumed that in a society of free individuals choices are made on the principle of "economy" with the aid of the monetary unit of measurement. One thereby provides a psychological base for the external equilibrium of money prices. Adding to this the belief that competition, in the sense of individual freedom of action, is a very real and relatively ubiquitous regulator of economic activity, economists may feel that an accurate development of the rationale of self-interest in somewhat mechanistic terms is a necessary avenue to an understanding of many aspects of our "going" economic order.

The force of this position is best seen when one attempts to visualize the problem of economic analysis in the absence of such methods. One alternative point of view is that represented by Veblen, wherein man's economic activities are presented as mainly of an habitual sort, proximately prescribed by prevailing institutions, more remotely resting upon an instinctive basis. The human reason is relegated to a subordinate position, as a mere tool for the pursuit of ends of an irrational character within institutions having no rational basis. The subject of study is a blind evolutionary process. Another point of view is the assumption of a social rationalism wherein the realization of certain social purposes is conceived to be the directing aim in social organization and social processes. Economic processes are subjected to inspection for the purpose of discovering the degree to which they promote the realization of rational social ends. On this plane analysis runs in terms of a purposive evolutionary process.

Again, it is possible to suppose that the accumulation of concrete data, descriptive and statistical in character, is the most

fruitful approach to the proper understanding of economic relationships. Undoubtedly this method will extend our knowledge, but to be intellectually manageable it must of necessity be interpreted and generalized, and vitalized by a determination of the forces at work. "Processes" must be added to a knowledge of "organization." Clearly, it is possible to support the superior scientific possibilities of drawing one's conclusions from accumulated data, rather than by deductive logic from over simplified postulates. But the clear-cut distinction between apparently different methods becomes dimmed when it is recalled that the systematic method has no validity except as the postulates are themselves permissible generalized interpretations of the concrete phases of economic organization and motivation.

One can easily get himself so badly wound up in these questions of scientific method that the temptation is to throw up the hands in defeat. The sense of intellectual despair is the outcome of supposing that there is *a* correct method for the scientific analysis of economic data. A more hopeful mood follows the realization that *any* method is germane which throws light upon the economic scene, and that there is *no* method which has any exclusive power to accomplish that end. In other words, there is no short and royal route to becoming an intelligent thinker upon economic subjects. The necessary apprenticeship involves a study of the diverse methods of analyzing social data. It necessitates the attainment of a proper "feel" for social processes, which can arise only from intimate contacts with "life" as well as from a generous knowledge of social theory and social history and social organization. An economic theorist can hardly be trained by the mere study of economics. His apprehen-

sion of the nature of his task will be changed and enlarged as he sees what knowledge is accruing and what methods are being used in such fields as demography, anthropology, and jurisprudence. Of necessity he must understand the canons of scientific knowledge as they are understood in other fields than his own. And he can well afford to be aware of the processes of thought as they are displayed in psychology and philosophy.

It will naturally be complained that I am merely setting up the impossible ideal, that to be properly trained for any intellectual task one's mind should encompass all knowledge. I have no such futile ambition for any one, for myself least of all. There persists, nevertheless, the necessity for a varied background against which to focus any particular area of social analysis. It is not that one need make any direct use of all this varied knowledge, but rather that he will have a more accurate apprehension of his materials and his task, and a wider assortment of ideas wherewith to work.

The realization of the sterility which is apt to overtake a subject like economic theory when it fails to fertilize itself from other fields of knowledge is an aspect of the recent general interest which social scientists have been taking in one another's work. The principal objection entered against recent systematic economic theory is that it is the attenuated and enfeebled offspring of a process of inbreeding within the field of economics, the frail contemporary child of an outworn tradition.

Before approving that indictment, it is well to ask where one would be if deprived of his stock of systematic theory, how much better or how much poorer would be his ability to carry on as an economist. It is my opinion that if such a test be applied with candor, the continued

necessity for systematic economics will become sufficiently evident. The nature of its service should be equally plain. It affords a method of reducing to manageable intellectual proportions a statement of the relationships subsisting between a very complicated array of economic phenomena and forces. And it furnishes a technique for the analysis of a great variety of special questions.

The question of course arises whether it is scientific generalization or metaphysical self-delusion to simplify what is not simple and to reason about what is illogical. It is a mere unjustified counsel of despair to reject the possibility of generalization. And it is to put beyond one's reach the analysis of many economic subjects if one ceases to reason about them. The question really is not *whether* one shall attempt to achieve a systematic statement of economic inter-relationships, but *how far* such an attempt can be carried, and *what place* such a statement shall occupy in the general body of economic knowledge. As the systematic statement becomes simple, clear-cut, and integrated, the more it must rely upon simplified psychological and institutional postulates. The more numerous and serious become the exceptions taken to its conclusions, the more numerous become the facts not covered by it, and the more seriously it will violate one's general view of the nature of the social organization and processes. As the statement becomes less completely integrated, more inclusive of stray facts, more vague in outline, it may very well impress one as more true to the actual situation, and at some point on this line of increasing looseness as most helpful to the understanding.

Plainly, between the clear-cut systematization of economic doctrines and the other extreme of unsystematized data there is going to be no statement which

will afford general satisfaction. Different minds will see varied excellences in different statements. The important thing is that the statement have the quality of illuminating the relationships held in view, and that it violate no fundamental knowledge of other social relationships.

I do not mean to ally myself to an uncritical eclecticism. On the contrary, I consider it most important that economic theory be subjected to the most critical inspection, to uncover all its implications. But the recent biased condemnation of "systems" seems to require a re-examination of their uses. No system can make me believe that all prices are the outcome of competitive forces, but I am enlightened by a contemplation of the logic of competition. I do not consider society a mechanism, but I am prepared to examine the extent to which economic phenomena are amenable to analysis in mechanical terms. I do not think "equilibrium" a proper concept for most analysis of social facts, but I can apply it to price phenomena for the light that it there sheds. Throughout the whole realm of price-relationships, a considerable degree of systematization is required merely in order to clear the ground for an orderly examination of special questions like taxation or banking policy. Were one, for example, to examine the effects of the export-debenture plan of farm relief without a systematic statement of economic relationships in his mind, he would have to invent one before he could make much progress.

The great danger connected with the use of systematic theory is that it presents a subtle influence toward inferring the nature of social processes from the outlines of the theory. The outcome is a quite untenable mechanistic view of social processes. A high degree of mental sophistication is required to grasp, and firmly hold to, the idea that such theory

is an intellectual instrument of a highly artificial character, wherewith to reduce highly complex facts and forces to a statement sufficiently simple to permit an integrated view of economic relationships and to forward the examination of more detailed facts.

The idea is by now thoroughly buried that systematic economic theory *is* economic science, and that the rest of economic studies are applied economics or economic history. And one can equally well dispense with the contrary notion that quantitative and descriptive studies are scientific, while systematic theory is intellectual speculation. It is possible, indeed, to do quite well without most of the controversies over method and most of the discussion of the scientific aim of economics. We have an established order through which provision is made for the wants of the members of society and into which their efforts are turned. Its process of becoming throws light upon its present operation. In a general way, it submits to systematic analysis upon the plane of the pricing process. In detail, it presents aspects which do not dovetail into the systematic analysis and require special examination with specialized techniques. In essential character, it becomes merged in a larger social process. But within that larger process, the economic game is played under rules which are amenable to analysis and understanding.

Moreover, the analysis of the economic order can proceed upon several different planes. It can be approached on the

psychic plane of human motivation, or the commodity plane of the production and distribution of useful goods, or the pecuniary plane of money prices and incomes, or the ethical plane of its provision of the material conditions of the "good life" for the members of the community. It can be looked at from the angle of individuals pursuing their several ends, or from that of a society having its functional needs. It can be examined in relative isolation, or against a complete social background. It can be approached from the angle of any social philosophy and be interpreted by analogy to several scientific disciplines.

The economist's particular task is the illumination of the manner of its working, and analysis of its possibilities and potentialities as it is or as it may become. All is germane which contributes to that end. All is foreign which blocks understanding and creates intellectual *impassees*. Used with discrimination and a proper understanding of its nature and limitations, applied not for the discovery of "laws" but as an aid to the illumination of complex facts and relationships, systematic theory constitutes an indispensable tool of the economist's craft. This is not the less true because economic theorists have no avenue of escape from what may be called "the economist's dilemma," the fact that they must resort to quasi-mechanistic methods for the analysis of certain aspects of the life of a society which they do not believe to be a mechanism.

MENTAL HYGIENE IN THE COLLEGE AND THE UNIVERSITY

ERNEST R. GROVES

MENTAL hygiene has a large place in the modern college and university. This is not because mental disease is rampant among the students in the institutions of higher learning, but on account of the responsibility that the college and university have as possible distributors of mental hygiene principles. Such institutions may rightly be expected to practice in their administration and instruction the principles of mental hygiene. To a large extent also they have under their guidance during four or more impressionable years potential leaders who need to be, both for their own happiness and welfare and for the good of those whom they are likely to influence in later life, familiar with the teachings of mental hygiene.

Although the records show that mental disease is uncommon in the college population and breakdowns rare, when serious mental abnormalities do appear they often prove costly experiences for the institution, which obtains much undeserved notoriety and frequently serious criticism. In no place is mental disorder so likely to be misinterpreted. The press still insists in holding over-study responsible for suicide and expressions of insanity although the scientist knows that there is no connection between the two. The situation in the colleges is similar to that in industry. Young men and women who are basically unsound, when transferred from the relatively easier environment of the secondary school, because of the new demands put upon them and also because of their advancement in age, are brought to a testing which causes their basic unsoundness to appear in a serious form

that announces the onset of some sort of nervous malady. Such students are unequal to the competition and pressure of a college environment, just as they would be marked for disaster were they to enter some other undertaking where greater maturity and application than that of their high school period would be demanded of them. Since the college represents a high selection of desirable types and an environment unusually wholesome, it furnishes as favorable a situation for youth as can be found, but it cannot give to the basically unsound the special treatment and consideration they need.

Mental Hygiene and Preparation for Life. The college and university assume the task of preparing the student for life. They are more than lecture halls. Youth comes to them with the expectation that he shall be better prepared to cope with life as a result of his investment of precious years. The college takes its intellectual responsibilities seriously. It is concerned with standards and insists upon the student's progress in the accumulation of credits. Unfortunately this emphasis upon the passing of courses often leads to neglect of the emotional life of the student. Only the unusual teacher gives much thought to the inner life of his students and the administration also is apt to neglect the emotional aspect of the student's life until some outward conduct that involves discipline forces attention.

There is an exaggerated emphasis upon the value of intellectual achievement in the college as a method of preparing for life. As a consequence students drift through the college and even the uni-

versity without gaining any substantial insight into personal problems. If the instructor notices idiosyncrasy in the student he seldom brings it to the latter's attention and more rarely does he make any constructive effort to straighten out what may be a serious kink in the personality of the young man or woman. When the time for graduation appears the multitude of youth have made little substantial emotional growth and almost none as the result of any intentional specific planning on the part of the institution. Nevertheless, education of the right sort does lead to emotional maturity and does become a protecting influence against psychopathic trends. This fact is well brought out by a term we use for the special treatment given those suffering from a mild type of mental disorder. In the vocabulary of the psychiatrist this treatment is known as "re-education." Had there been in such cases proper education at the start, a reconstruction of character would seldom have become necessary. Anyone who has served on college administration committees knows how often troublesome or peculiar students are discussed and reference is made to characteristics that the mental hygienist would recognize as neurotic trends. Pity is expressed, but seldom does anyone suggest that the college has an obligation to assist the student in ridding himself of qualities that are bound to limit his success as soon as he graduates from the institution.

More is involved in the task of emotionally maturing the student than merely his own happiness. Intellectual achievement means power, but it does not insure judgment, or, by itself, establish wholesome attitudes toward one's fellows. Unless the emotions are disciplined intellectual power like any other may be turned to unsocial ends driven by the force of

abnormal cravings, the results of a childish character. Perhaps nothing at present so limits the usefulness of the colleges as their neglect of the emotional life of their students.

The Need of Mental Hygiene in the College.

The college has need of mental hygiene because its various activities require every help that science can give that will increase success. Since the institution brings youth together in close contact, attempts to instruct them, and assumes a responsibility for their discipline, it especially needs the contributions that mental hygiene can make to these different interests. It is, however, only when we think of the final product of the college, its graduates, that we see fully the importance of mental hygiene. This was forcefully brought out by an article entitled "Mental Hygiene and the College Student Twenty Years After," written anonymously.¹ In the effort to discover just how much mental hygiene is needed in the American College, the graduate investigated the career of his classmates a generation after leaving the institution. Of one-fourth he knew practically nothing so he left them out of the investigation. Of the three-fourths whose careers he had been able to follow in detail he discovered that about forty per cent had since graduation shown signs of neurotic, psychoneurotic, or even psychotic difficulties. Among this number were two-thirds of those who were admitted to Phi Beta Kappa and this group included also the most serious cases of mental and nervous diseases. Of the seventeen per cent that had died, two thirds gave evidence of some degree of neurotic difficulties. One death was a suicide. There was nothing in the college history of this class to indicate that it was a particularly

¹ See *Mental Hygiene*, October 1921, pp. 736-40.

psychopathic group of young people, indeed its reputation was that of a rather commonplace class. The author briefly summarizes the careers of some of those who met with disaster after graduation and the following examples are impressive:

A. One of the ablest members of the class, who received not only the highest marks for scholarship, but also the highest office in the gift of the student body. This individual, an only child of New England extraction, was, it appeared later, of a markedly, though long latent, manic-depressive constitution, and after achieving considerable success in a professional field, succumbed some fifteen years after graduation to this increasingly emerging and menacing type of disease. A long course of psychoanalysis resulted in marked improvement and the diminution of the frequency and severity of the alternations of the emotional states, but the prognosis has never been considered very favorable by the psychiatrist in charge of the case.

B. Perhaps the most brilliant member of the class, who subsequently attained to the rank of a college professor. The patient's career in two colleges was terminated by the onset of depressions, the first mild and lasting for only about six months, the second severe and involving two years of treatment in hospitals for nervous and mental diseases. Since the latest episode a few years ago, the uncongenial profession of teaching, in which success was attained at such immense cost of vitality, has been succeeded by research work, for which this individual is eminently adapted.²

Of course there is no way of telling just how much mental hygiene could have done for these individuals when they were in college, but if preventive work is possible in the field of mental disease surely such a record as this justifies the mental hygiene program in the college.

Opportunity for Mental Hygiene. The colleges and universities offer an unusually favorable opportunity for mental hygiene. Not only are the students highly selected, representing, on the whole, the more promising graduates of the high schools, but the situation on the college campus gives the mental hygienist an advantage

over those who work in industry or in private practice. Ordinarily the patient scatters his life over many contacts of which the specialist can, for the most part, have little information. It is true that to meet this difficulty the psychiatric social worker is called upon and she frequently can supply the needed data. Even with this information the complete picture of the individual is ordinarily not so easy to make as it is when the college student is being investigated. His life is largely expressed on the campus where it can be observed in its various aspects in detail and with a definiteness difficult to obtain elsewhere. The specialist if he so desires can have easy conference with other men or women who intimately know the student in the classroom, in sport, or in the lighter social experiences.

In most up-to-date colleges also the medical department can be called upon to supply necessary information regarding the physical conditions of the patient who appears to be in need of psychiatric assistance. A better opportunity to know the patient intimately without bringing him into the atmosphere of an institution devoted entirely to the handling of psychopathic disorder can hardly be imagined. Thus the college and university setting not only challenges mental hygiene, but provides an experiment station and an opportunity for demonstration exceeded only by the possibilities of the family and the grade schools where the earlier age of the child gives preventive work greater promise.

Forms of Adjustment Difficulty. The college furnishes its own peculiar types of social strain. It helps in the understanding of the problems of mental hygiene in the college to distinguish these, but they must not be thought of as unrelated, for it is seldom that any one alone is the explanation of a personal maladjustment.

² *Op. cit.*

1. Many college students have not been away from home for any length of time before they enter college. Possibly this is a mistaken policy on the part of parents who might well prepare for the ordeal by permitting the child to have a few days away from home, spent in travel or in visiting relatives. But only the thoughtful parent is likely to see the need of this, and thus it happens that most young people when they go to college experience for the first time the pangs of homesickness.

Not only must the ties of home be broken, but the environment itself requires new adaptation. It is larger than the high school from which the student has come and less personal. For the first time the young man or woman may be thrown among strangers. The instruction is different and the standards are higher and may seem more exacting than they really are to the new student.

It is true that at present most colleges make special effort to help the freshmen at the beginning of their courses. This very effort, unless wisely handled, often adds to the bewilderment of the student, who is rapidly introduced to many features of college life in the effort to help him get adjusted, and makes him feel less secure than if he were given a more gradual approach to his new activities. Whether he is labored with at the beginning by a special faculty organization created to orient him to college life or left alone, he must change some of his habits and become conscious of others as has never been true before. He may, for example, for the first time have to become accustomed to cooking very different from that of his mother. He may be surprisingly disturbed by the boarding house fare. Although there is frequent rationalization in regard to this, those experienced with college students realize how difficult the new food adjustment often is.

2. Demands are put upon the young person for self-direction to an extent that makes college experience something unique. Of course, the more responsibility he has been given by his parents and former teachers, the easier it is for him to make the adjustment. The mere fact that he changes from living with his family to a dormitory existence throws upon him the necessity of making decisions that were previously merely a part of household routine. If he seeks advice regarding the more important decisions he has to make, he must turn to persons whom he has not long known, of whose interest he may not be so confident as he was of his parents' and former friends'.

It is found in practice that the time schedule is a very persistent problem that comes up when the mental hygienist deals with concrete difficulties. The student is not trained to make proper use of time which appears so abundant when he first comes in contact with what seems to be a widespread leisure. It is folly for the faculty to complain when the freshman does not know how to study or to use his time with profit. Just because of these immaturities has he come to college; this training in the use of time it is the business of the college to provide.

3. Competition and self-esteem are sources of much trouble among college youth. No one deals much with youth in any environment without appreciating how significant in their life is the problem of self-esteem. The very fact that the student has entered college proves that he has had a degree of success in his high school. Frequently he has been an outstanding student and has received a good deal of distinction, in sports, in study, or in general popularity. Thrown into the new environment, one of the first efforts of the young person is to estimate his standing and if possible to win back the position

that he had in the high school which he feels he has lost. His ambition may concentrate on any one of four interests: scholarship, athletics, fraternities, and, in case of the girl especially, popularity expressed in dates. Along whatever line he struggles for self-esteem he finds new competition. Not only must he contend against his own classmates, but under the over-shadowing of the upper classes.

The prestige of the fraternity is not only great but maintained by having a proportion of the student body left out of membership. This immediately creates for the fraternity an artificial value which the student easily exaggerates. There is hardly any place about which more tragedy centers for the freshman than the question, Will he make a fraternity? Social popularity, as expressed in dates with members of the opposite sex also has a prominent place in the problems of the college student. Denied such association, he or she may come to have a sense of inferiority. On the other hand if opportunity is provided the temptation to use it extravagantly results not merely from the strength of sex attraction, but may come even more from the desire to build up social reputation and satisfy self-esteem.

4. Growth also brings for the college student a great deal of difficulty. The college environment often forces rapid growth where gradual change would bring little disturbance. When the student has come from a narrow religious home or community these difficulties of adjustment are multiplied and the immediate effect of growth may be painful. The trouble is usually rooted in the fact that parents have not made possible the child's growth beyond their own ideas without a moral struggle due to the feeling of the young person that any departure from what has been taught him is treason against love and a letting down

of standards. These unnecessary struggles, due to faulty preparation in the family, create a moral risk and explain the sudden change in characteristics sometimes found in college students. The mental hygienist is interested in such an experience because it represents an emotional crisis.

5. The problem of sex comes to the adolescent whatever his environment and cannot be prevented from entering the college campus. Indeed there are many circumstances which bring it to the front. The freedom that the new environment permits, the contacts which lead to the rehearsal of experiences by the more sophisticated, the new instruction which frequently seems to the student to be sapping his moral ideas because they have been built upon traditions out of accord with the ideas he is given in his college courses all add to his confusion in dealing with personal problems of sex. If the college is one that is exclusively for men or for women the very artificiality of such a segregation during the late adolescent period stimulates and distorts sex. The co-educational institution, however, does not escape its problems. Although the constant contact of the young men and women provides a more normal environment, the very freedom of association makes it all the more irksome for some to give proper attention to study the value of which seems remote in comparison with the immediate and compelling interest that the young man or woman feels for some member of the opposite sex. Since success in college demands self-discipline the opportunity for maladjustment is present. Even the most healthy association of young men and women cannot eliminate problems that are caused by the postponement of marriage for the purpose of getting an education.

The Program of Mental Hygiene. The

chief purpose of the mental hygiene movement in the college is prevention. It undertakes to lessen the failures of the college students especially in meeting the tests of their environment. It also of course attempts to do everything possible to detect those who are candidates for later neurotic experiences and if possible to keep them from developing their morbid tendencies.

Next to the preventive part of the program comes the handling of adjustment difficulties. Mental hygiene takes over the emotional problems so largely neglected by conventional college courses and endeavors to help the student develop wholesomeness in his own inner reactions to life. This involves more than merely showing the student how he can more wisely meet any present difficulty, for effort is made also to help the student get the insight which not only will assist him in meeting immediate maladjustments, but will enable him also to have that understanding of himself which will insure a happy and useful life. This part of the mental hygiene movement is directly concerned with the growth of the student who must go forward and bring into accord his intellectual advance and his emotional attitude. Mental hygiene by giving insight to the student also enables him to estimate more correctly the resources he has for his undertakings in life. This makes possible greater success in his life after graduation. It also contributes to his later happiness since misinterpretation of one's own equipment for life is a prolific root of trouble for most people.

If it is thought of as an annex rather than an integral part of the institution, the mental hygiene program is more difficult to carry out successfully. Surely nothing in college has a better right to be considered educational than the use of science in dealing with problems of

personality. It is merely its newness that makes it seem to some an addition rather than an organic part of the function of the institution.

Mental Hygiene and Admission to College. Since the college can give no one an adequate preparation for life if it stresses only intellectual achievements, no admission to college should ever be based entirely upon the credits obtained at the high school. There are always among those who present themselves for entrance some who, in spite of good grades, are unfit to enter upon a college career. Others there are who have chosen the wrong institution and for them there must be loss of time and energy if they are not directed to the kind of college that can serve them best. Still others need special counsel if their college career is to prove successful. Thus at the very time of entrance, problems that are essentially related to mental hygiene often arise and therefore admission to college should never be a mere mechanical routine. Questions can be asked and information gathered of great value to the psychiatrist who wishes to discover as early as possible those whom he can especially help. If the emotional preparation were entered upon in somewhat the same fashion that the colleges now concern themselves with intellectual attainments, mental hygiene would be able to prevent a considerable number of the tragedies that result from students going to college when they should not, or entering the wrong college, or starting wrongly a career that without proper insight they cannot prosecute successfully. Mental hygiene will not eliminate from the start all the problems that the college brings forth, but it will reduce them to the minimum.

Mental Hygiene Lectures. There is a consensus of opinion at present that one of the most useful undertakings of the

department of mental hygiene in college has to do with lectures which bring to the students in an understandable form the principles they need in mapping out their college course so as to get from it the greatest values possible. Regarding the question when these lectures ought to be given and what should be their content there is not the same unanimity of judgment. Some believe that the lectures should come early, at least during the freshman year, that the student may have the benefit of them from the start, while others would depend more upon conferences as a means of helping the freshmen and would develop more serious and mature courses best adapted to seniors who are just about to leave the institution. Probably the most efficient program combines these two, giving an introductory course early in the freshman year, while later, preferably in the senior year, a more substantial and advanced course is offered. The first surely should be required of all students; in order to maintain a sympathetic interest among students it might be preferable to have the latter course elective. In determining this, however, consideration must be made of the general policy of the institution, since requiring the advanced course would not seem coercive to seniors accustomed to little freedom of selection.

There appears to be general agreement among those who have had experience in giving courses in mental hygiene in colleges that the first course especially should center about the common problems of the students. They should be interested first in difficulties near at hand and through these experiences should come to have a grasp of the principles of the science. It has been found by many teachers an advantage to have the student write out his life history. This not only helps the student to get greater insight

and an ability to treat more objectively his own personal difficulties, but it also brings to the notice of the instructor individuals who seem most to need special counsel. The instructor of experience is quick to detect those who show morbid trends. It is most important that the elementary course in mental hygiene be protected from the stigma of dealing essentially with mental diseases. It is not difficult for the instructor to appeal to a morbid interest in a certain type of student to the disgust of the more healthy minded members of his class. I have seen this perversion brought about by an instructor who thought himself in accord with mental hygiene. It is only fair to say that he was not a psychiatrist. Indeed, he had come to have a psychopathic reputation himself among psychiatrists of the city, because they had in several instances treated patients who had been hurt by the teaching received in his classes. The well-qualified instructor will steer clearly away from any emphasis of the morbid especially in the first course in mental hygiene. In the more advanced work the student can be expected to have the background which will make it safe to use clinic cases, if such can be had, to illustrate various types of mental abnormality.

In no instruction does more depend upon the character and good sense of the teacher. Mental hygiene courses are worse than useless if they are impracticable or presented in such a form as to make it next to impossible for the uninitiated student to understand what is being talked about. The instructor must have the gift of transferring highly technical material to a simple vocabulary. Nothing will spoil the mental hygiene program sooner than instruction teeming with technical jargon.

The institution that is not prepared to

organize a mental hygiene program with a full-time psychiatric specialist is not justified in not offering any mental hygiene instruction. Some institutions that are not in position to employ a full-time worker—and indeed if all colleges were ready for such psychiatric work their demands at present could not be met because of lack of competent instructors—have with good results brought to the student body outside lecturers especially gifted in presenting in a popular way the principles of mental hygiene. In other institutions some one connected with the psychological department or with biology has built up an efficient course that has been essentially instruction in mental hygiene. Rarely the same work has been done by some one connected with the department of sociology. Sometimes there has been a combination of outside lecturers and an allied course taught by some member of the faculty whose specialty was intimately related to the field of mental hygiene.

Personal Conferences. The most important part of mental hygiene work in the colleges centers about the personal conferences with students. Young people are quick to realize that their difficulties need to be treated concretely and they are surprisingly eager to get assistance. Whether there is a definite mental hygiene program or not, in all colleges the students seek counsel and naturally gravitate toward some member of the faculty from whom they get sympathy and understanding. It is extremely important that this counseling be done by those who have the experience and background that justify the giving of advice.

The present policy of many institutions of higher learning to distribute students so that each member of the faculty becomes an adviser for several young people is utterly formal and fruitless and even at

times mischievous. College instructors are not trained counsellors and it is fair criticism to say of many of them that they are not well prepared to counsel young people except with regard to the most trivial matters. No one can give good counsel who is not well acquainted with modern science in its application to problems of human nature. He needs familiarity with the usable materials of psychology, sociology, and psychiatry. He especially needs the background which will make it possible to detect problems outside his province and to know to whom they rightly belong. It is true that the majority of problems presented by young people to those from whom they choose to take counsel belong within the field of what we would call normal social life, and it is a pity from the point of view of the welfare of his science that the sociologist so rarely takes an interest in the concrete maladjustments that would be brought to him in quantity were he prepared to deal with them. Many psychologists also are neglectful of their opportunity but in every sizable department of psychology there is usually some one whom the students seek for insight and advice. However competent the psychiatrist may be and however responsive the students to his offer of counsel, it must be recognized that students always seek other faculty members as well as the psychiatrist. If this relieves the latter of minor problems, it proves an advantage that is exceedingly necessary to anyone who gives serious counsel, but the faculty adviser must be ready to steer immediately to the specialist in mental hygiene students who seem to need special assistance. When intimate contact is maintained between these faculty members that students go to for first aid and the department of mental hygiene, the latter deals not only with the cases that come directly to

it for help, but also with those that are sent to the specialist for counsel adequate to their needs. Were it possible to force all students to go to the mental hygiene specialist for advice the burden presented by such a conference program would be excessive, for the social problems that arise in the college environment are many, ranging from the most trivial to the most serious, but it is imperative that any faculty member to whom students have easy access shall be thoroughly in sympathy with the mental hygiene movement and eager to turn over to the specialist any problem that appears to be serious in character.

Mental Hygiene and the Faculty. To make mental hygiene successful in college and university there is need of the faculty's coöperation, and this means that the administrative and teaching staffs have sympathy with the purposes of mental hygiene. They must also have some understanding of its methods and a confidence that will make them quick to take advantage of its resources just as soon as they come in contact with a case that needs the expert. To bring about this working arrangement some educational effort must be made to enlighten the faculty as to the value of mental hygiene. It is unreasonable to assume that the teaching force made up of specialists in fields far away from the science of human affairs will all have understanding of or interest in the mental hygiene movement. Most of them have spent nearly all their life in scholarship which has taken them away from familiar problems of everyday life and given them to some extent a detached attitude toward personal problems. Indeed some of them are definitely psychopathic themselves and their entire career including their profession has been influenced by morbid trends which from time to time appear even in their instruction.

Speaking from experience, I know that some of the difficulties that appear in the student body are actually brought about by morbid suggestions of psychopathic teachers or result from the unbalanced behavior of such instructors who have authority without discretion. Probably every college administrator has persistent problems arising as a consequence of the unadjusted life of some professor whose brilliancy has carried him on to a life appointment but who has never been well adapted to the teaching of young people on account of emotional handicaps. It is seldom that such a personality can be changed, since any suggestion that would lead to better adjustment appears as criticism and is resented at once. Fortunately the great majority of any faculty are healthy-minded men and women, who, although busy with their own affairs, are willing to take a reasonable interest in any effort to conserve the welfare of their students. It is from these instructors that the mental hygiene specialist must expect his greatest assistance in discovering the problems of students and also in handling them with success.

One of the best ways of interesting the faculty is to invite men of national reputation gifted in the interpretation of the principles of mental hygiene to speak at a faculty meeting. In the past I have been so fortunate as to make it possible for the faculties of which I was a member to hear such national leaders in mental hygiene as Frankwood Williams, William A. White, Abraham Myerson, George K. Pratt, and others. The response in each instance was immediate and direct. Again and again members of the faculty told me in confidence that they had dealt differently with a student problem in their class on account of what they had heard at the lecture. Requests were also made for reading material, the more progressive instructors realizing that familiarity with

mental hygiene would prove an aid to them in dealing with their classes in the ordinary routine of instruction.

These requests often came from scientists in other fields who wanted to gain familiarity with mental hygiene for its advantage in their own work. In my own consultation work I have had many requests from my colleagues who felt the need of assistance in dealing either with their own personal problems or that of members of their family and I have in certain instances been able to direct these individuals, when their problems were clearly outside the field of ordinary social adjustment, to the mental hygiene specialist that seemed best fitted to help them.

As mental hygiene makes greater progress in letting its resources be known there is every reason to suppose that persons who are well trained will seek the specialist in mental and social problems just as now they have become accustomed to go to the doctor as soon as they realize the need of information regarding problems of health. Dr. Frankwood Williams tells of a faculty member of national reputation who was convinced of his mental abnormality, and was persuaded to go quietly to a sanitarium for treatment. As a result he came back to his institution to go on with his work which otherwise would have been spoiled by a nervous breakdown, clearly inevitable unless he obtained outside assistance. Since the faculty exercises authority, it is extremely important that it be made as wholesome-minded as possible for even one badly adjusted faculty member can stir up an enormous amount of trouble in any college.

The Problems of the College Student. What are the problems that the college students bring to the department of mental hygiene? This question can be answered from

experience. Dr. Riggs and Dr. Terhune report that from their record the following have been the most common problems among the Vassar women.

. . . discouragement, depression, living on a poor schedule or none at all, below par physically, bored, dissatisfied, pain, love affair, infringements of rules or good taste, fear, too dependent, homesickness, low intelligence, acute grief, low cultural level, narrow interests, poor work, cheating, lack of purpose, suicidal or talked of suicide, sex difficulties, difficult home life, fear of mental disorder, carrying too heavy an academic schedule, working long hours, religious difficulties, financial strain, sleep-walking, nightmares, and stammering.³

Dr. Thompson gives us a general classification that brings out the type of problem experienced by the Yale student. The following table permits us to see the physical condition of these men.

| | Per cent |
|--|-----------------|
| Frank mental disorder which includes mostly depressing and neurotic reactions..... | 45 |
| Scholastic difficulties..... | 25 |
| Sex problems..... | 15 |
| Personality problems..... | 15 ⁴ |

Some interesting statistics come to us as a result of the work of Dr. S. J. Smith. From 1924 to 1926 three hundred male students sought assistance. They came from the following sources:

| | |
|---------------------------|------------------|
| General dispensary..... | 198 |
| Infirmary wards..... | 21 |
| President's office..... | 3 |
| Dean of men..... | 14 |
| Other deans..... | 5 |
| Heads of departments..... | 5 |
| Berkeley police..... | 3 |
| Voluntarily..... | 51 |
| | 300 ⁵ |

³ "The Mental Health of College Women," *Mental Hygiene*, July, 1928.

⁴ Dr. L. J. Thompson, "Mental Hygiene in a University," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, May 1929, p. 1051.

⁵ Psychiatry and University Men," *Mental Hygiene*, January 1928, p. 40.

These three hundred men represented the following classes:

| | |
|--------------------|-----------------|
| Freshmen..... | 81 |
| Sophomores..... | 82 |
| Juniors..... | 68 |
| Seniors..... | 49 |
| Postgraduates..... | 20 ⁶ |

Their problems roughly classified were as follows:

| | Number of cases | Average age |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Maladjustment..... | 84 | 22 |
| Sex..... | 58 | 21 |
| Hysteria..... | 15 | 23 |
| Neurasthenia..... | 21 | 24 |
| Psychasthenia..... | 12 | 22 |
| Anxiety neurosis..... | 5 | 23 |
| Traumatic psychoneurosis..... | 11 | 21 |
| Intellectual inferiority..... | 11 | 21 |
| Psychopathic personality..... | 10 | 22 |
| Disorder of ductless gland..... | 15 | 19 |
| Neurological disorder..... | 24 | 20 |
| Psychosis..... | 24 | 23 |
| Unclassified..... | 10 | 28 |
| Total..... | 300 | 21.7 ⁷ |

In this work of Dr. Smith at the University of California, twenty-four neurological cases were given the following diagnosis:

| Diagnosis | cases |
|-----------------------------------|-------|
| Epilepsy..... | 10 |
| Brain tumor..... | 1* |
| Multiple sclerosis..... | 2 |
| Progressive muscular atrophy..... | 1 |
| Friedreich's ataxia..... | 1 |
| Peripheral neuritis..... | 2 |
| Migraine..... | 4 |
| Encephalitis..... | 3 |

* Diagnosis questionable.⁸

Problems of Sex. The average college student is in the period when sex most often creates mental disturbance. As has been suggested already this is due in part to the postponement of marriage and in part to the segregation characteristic of

the institution that is exclusively for men or for women. The environment, however, does not account for the appearance of sex difficulties, since in many cases the individual was destined to have trouble in his late adolescence. In these instances the trouble harks back to the family training. Moralizing proves to be an ineffective way of helping the average college student who faces concrete sex difficulties. The usual result of forcing a moral issue without giving insight is concealment and mental conflict and despair on the part of the student who needs help. In no experience is it so important that simple, definite, and constructive information be furnished the student in a way that will instill confidence which will help him to use all his energy in straightening out his difficulty. As would be expected masturbation, at least in the male college, is one of the common problems of sex. Kerns reports that at West Point autoeroticism is the one sex problem that stands out above all the others. This is probably in part, as he suggests, the result of the limited social contacts possible at the military academy.⁹ Smith also finds at the University of California that masturbation is a common sex problem. He reports that the improvement of the student concerned with this difficulty is usually reassuring, but, on the other hand, the distinctly homosexual problems are much more difficult to bring to a successful issue.¹⁰ Unquestionably the students now at college are better prepared to cope with sex than their predecessors, due to franker attitudes, clearer understanding, and for many a better preparation in their early life than was generally true a generation

⁹ Harry N. Kerns, "Management of Acute Mental-Hygiene Problems Found Among College Men," *Mental Hygiene*, April, 1925.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

ago. Nevertheless, it is one thing to understand sex, and another to cope with it. It is the artificiality of the student's life, his removal from his family, and his postponement of marriage that explain in large measure the various types of sex strain that are felt by the students who are free from psychopathic trends.

Problems of Self-esteem. The atmosphere of the college is one that challenges self-esteem. From every quarter the student has hurled at him preachment, warning, and inspiration designed to stir up his ambitions and make him feel the need of exerting himself to the uttermost. Much of this is standardized to the requirement of the loafer—the irresponsible and insensitive type of student. Its effect upon the more imaginative and sensitive is often to exaggerate wholesome ambition, leading to overconfidence in one's equipment or a discounting of one's actual resources. Parents urge the student to maintain the same standard in the college that he did in the high school while from the administrative office suggestions often come to the faculty members that they conform in their grades to a standardized curve that assumes a certain proportion of low marks and even possibly of failures. Thus the student is urged to maintain good scholarship and the faculty is expected to restrict high marks to a small proportion of all the marks given to students in the course. Sometimes the institution even goes so far as to demand that the instructor report his grades according to a pre-determined distribution of credit. Thus instead of emphasizing efficiency in instruction the institution mechanizes the entire procedure and the student is asked to struggle for what only a limited proportion of the students can actually attain. The orator who visits the campus is forever inciting students to distinction by making it ap-

pear that it is a moral fault not to obtain high places of authority and reputation. The average student if he is at all sensitive, especially if he has had marked success in the smaller environment of the high school, has everything set to develop inferiority feeling leading to depression and even at times to thoughts of suicide.

Suicide Problems. The suicide of a college student is always first page news. There is hardly any social occurrence that the general public is more likely to misinterpret. Nearly always there is an underground feeling among those who know of the suicide that the institution was in some way at fault; that it was putting too much strain upon the young life. This belief is encouraged often by the letters that the suicide leaves behind in which he puts upon something other than his own emotion the responsibility for his contemplated act. The scientist knows that most suicides are not the result of any objective situation, but a product of the distorted personality. The desire to end everything by self-imposed death is usually a fleeting, although while it lasts an almost irresistible, obsession. Thus it follows that if the person contemplating suicide comes under the oversight of an experienced psychiatrist he may be led out of the gloom into which he will never again retreat. This, of course, is not true of those who are chronically depressed as the victims of some serious mental disease. Although many of the threats of suicide have no significance since they represent mere talk, it is never safe to assume that this will be the case, for sometimes the student who has again and again announced his intention of committing suicide, without anything happening, finally under sudden impulse ends his life. The pity of many college suicides is the ease with which the

student could have been brought out of his depression, if only at the right time he had come in contact with some discerning person. Once the black curtain that seems entirely to surround him is thrown back he becomes free. A college suicide has not only pathos, but usually a great quantity of morbid suggestion. Frequently the very atmosphere of the college life seems suddenly to change and a thick shadow spreads itself over all the activities of the institution. In addition to the suffering and morbid reactions that accompany the suicide, we have the distressing notoriety which the institution receives from the indiscriminating. It follows that, although the suicide is not a major problem for mental hygiene in college, every time an incipient suicide is detected and wisely handled much has been done for the college welfare.

Mental Hygiene and Vocational Guidance. The more seriously colleges undertake to give the necessary guidance that the students have a right to expect in the shaping of their future careers, the more stress it is found necessary to put upon the emotional life of the students seeking counsel. Thus mental hygiene aids in the intelligent choosing of one's life profession. When the institution supports a bureau for vocational counselling it is important that it function in close fellowship with the department of mental hygiene.

College Discipline. A large proportion of the discipline problems that are carried to administrative committees or handled by deans issue from mental or social maladjustment. The college radical and the individual who is always heckling against authority are frequently the product of inferiority feeling, produced by an autocratic parent who made the child hostile to every thought of regulation. Chronic disturbers of the college peace as

these individuals are, they often have much promise if only they can become free from emotional conflict and able to make constructive use of their opportunities. Even stealing, lying, and cheating when dealt with by the specialist in mental hygiene have been found not to be so much an expression of immorality as the coming forth through a subterranean channel of disorganized impulses, the product of an emotional conflict. It is doubtful whether any serious case of discipline should ever be treated without the final decision being made in the light of mental hygiene. Although the college psychiatrist cannot wisely be made the institutional judge, rendering verdicts when offenders come up for discipline, there are many reasons why his assistance should be sought whenever any serious case for discipline arises on the campus.

The Limits of Mental Hygiene. Indispensable as mental hygiene is in the modern progressive institution of higher learning, it is disastrous when the value of its work is exaggerated. The mental hygiene department cannot afford to crusade or promise too much. Immodesty on the part of those who direct such activities in the college shows a lack of judgment that is a bad prophesy for a long-time successful program. No mental hygiene department, however efficient, can prevent all occurrences of maladjustment. Sometimes those in charge of mental hygiene work in the colleges feel the need of being saved from the exaggerations of enthusiasts. Sentiment is always ready to gather about any new thing, and the American easily turns to fads. Mental hygiene represents a serious effort of preventive science. It necessarily works with caution and puts forth modest claims for itself. The greatest exaggeration of its service comes not from those in charge of the work but from the supporters who

find in mental hygiene something resembling a new religion.

Mental Hygiene Progress in the College. Mental hygiene offers the college a much needed resource, and as time reveals more clearly the value of its contribution it will surely come to be a necessary part of every well equipped institution for higher learning. It is the only constructive effort made to deal with the emotional life of the youth who are seeking superior training for the responsibilities of life. It is too early to lay down in any rigid fashion the line of progress that mental hygiene will follow in its attempt to serve young life. The American is more inclined than ever to look to education as

the efficient means of advancing social life. As soon as science cut underneath the intellectual level, it began to deal with the emotional content of personality. It was inevitable that a movement should develop to apply such information as we have for increasing the happiness of both the individual and the group. Once such an undertaking started it enlisted the interest of those responsible for college management, who, of all people, have the best reason for realizing the seriousness of emotional maladjustment. Mental hygiene is so needed in the college that it needs only to demonstrate its usefulness to be widely welcomed as a modern educational asset.

OPPORTUNITY IN THE MODERN WORLD

WALTER G. BEACH

MANKIND has always asked for opportunity. Through it comes life; character is conditioned by it; capacity is stimulated or limited by its presence or absence. Men have fought for it, prayed for it, lied for it, committed crime for it. And it has been thought of as a matter of luck or chance, without reason in it, to be obtained as one might stumble upon hidden treasure. But underneath all the folly and wretchedness which characterize the struggle for it, lies the dimly-realized truth that only by giving the mind free play, through leisure and the materials of workmanship, can it grow and expand; and only by giving to life itself at least the minimum materials for its development, does it reach out to the great possibilities which give it worth and meaning. Herein lies the key to the modern scene.

I

The first and most usual conception of opportunity is that it is some aspect or gift of nature. Natural resources give to man the material basis of life, and the richer these resources, the richer is man's opportunity. This way of thinking about opportunity has had its completest expression in and through the discovery and occupation of America by the peoples of Europe. It has been a common thought, voiced by many an observer, that our country has been "a land of opportunity." This idea is the result of two facts. One is the vast abundance of nature's gift to man in this "New World." The other is the comparative freedom from interference in possessing her, which was granted to men of all ranks. At the opening of the nineteenth century the older world had

reached a condition in which nature seemed no longer adequate for the needs of population. Nature, it was thought, is the maker of opportunity; and if nature's resources be denied to great groups of men, only misery can follow. It seemed a great moment in the world's life, therefore, when it came to be understood that here in America was a place in which nature was almost untouched, and in which men of all classes might equally escape the restraints upon liberty which old world traditions had built up through ages of class struggle, and so might enter equally and without interference upon the enjoyment of nature's gifts. The vigorous young republic foresaw for its people intellectual liberty, freedom from political tyranny, and a vast territory of undeveloped resources. To its mind, in the main, opportunity was material, and it must be said that such has been and probably still is its meaning in America. Opportunity is thought to mean vast acres of untouched soil and gigantic forests. It means coal and iron and copper and gold and silver. It means great rivers and magnificent harbors. In a word, it means nature, bountiful and lavish, pouring forth her gifts and asking only that man should be willing to receive. So true is it that this was the chief thought in the minds of men that the very existence of such limitless material wealth blinded them to the fact that there could be anything else to struggle for. If America was a happy country it was because nature was kind. If America was a home and "shelter for the oppressed millions of Europe," it was due to the fact that there was free and productive soil waiting for the toiler. There was an abundance for men of all classes and every rank, and there need be no clash of interests. All that men asked for was to be let alone, and this was our ideal of liberty and opportunity.

And so we marched across the continent, absorbing and appropriating. Over the Alleghanies and on to the Mississippi went the stream of population; up to the Great Lakes and down to the Gulf. Then step by step the march led over the plains to the Rocky Mountains, from whose summits the great procession looked down upon a new land of promise blessed by the waters of the Pacific. History has never recorded so marvellous a journey, so matchless a progress of mankind to inherit the earth and to seize its golden gifts. The peasant of Europe became the freeholder of America, and the epic poem of this triumphant march is America's song of victory for the individual. It seemed to rest only with the individual whether he should go forward or not. The very abundance of natural resources solved all difficulties. Apparently one need trust only in his individual strength, and nature would reward his efforts. This is the first stage in the development of opportunity in America.

But it is a common observation that we have reached a new stage in our development. The virgin soil has been put to service. Rivers and harbors have been utilized; the mineral deposits of nature have been appropriated by the individual; the vast forests have passed into the hands of owners. It is not that nature is any less generous than of old, but she has been appropriated and often exploited. We have therefore reached that point in our life when the individual can no longer count upon economic welfare simply because of a scant population in the midst of boundless natural resources. There is still an abundance of land and other means of life. There is no acute pressure of population exceeding the productive powers of the soil. But population has greatly increased and the land is no longer free nor easy to acquire. America faces

a condition in which she must ask whether she is to lose the name and glory of a land of opportunity open to men of every rank. The door of opportunity through free nature is gone. Is there no remedy?

II

Opportunity is something greater than a transient thing, and so it must depend on something other than the individual exploitation of nature. *Opportunity rests permanently, not on bare nature and unrestrained individual freedom to exploit her, but upon social organization and the law which expresses social organization.* And since social action rests upon social organization, it may be briefly stated that opportunity is determined by social organization. Moreover social organization as a form of control over men usually is embodied in law. Law is the expression and result of the ideas which characterize social organization, as far as economic and political life is concerned, and the terms law and social organization may for some purposes be used interchangeably, depending upon whether emphasis is to be laid upon the nature of the social organization or upon its result in the form of social control through law. The purpose of this discussion may therefore be stated as an effort to show that human opportunity depends primarily not upon nature as such, but upon social organization and law.

It is hardly necessary to suggest that not all organization and law are preservative of opportunity. Indeed the law arising out of organization as we find it today is often of such a character as to make possible the exhaustion of nature's resources and to restrict the growth of individual life. We have come through an era of "individual law," which simply defines the limits within which the individual may move without restraint. It is negative rather than positive; it is

regulative, but not constructive; it is individual, not social. Its expectation is to protect individual from individual in using nature even to the point of her exhaustion. But there has been little thought of preserving nature or of organizing her opportunities. Nor has there been a conception of a social whole for which organization and law must stand, rather than for the isolated individual. That is, the idea of "society"—the associated community life—has had little or no recognition nor understanding. Instead, law has been based upon the thought of "individuals in conflict" and nature as the object of the individual struggle. The individualist philosophy of the eighteenth century became embodied in the *laissez faire* economics of the nineteenth; and to this was added the biological concept (though misapplied) of the struggle for existence and the "survival of the fittest." Inevitably the conflict of man with man or of class with class displaces the concept of social unity and welfare; and inevitably, also, there could be no recognition of society as a unified life by which opportunity is organized and through which the individual lives and grows.

Such a form and type of negative law and organization was a natural result of older conditions. On the one hand, organization frequently has been simply an instrument of class or monarchic tyranny through which nature was seized and divided. And on the other, as in the English struggles for liberty which became embodied in law, it was to be expected that law expressing such hard-won rights should take the form of restraints upon governmental interference with the individual and permissive grants for individual activity within defined limits. What such a system of non-interference law may come to, may be

seen in the legally intrenched position of the modern corporation. Having come to occupy the legal position of an individual, it has entered into the right of action and freedom from interference of the individual. Clothed with the protection which the law, wrung from tyranny, gave to the individual against governmental interference, it now over-rides and destroys the individual, while it defies the interference of a new kind of government which stands for the common interests of society.

We have reached the inevitable result of such individualist organization, in a type of law which is occupied in defining individual titles and rights. The result is exploitation under regulation; it is individual aggression under the "rules of the game." It expresses the competitive-conflict attitude of man to man and is absolutely opposed to democratic co-operation for the common good.

Where such a type of organization and such an idea of society prevails, opportunity must dwindle and the conflict grow more bitter. Aggression becomes bolder and is less restrained by obedience to the law; and the further consequence is a reign, not of law, but of lawlessness. For lawlessness is but the extreme expression of action directed solely to individual ends. It results from trusting for opportunity simply to nature and individual effort. It is a necessary outcome of the failure to *organize nature for the sake of opportunity as a community or social need*. Common theft, robbery and other similar offenses are not essentially different in this respect from the individual or corporate appropriation of public lands and resources, or from corruption in government for private gain. In every case the idea of liberty is confused with the idea of the non-existence of control; nor is there any consciousness of social responsi-

bility, corporate disregard in this respect being usually the example for imitation by individual offenders, both young and old. "What we admire, we become," says Ruskin; and the force of imitation is so strong that, though a school house and a church be placed upon every corner, their teaching of the obligation or respect for law must be overcome by the force of continuous examples of lawless business aggression.

If this is the result of our non-interference type of organization and law, it is clear that it is a different law which is needed to form the basis of permanent opportunity. This may be called co-operative organization and law. It is constructive. It is representative, not directly of individuals, but of society as a whole. It recognizes the community life and interests, and it proposes to care for that life and its interests. We have as yet little of such organization devoted directly to society as a unit, and indirectly to the individual as a member of society. Though law is a social institution in its very nature, our law as yet does not greatly aim to protect social as distinct from individual interests. Social philosophy accepts the idea of the existence of society as such and the impossibility of the existence of individuals as separate atoms. But social organization and law are slow to follow and express this philosophy. And so while we have an abundance of individualist law, we have little constructive, co-operative law planned to represent the community as a whole.

And yet the dilemma must be faced. We cannot always escape the loss of natural opportunity as our fathers did, by moving on to new lands. Migration is but a temporary relief, and as new lands disappear we again face the old problem. The only permanent opportunity must come through such social organization as,

first, will conserve nature, not exploit her, and, second, will so relate men together as to result in the stimulation of discovery and invention and the limitation of population pressure through the raising of the standard of living. The restraint upon appropriation by the individual should no longer be a restraint of one individual in relation to another. It should rather be a restraint upon the individual in relation to and for the sake of the community or society as such. For permanent opportunity comes, not through nature directly, but through the social organization of nature and of accumulated knowledge about her in relation to human needs. Nature is not, after all, just so much land and water and coal and other resources; and it is only when she is seized and parcelled out that she is really definitely limited. If organized and conserved, in the main she enlarges her resources through revealing them, and thus spreads them over greater quantity and variety of life and its needs, affording an expanding and unending growth of opportunity. Opportunity is indefinite and well-nigh unlimited in quantity and kind. But it is not found; it is created. Knowledge, invention, the direction of human interests arising from the ceaselessly changing movement and organizing activities of society bring it into being or enlarge it and enrich it at one time and place, while at another restricting it or destroying it altogether. The opportunities of an era are the expression of a socially created energy and themselves are the test and the revealer of the society in which they arise. The Athenian society of the age of Pericles created opportunity for its citizens which Athenians of other ages—earlier and later—knew nothing of.

The meaning of socialized organization of nature and man and the relation of opportunity to it, may be seen in many

directions. In regard to material resources, it would aim to prevent individual monopoly in the interests of community use. Coal and water, forests and harbors, and the franchises of cities would be considered with reference to the needs of society as a whole. Already we are slowly feeling our way in this direction. So, too, we are trying to find new resources in nature through organized effort, as through scientific agriculture with its government bureaus and endowed laboratories; through irrigation measures; through chemical utilization of hitherto waste materials; and through new specializations and redistribution of minds in the study of nature.

But it is not only by the direct social utilization of natural resources that opportunity is thus secured. Social organization for the preservation of life and its prolongation looks in the same direction. The effort to improve the conditions in regard to housing, sanitation and pure food; the whole program of social insurance; the effort to adapt the school to the most real and vital human needs; and other similar phases of the struggle for social advancement and the lifting of human standards, are a part of the recognition of the need of social organization of opportunity through consideration of the welfare of the entire body of society.

So, too, the organization of leisure is a phase of the opening of opportunity. Too long has leisure been unorganized by society and left in the main to individual exploitation for profit. In this regard our life is in painful contrast to the life of ancient Athens with its public theater, open and free to all its citizens, where instead of the cheap and common, they might witness a drama of Sophocles or Euripides. Perhaps the time will come when we shall realize the meaning of such socially organized opportunity, and cities

will then open freely to their citizens—that is, to themselves—their own art galleries, music halls, and theaters, as they now open their schools to their children.

It is here that the consideration of the meaning of the instruments of education becomes important. These instruments belong in part to the fields of leisure and of enlightenment. They form that larger education of the people upon which opportunity depends. Unfortunately, because of our individualized type of organization, education must now compete with forms of leisure-exploitation for the sake of profit. Yet all the more is there need that the agencies of education should realize their great possibilities and gird themselves to accomplish the great social purposes for which education is fitted beyond most other social instruments. In a social system which is imperfect there is continued need of reorganization; it is necessary to study social life and to readjust social arrangements to meet our changing needs. Only in this way can stagnation be avoided, and only thus can opportunity be open to the life of all. But the most important phase of this continual readjustment, the most vital condition of its possibility, is the socializing of intelligence. After all, the great problem of opportunity is the problem of education, in the sense of that broader social education of the adult mind, through which intelligent understanding may come to control in the organization of our life.

Progress toward better things is constantly defeated by conditions which interfere with rational thinking and intelligent understanding. Such conditions are seen not only in the existence of a vast body of sheer ignorance, but also in the burden of custom and tradition, and the imitation of prominence due to wealth or class position. And such conditions

are evidence of a failure of opportunity. Democracy is not primarily a problem of the even division of wealth. It depends rather upon the distribution of opportunity; and opportunity is vitally dependent upon knowledge and education. As Cooley has said, "our principal institution having opportunity for its object is education." And if intelligence is to be socialized there must be freedom of discussion; for it is through the contact of minds that new ideas arise. Discussion may be by speech or by the written word; but to mean anything, it must always be free. It is unfortunate that our agencies of discussion are not altogether free; and for this reason it is of the highest consequence that each of these agencies should realize its mission to society, and its social opportunity.

It must then be concluded that opportunity is not just raw nature and unrestrained individual effort to possess it. On the contrary opportunity, if it is to be permanent, rests upon an organized system, an economy, which must be both intelligent rather than simply traditional, and universal, in the sense that it recognizes as a whole and so all the varied interests of society. To obtain this opportunity is the supreme work of social organization. The welfare of each group must be thought of as necessary to the welfare of the whole. Each economic group, each racial group, each intelligence group, must be considered, for only in this way can opportunity be saved from being parcelled out and exhausted by individual interest.

The present life of the world seems to present two contradictory aspects. On the one hand are the possibilities of advancement through discovery and expanding knowledge. The very rapidity of the new discoveries startle by their suggestion of new arrangements and

relations among men and new possibilities of human welfare. The cure of disease, the development of enlarged food supplies, the opening of new means of communication by telegraph, telephone, radio and airplane, new chemical knowledge, better understanding of heredity in plant and animal life—how easy it is to enumerate them, and how they seem to suggest the almost inevitable advancement of human welfare. But on the other hand looms the tragedy of our world; its weakness and its ignorance (for the majority of mankind is still quite illiterate and controlled by ignorance and tradition); its suffering through disease, poverty and the cruelty of man to man. Hatred, antagonism, war and misery seem to mark mankind for destruction.

Fortunately there is a third alternative: even within the tragedy of the world is the suggestion of a new life. For the evils of the world are largely the result of social relationships which are based upon an older ignorance. There is nothing inevitable in them. They are not Fate; but the very expanding knowledge of our age suggests the building of new relationships, new organization and new opportunity. The evils, the tragedy, are the expression of social life in relation to nature; they are to be controlled through new social life embodying new knowledge wrought into new social organization.

Contrast, then, the two ideas of oppor-

tunity. On the one hand is the idea of an abundant nature and an individualist law. The effort of the individualist is to gather and control for himself the forces of nature. He appropriates the forest, monopolizes the oil, corners the wheat, gathers in his hand the coal, the copper, the franchises of cities. These things he cannot use, but he can compel others to pay for the privilege of using them, and he can grant others the right to exhaust them. Men must ask him for the opportunities of life and joy, and these he may deny them.

On the other hand is the idea of opportunity through social organization and law expressing such organization. What does this idea demand? Only that social action shall prevent such individual control of nature; that organization shall bind men to common use and offer common opportunity. It proposes to restrain the individual for the sake of the social organization of nature, so that each member of the community life may find opportunity through that organization. It believes that strength in society is not the strength of individual aggression; not the strength of an aristocratic civilization with its war and conquest and exploitation and great fortunes, and its suffering and weakness and ghastly poverty. It believes rather that strength in society is social, and is the result of organization and co-operation toward common ends.

TEACHING AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

SOME CONTRASTS OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY: I

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

ANY attempt to draw a clearly cut line between European and American sociology as forming two organic systems each conspicuously different from the other but harmonious and coherent within itself, is a very hopeless enterprise, faulty in its very nature. It is the purpose of this paper merely to illustrate contrasts and similarities in the general development of sociology in recent times. A second paper will present similar contrasts between certain "schools" and current contributions of America and Europe.

Let us begin with several exterior differences in the growth of sociology in Europe and America during the last 70 or 80 years. A conspicuous difference in this respect is that in *America Sociology has grown as a child nursed by the Universities and Colleges; while in Europe its modern start, since August Comte, and development have in a considerable degree taken place outside of the Universities and Colleges.* Indeed a number of the founders of the principal modern sociological systems in Europe never occupied the position of a teacher in University at all. Among these were for instance, Herbert Spencer, A. Gobineau, Otto Ammon, B. Kidd, J. Novicow, P. Lilienfeldt, K. Marx, G. Ratzenhofer, N.

K. Mikhailovski, P. Lavrov, A. Coste, H. de Tourville, E. Demolens, P. Rousier, K. Loentieff, and others. Others occupied a temporary professorship not in the capacity of a professor of sociology but of a professor of natural science or a discipline widely different from sociology. Such was the connection with a college which August Comte, E. de Roberty, G. de Greef, F. Le Play, L. Gumplowicz, G. Simmel, M. Kovalevski, G. Tarde, E. Durkheim, R. Worms, V. de Lapouge, Morselli, and many others had. Sociology was, so to speak, only their "hobby" and not what they were employed to teach in the University. Only quite incidentally a few of them occasionally gave a series of sociological lectures in various "free colleges"—schools not included in the system of regular colleges supported by the governments,—or perhaps gave in the regular Universities some sociological—some non-obligatory course—a "hobby-course"—not included in the regular College curriculum. In the United States the situation was very different. Here sociology emerged, from its very beginning, as a University or College discipline. Long before any European University had a sociological course a series of American Universities introduced sociology as a

regular course in the University curriculum. As early as 1876 W. G. Sumner gave his course in sociology at Yale; in 1890 sociology was given by F. H. Giddings in Bryn Mawr University; it was introduced in 1885 at Indiana, in 1889 at Kansas, in 1890 at John Hopkins, in 1891 at Harvard, and in 1898 at Chicago Universities.¹

This difference also continues to exist at the present moment: although the number of Universities and Colleges in Europe where sociology has been introduced as a regular course has considerably increased since the time of the War and Revolutions; nevertheless this number is still much below that of the United States. In Europe sociology still remains an extra-University discipline not recognized by the majority of the Universities; in the United States the Universities and Colleges which do not have it are the exceptions.

Since up until the last few years sociology in Europe was not taught in Colleges there was no need for an existence of the text-books in sociology. Since in America sociology was adopted very early by the Colleges, this made necessary the preparation of the College text-books. Hence the fact that *while American literature in sociology has been composed largely out of the text-books in Europe the text-book literature has occupied a relatively insignificant place in the total sociological literature of that continent.* Up to 1906-1910 in European sociological literature there were almost no books written for the special purpose of serving as texts. At the best there were few works remotely approaching to the text type, as for instance L. Gumplowicz's

Grundriss der Soziologie (1885), or G. de Greef's *Introduction à la sociologie* (1885), Morselli's *Sociologia generale* (1898), Th. Achelis's *Soziologie*; R. Eisler's *Soziologie* (1903), E. Waxweiler's *Esquisse d'une sociologie* (1906) and two or three other similar works. But even these were not written with the purpose of serving as texts and represented either a summary of other more substantial works by the same authors or a popularization of sociological works for the general public at large. The bulk of sociological works produced in Europe has been composed almost entirely out of monographic works; works which have not cared to be popular or suitable for students but have cared, principally, to be a contribution to the science of sociology. In America the situation has been rather the opposite. The energy of the American sociologists to a much greater extent has been spent in the production of the text-book literature. Before 1906-1910 American sociology already had a series of books written for texts and with the characteristics of texts. Samples of these are *Introduction to the Study of Society* by A. Small and G. Vincent (1894); *Principles of Sociology* by F. H. Giddings (1896); *Giddings' Elements of Sociology* (1898); *Outlines of Sociology* by L. Ward (1898); *Text-Book of Sociology* by J. C. Dealey (1903); *Introduction to Sociology* by A. Fairbanks (3rd ed. 1903); *Elements of Sociology* by F. W. Blackmar (1905); *Foundations of Sociology* by E. A. Ross (1905); *Sociology and Social Progress* by T. N. Carver (1907); and *General Sociology* by G. E. Howard (1907). The situation is similar at the present moment. The yearly production of sociological literature in America is still represented by text-book literature—this to a degree incomparably larger than that of Europe.

This difference is even more significant than it appears from its exterior form. In

¹ See Small, A., *Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States*, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 21, pp. 731ff. Giddings however developed his beginnings from the Editorial offices of *The Springfield Republican*.

the first place it explains why the American sociological text-book literature is the best in the world. *No other country can rival the United States in this field—not only quantitatively but also qualitatively.* Even now, in spite of the appearance of several European text-books in sociology they are neither so well rounded, so full of information, nor so well adapted for the text-book requirements as are many American sociology texts. This is true both of the texts in General Sociology and of special sociologies, be it Rural and Urban Sociology, Social Psychology, Criminology, Cultural Anthropology, Social Evolution and so on.

However, this superiority of the American text-books has had its drawbacks. The point is that the text-book always puts some limitations on the originality of the work. A good text-book must always be well proportioned, and no one part of it can be very much developed. Again, any good text contains a great deal of truism and platitude, current and popular opinion. Any text requires from its author not so much creative originality, as a competent survey of existing theories and material well known to the specialists but unknown to the students. Text-book writing is somewhat in conflict with the writing of original monographs which tend to say something new and important and to say it distinctly and in a developed form. The more a sociologist is busy with the writing of texts the less he has time and energy for the production of original monographs; for, as a rule, monographs require enormous energy, patience, meditation, creative mind and much research. This is almost impossible for a scholar busy with the writing of texts. In addition, one engrossed too much in text-book production is likely to acquire habits of thinking stamped by "the text-book intellectual level," which, as a rule,

is much below the intellectual level of a monograph. Add to this the various commercial and similar considerations which tend to lower the level of the text-books still more. Likewise, the habit of publishing and financing in inexpensive editions numerous important monographs has not been established in the American scene. All this explains why *American sociological literature, although unrivaled in the field of texts, at the same time can scarcely be said to be unrivaled in the field of real scientific contributions to sociology,—in the field of new, original and fertile theories, in the field of real enrichment of our knowledge of social phenomena.* It is certain that American sociology has made its contribution in this field also, and we shall see that this contribution has been rapidly increasing but, as yet, it has not been so great as to be unrivalled. If one would survey the most important original theories in the field of sociology which have been set forth during the last fifty years it is likely that any of the large European countries—France, England, Italy, Germany, Russia—has serious reasons to maintain that its contribution to sociology has been, at least, not less than that of the United States of America. And it is probable, also, that each of these countries would be able to confront the three or four outstanding American sociologists (in the field of original contributions) of the last fifty years by the same or an even greater number of equally outstanding sociologists. Such is the essence of this difference.

The next important point of difference between the sociologies compared is as follows: Though the last twenty years have been marked in Europe by an establishment of special institutes for sociological research, such as the Solvay Institute in Belgium or the Köln Institute and the Institut für Betriebs-soziologie in

Germany, or Le Play house in England, nevertheless, the number of such institutions in Europe has been very limited, and the research opportunities have been very scarce (mainly on account of a lack of funds, in the War and post-War conditions). In the United States the situation in this respect has been, for the same period, incomparably more favorable. *In various forms—beginning with various experimental stations and ending with various Research Institutes in the field of social phenomena—this country has, at the present moment, an incomparably greater number of such institutions and spends incomparably larger funds for various branches of research in the field than any, or perhaps than all European countries taken together. This naturally results in the much more rapid progress of sociological research in this country than in European countries. At the present moment American Sociology has already such an enormous and valuable amount of special research-material that even very few of the American sociologists themselves have an adequate idea of its richness and significance; and not a single American author of a text in general sociology has tried to any significant degree to use it. At the present moment, the American situation is characterized by "a lack of the missing link" between the text book literature and that of special research. This "missing link" is an elaboration of new inductive theories, principles, and generalizations based on the data of special researches. If this is done in the future, and if Europe does not keep pace with America in the field of research, this may lead to the future ascendancy of American over European sociology.*

Let us now consider another difference. Putting aside the works of the outstanding European and American sociologists and taking the bulk of the ordinary sociological works of both continents, we can but notice a conspicuous difference between

their character. *The bulk of the sociological works in America are marked by their quantitative and empirical character while the bulk of the sociological literature of Europe is still marked by an analytical elaboration of concepts and definitions; by a philosophical and epistemological polishing of words. Putting the same idea in negative form it may be said: the bulk of the sociological studies in America is very rich in quantitative and empirical materials and is somewhat poor in fine and elegant thinking; the food is rich but it is not quite finely digested. In Europe the bulk of the studies shows fine thinking with all the exquisiteness of epistemology and logic but the wheels of this fine thinking are moving in the air on account of the lack of concrete, and carefully studied material. The result is, in the American case, the domination of the material over its investigator and the limited vista of the investigator who often behind the trees of his material does not see the forest. In Europe the result of the fine intellectual machinery working in the air is a kind of scientific sterility, an unfertile word-polishing which does not get us any further. Indeed, consider hundreds and thousands of various special bulletins, theses, papers, surveys and so on, published annually in America. They are full of figures, diagrams, case-studies, tables, correlation coefficients, indices, newspaper clippings and other forms of empirical materials. And yet, among all these studies one rarely finds a really thoughtful study, with fine and elegant logic and with logical and epistemological discriminations; a clear mastership over the facts studied, a broad horizon, a large mental perspective, a solid background, and adequate generalizations are the exception. The bulk of the studies are rather of a routine, I would say even, of an automatic character. Living in an age where everything from a car to a Victrola record tends to become automatic, our studies follow the same tendency.*

Every professor of sociology or psychology or political science in this country through whose hands have passed dozens of master's and doctor's theses; who has read hundreds of various surveys and case studies; who has gone through dozens of various bulletins and research-studies published by various research institutions, knows that the enormous bulk of these works were prepared almost half-automatically. To send a questionnaire or to compile the data from superficial interviews and other sources of a survey; to tabulate them; to apply Pearsonian or other formulas of correlation; that is the usual procedure in a great many of the studies. Having performed these or even still simpler operations the authors describe the results often without any particular knowledge and carefulness; and the study is ready. All this is done half-automatically; just following the usual routine, without any attempt to penetrate into, or to ask of the validity of the material, its adequacy, the validity or spuriousness of the correlation, the real significance of the formula applied and the adequacy of the results received, their similarity or discrepancy with the results of similar studies, the survey of these other studies and so on and so forth. In non-statistical studies one commonly meets defective logic, a poor knowledge of the field, an ignorance of the studies made before, a superficiality of the thinking, lack of originality, clumsy methodology, etc. etc. In spite of the ability to make an automatic application of the Pearsonian formula studies often show a violation of the fundamental laws of logic, and a lack of any understanding of the fundamental laws of induction. Shall we wonder that under such circumstances a considerable bulk of these researches do not rise above a purely clerical, half-automatic work, with all the limitations, provincialisms, and faults of such works? This is what I mean by

the domination of the material over its investigator, lack of fine thinking, and loose logic of these researches. Such is one of the most common defects of a considerable part of the American researches which must be overcome if we are to have genuine scientific researches instead of pseudo-scientific stuff whose value is very questionable.

In Europe with regard to logic and fine thinking the situation seems to be better. Whether this is due to the fact that these studies have very sparse concrete material which by virtue of its sparseness cannot dominate the investigator and urges him to compensate for the lack of material by polished speculation; or whether it is due to a greater attention paid in European Universities to logic, philosophy and epistemology which give a refinement to thinking; or whether to the fact that many European sociologists came to sociology from philosophy, logic, epistemology (e.g. Simmel, Durkheim, De Roberty, Wundt, and many others) or at least were well trained in these disciplines; whatever may be the cause the discussed art of a more elegant thinking in European sociological works, in German, French, Italian and Russian, can scarcely be questioned. As a sample take for instance the recent works of L. von Wiese, O. Spann, Th. Litt, K. Breisig, C. Brinkman, W. Sauer, Gerhard Lehman, Th. Geiger, A. Walter, F. W. Jerusalem, H. L. Stoltenberg, Max Scheler, Max Hausenstein, Hans Freyer in Germany; or the works of M. Halbwachs, C. Bouglé, G. Richard, Mauss, Fauconnet, Hubert, and others in France. As a rule one almost always finds in these works a thinking with all the delicacies of epistemological discriminations, though quite commonly one finds in these works very little "real meat."

There are some exceptions to the difference discussed, but the difference itself seem to be quite tangible and real. From

this standpoint it is very useful for a European sociologist to come to this country and to plunge himself into the study of the bulk of special researches existing and to learn the method, the technique, and the results of these researches. On the other hand, it is advisable for an American sociologist to peruse carefully European sociological works in order to acquaint himself with the fine points of its elegant art of thinking. The study of philosophy, logic, epistemology may also help a great deal in this respect. So much for this point.

The last general difference between the sociologies compared is that *European sociological works show a somewhat better knowledge of history generally and the history of social thought particularly and the historical method is somewhat more and more skillfully used than in the American sociological works.* Glance through the bulk of the European sociological works and you will see that they, as a rule, open with a developed or short historical survey of the preceding theories in the field; they are full of references to historical facts; they use wide historical confrontations and historical material, especially that from the history of law and juridical codes, institutions, and sources. In America such a procedure is relatively rare. The majority of the texts, and often even treatises, either do not have any references at all to the predecessors, or at the best, have few scanty references to American sociologists—mostly other text-book writers. Putting the thing in a humorous way *we can say that the bulk of American sociological works tacitly imply that there was nothing or very little before 1890 when sociology definitely appeared in America.* Of course a few sociologists like Comte and Spencer there were but they were about all. As a rule a knowledge of the history of social thought has been very meagre in America; this applies to the bulk of the sociologists. As

a result the classical works of sociology in their original or translations—be it the works of Comte or Spencer, Buckle or Durkheim, Tarde or Max Weber, Condorcet or Ibn-Khaldun, Vico or Plato, Aristotle or Confucius, as a rule are unknown to the bulk of the teachers in sociology or are known only from some secondary sources and in a very inadequate form. A knowledge of the classical works in sociology and social sciences has not been required from the candidates for master's or doctor's degrees in sociology. This explains the short historical memory of American sociological works.

Concluding this superficial characterization of the American and European sociologies it should be emphasized that the above contrasts and parallelisms are to be taken only as very approximate and rough; nevertheless I hope that they are not misleading. From the above one can see that as far as the American sociology is concerned its present situation is rather cheerful in comparison with the situation in Europe. If the American sociologists would try further to reinforce themselves in the weak points indicated; if their energy more and more will be given to the research monographs instead of being given to the manufacturing of the texts; if in addition, the bulk of them would try to avoid "merry go-round" in superficial "preaching" generalities and would plunge themselves in the painstaking and deep study of specific problems; then, with the favorable financial and other situations in this country, and with a realistic bent of American mind, there are all the reasons to expect the flaring up of American sociology to a new and higher level. This is the more true because of the fact that in some fields of special sociology, for instance in Rural Sociology, America already occupies this position of leader, not only in text-books, but in monographic literature.

EXPERIMENTAL SOCIOLOGY: A PRELIMINARY NOTE ON THEORY AND METHOD

LOWELL JUILLIARD CARR

COMPLETION of the first year of experimental sociology at the University of Michigan may serve as the occasion for a brief statement of the theory that underlay the late Professor Cooley's interest in the venture and for a progress report on the venture as a whole. As in the case of any new project that has barely begun, one can speak of "results" only in a very tentative way. Most of the year was spent in a trial and error effort to locate the needle of the desirable in the haystack of the possible.

In its largest aspect the whole course is an experiment, which it will require several years to complete, to test the hypothesis that human *interactions* as distinguished from *reactions* are (a) observable, and (b) related to controllable factors. It is much too early to express any opinion as to the truth or falsity of that hypothesis. The most that can be said on the basis of our year's work is that interactions within a certain limited range are observable, but that refinement of technique will be necessary before the question can really be answered. Pending that answer the problem of related factors must wait.

The whole problem issues from the transition that is taking place in American sociology. For a number of years the evidence has been accumulating that American sociologists are moving from the philosophical to the empirical stage of their thinking. More and more generally social phenomena have come to be regarded as "natural," i.e., as phenomena that must be described before they can be evaluated or explained. The work of the Chicago school on the sociology of the

city;¹ Sorokin's studies of social mobility;² Chapin's chapters on culture cycles, invention, the growth of institutions;³ "Middletown"⁴—these are a few of the evidences of what is happening. If we may trust the history of other sciences and take due note of the peculiarities of social phenomena we shall have good ground for predicting a long future for this movement. There are, however, already intimations that a further development is preparing. Recent advances in social theory, in social psychology, in genetic psychology and in general linguistics are creating a situation in which there is at least an implied challenge to the sociologist to push on beyond the empirical level to the level of definitely controlled experiment. Let us glance briefly at these advances.

The theoretical change becomes apparent when one recalls that as recently as ten years ago most social theorists were still thinking in terms of instincts, institutions, conflict, accommodation, or similar vague rubrics. By no means all have ceased to think in such terms even today, but Bernard has blown the instinct mythology at least out of the water, and there is a growing interest in the actual processes by which institutions, conflict, accommodation and other so-called social phenomena are created and carried on.⁵

¹ See F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang*. Park and Burgess, *The City*. H. W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*. Marion Hathway, *The Young Cripple and his Job*, etc.

² Pitirim Sorokin, *Social Mobility*.

³ F. Stuart Chapin, *Cultural Change*.

⁴ Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown*.

⁵ See L. L. Bernard, *Instinct*, also his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chapters 7-10. See also Harrison Sacket Elliott, *Community Conflict*, and also

There has been a growing recognition of the importance of what Giddings a generation ago called "interstimulation and response," and that growing recognition has gone hand in hand with a philosophical clarification that bids fair to banish the baleful bifurcation of man and environment that has rendered so much social theorizing utterly futile. The position for which Professor Cooley stood for more than a quarter of a century is finding expression more and more widely as social theorists clarify their own positions and as psychology and the new physics create a more dynamic intellectual atmosphere. Thus Miss Follett gives us a new insight into the meaning of integration,⁶ and Bentley insists that what we are studying is "man-society," not either in disjunction.⁷ Balz, who was still thinking of human nature in terms of instincts in 1924, could nevertheless write, "The social fact in its concreteness is a situation rather than a thing."⁸ With the *gestalt* psychologists emphasizing the dynamic nature of psychological wholes, and with the new physics inexorably compelling us to scuttle our old static absolutes, Space and Time, and to think of matter as motion in Space-Time, with all this bustle and stir about us, we are being pushed rather than led to confront the living configurations of the on-going processes of human association. Fortunately this is happening at a moment when the empiricists are in full cry and behaviorism is a power in the land. Consequently we dare not content ourselves with philo-

sophical abstractions. If there is an on-going process it must, as de Roberty long ago pointed out, be a process of interaction, and interaction must go on somewhere in specific and observable events. The problem, therefore, is to observe and record the essential characteristics of these events.

Here is the point at which our friends in the cognate fields begin to make themselves heard. Moede and Allport have shown how social psychology can be made as definitely experimental as the older type.⁹ Watson, Gesell, Piaget, Anderson and others are opening up the field of experimental genetic psychology. In general linguistics experimental technique is measuring the effects of speech stimuli. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that from the cradle to the grave the problems of human behavior are being attacked with the experimental methodology. True there are still many regions such as jurisprudence, political science, economics and much of sociology closed to the laboratory experimenter.¹⁰ But everywhere in the sciences dealing with the more generalized phenomena of behavior the mere *ex post facto* description of gross empirical phenomena has given way, or is giving way, to controlled experimentation with the actual process phenomena themselves.

The question, therefore, would seem to be imminent and inescapable: Why cannot sociologists utilize the technique of the controlled experiment?¹¹

⁹ Dr. Walter Moede, *Experimentelle Massenpsychologie*. Floyd H. Allport, *Social Psychology*.

¹⁰ See, however, O. Garfield Jones, *Laboratory Work in Municipal Citizenship*, *National Municipal Review*, 17: 580-585, October, 1928, for an account of the use of laboratory methods by political science classes in the University of the City of Toledo in studying political behavior in that city.

¹¹ It may be said that they are already doing so as evidenced by Sorokin's work. While I have the

The Process of Group Thinking. Alfred Dwight Sheffield, *Training for Group Experience* and Eduard C. Lindeman, *Social Discovery*.

⁶ M. P. Follett, *Creative Experience*.

⁷ Arthur F. Bentley, *Relativity in Man and Society*, Chapters 12-14.

⁸ Albert G. A. Balz with William S. A. Pott, *The Basis of Social Theory*, p. 24.

The answer depends on a re-orientation of sociological thinking to one fundamental fact: *With reference to any given observer* the phenomena of interaction stand on three levels of accessibility—first, the face-to-face situation; second, the crowd situation; and third, the distance-contact, or public, situation. Assuming for the present that the earlier theorists were right when they insisted that we cannot experiment under controlled conditions with crowds and publics, we may turn at once to the face-to-face situation. Assuming that as sociologists we are primarily interested in interactions, since reactions are already the province of the psychologists, how can we experiment with interactions in face-to-face situations? Instantly we face two problems—motivation and record.

MOTIVATING INTERACTION

How can you induce "normal" interactions under the highly artificial conditions of a laboratory? No other question so clearly points the contrast between a psychological experiment and a sociological one. To study the behavior of an individual from the point of view of social psychology you have only to expose him to the given social stimuli and record his responses with the instruments usually employed by the laboratory psychologists. This is no mean achievement, and I do not wish in any way to suggest that it is not eminently worth doing. What I am concerned with showing is that this pro-

highest admiration for Professor Sorokin and owe my present interest in this problem to a talk with him at the St. Louis meeting of the American Sociological Society in 1926, I am under the impression that he has never sufficiently differentiated sociological from socio-psychological experimentation. In a sense this may seem a mere matter of definition, but in reality I suspect that it indicates a fundamental difference in point of view.

cedure does not exhaust the field. What remains, however, is by no means simple.

Ask anyone who has given only passing thought to the problem "How can we set two or more persons to interacting naturally for purposes of exact observation at a stated time?" and the answer almost invariably will be "It can't be done—self-consciousness will vitiate the whole experiment." That is perfectly correct—so long as you insist on regarding interaction as something thrust willy-nilly on your subjects from without. But note this: Normally interaction does not have this character at all. Normally we are in almost constant interaction with other people for hours every day, we are all more or less aware of the fact, and, after we have passed the awkward age, the whole process leaves us singularly unembarrassed. Why this difference between life and the laboratory? Because normally interaction is not imposed; *it is an instrument for the effectuation of our desires and purposes.* We use it as unconsciously as we use our teeth at table. Most of the time we take it for granted. Only in the dentist's chair or when we say good-night to The Girl does interaction as such ever obtrude on consciousness. The rest of the time we are so busy with the waxing and waning of our designs on the world that we utterly ignore the means by which they are effectuated. We speak of having to "see" a man or "talk" with someone, but we seldom actually think of the seeing or the talking. Because these things happen automatically we never have to attend to them, and the consequence is that when somebody plumps us down suddenly in a laboratory and orders us sternly to "interact" we feel very much as though we had just waked up in our pajamas on the public square. The awful publicity paralyzes us beyond all semblance of our natural selves.

For this the remedy is perfectly simple: Merely recognize the functional nature of interaction. Given a definite objective, any group of people *must* interact if they are to achieve the objective together and not separately. It does not greatly matter what the objective is—it may, in fact, be the task of discovering some objective—but given any sort of common goal, the unreality vanishes and interaction becomes the perfectly unconscious instrument of adjustment that it normally is. So incidental does it in fact become that instead of obtruding painfully on consciousness to the exclusion of normal behavior it actually tends to drop into the background so completely that in our first few experiments the interacting subjects found great difficulty in making interactions the objects of consciousness at all and in the very last week of the course one of the most important experiments was almost ruined by the fact that two members of the class who had been assigned to act as observers became so interested in the results of interaction, namely, the details of an impending picnic, that they completely forgot to record the interactions themselves. The curious fact appears to be that instead of being impracticable because of self-consciousness the study of interactions becomes almost impossible because of un-self-consciousness. The real difficulty is not to get people to interact normally. The problem is to get a record of those interactions once they have been set going.

THE PROBLEM OF RECORD

What an individual does can easily enough be recorded. He can be set to punching keys, or lifting weights, or marking test blanks or repeating words. But what goes on between that individual and a friend is a much more subtle matter.

How are you going to get that subtle give-and-take transformed into a permanent record that can be analyzed at leisure? You have three courses open to you: 1. Have each subject record as much as he can; 2. Utilize a third person as a recording observer; 3. Use a mechanical means of record. The first two come down in the end to the paper and pencil record. But the paper and pencil record suffers from three fatal defects: (i) It is incomplete; (ii) It is merely a subjective interpretation of those portions of reality that the observer has happened to catch; and (iii) It is distracting.

It is incomplete because we have no adequate code of symbols by which to represent specific interactive behavior. Interaction has been so far from the center of attention that tradition has never verbalized more than a small fraction of the interactive phenomena that occur. There are innumerable gestures, facial expressions, voice inflections, pauses, silences, approaches, withdrawals for which we have no verbal symbols whatever. Try to describe what really happens between yourself and the next friend whom you chance to meet casually on the street. Of course you will see only part of the performance for you will be unable to see your own behavior as your friend sees it. But even with the field of observation thus cut in half for you it is almost certain that you will be able to "register" only a small fraction of your friend's total overt behavior. And of the things that you do see you will be quite unable to describe more than another small fraction even to yourself. Practically you handle the situation by "interpreting" your friend's behavior, i.e., not by noting separately the shrug, the lifted eyebrow, the hesitation of speech but by some such synthesis as "offended," "skeptical," "doubtful,"

"undecided." Your record is inevitably subjective. You seldom see *what happens*; you tend to see what you think it *means*. So your record is doubly selective—more than half of it has probably been left out, and what remains has been refracted through your expectations. If now for the sake of accuracy you try to write down all this while you are still talking to your friend, strive to miss nothing, keep track of his remarks, and endeavor to play your part in the whole situation as though you were not making a record at all you will presently be in a position to write your own edition of Alice in Wonderland. The paper and pencil record cannot escape incompleteness, subjectivity and a measure of distraction.

The obvious answer is, "Eliminate the human recorder." Easily said and with the present offerings of modern technology such as the dictograph and the motion picture it might be easily done. But at this point sociology collides with economics. Dictographs, motion picture cameras and flood lights would cost from \$400 to \$1,000. That item in itself is not prohibitive, but when one begins to consider operating expenses the matter bears a different hue. Even with a small kodak machine every minute that you turn the crank costs you from \$1.25 to \$1.50. What can a sociology class do in one minute that would be worth \$1.50? An interesting question that rapidly becomes more interesting as one calculates that a three-hour laboratory course meeting thirty weeks a year consumes 5,400 minutes. Of course we should want a record of only a fraction of that time, say one-half or one-fourth of it, but during that one-half or one-fourth we should want not one record but as many as there were working groups in the class. Fifty-four per cent of our experiments this year had to do with interaction; the rest dealt with

personality cues, personality refraction, pre-verbal communication, variability of word-of-mouth communication and similar problems in social psychology. But in the interaction experiments there were always from two to four groups involved, or an average of 2.6 groups always at work. Assuming that we should have needed the pictorial record only one-fourth of our total laboratory time, which is a rather conservative estimate, the cost of a complete film record of the interaction experiments would have been from \$4,387 to \$5,265 for the year, not counting the first cost of cameras and flood lights. That for a class of nine students for one-fourth of the time for two semesters!

Obviously, despite its scientific desirability, the motion picture record of face-to-face interaction is out of the question for any ordinary laboratory in experimental sociology. Until experimental research of this kind is subsidized from more ample funds than those at the disposal of the average department of sociology it must function less as an instrument for the discovery of new truth than as a means for making human relations more real and vivid to inquiring students. The laboratory psychologists are demonstrating that for teaching purposes a rough approximation to rigorous scientific methods may serve an admirable pedagogical purpose without adding one new fact to the sum total of human knowledge. No laboratory man expects new truth to issue from the notebooks of the beginners. Similarly we have found a distinct sociological value in our own experiments despite the unavoidable limitations of the record. The entire laboratory equipment has consisted of three ordinary burlap screens, six feet by six, costing \$3 each. With these screens, two adjoining class rooms and the inefficient paper and pencil record we have managed to create

something like real enthusiasm for what some of the students frankly regarded during the first two weeks as "the craziest course we ever got into."

The craziness consisted in the demand that interactions be made central in attention. The theory behind that demand, of course, is simply that from the present standpoint of sociological theory today sociological observers ought not to limit themselves to such disjunction of individual and environment as is implied in the usual emphasis of social psychology on the *reactions* of the individual. If it is true that the individual is responding not to a stimulus merely but to a stimulus-plus-himself, the real problem would seem to be not the reactions of individuals to social stimuli but the interactions of individuals who happen, as it were, to be reacting. Instead of centering attention on individuals in an environment it would seem to be desirable to center on situations in which individuals are involved. Instead of regarding behavior of the individual as the main object of attention and the situation as simply the sum of the conditions under which it occurs, it would seem worth while to make the situation central and let the behavior of individuals fall into place among the other conditioning factors such as the number of persons involved, the tempo of interaction, the means of communication, and the rest. Whether this will prove to be a fruitful angle from which to approach the matter remains to be determined. It cannot be settled *a priori* in the armchair. In any event it implies a fundamentally different point of view than the one usually prevailing in social psychology. The behavior of individuals under social conditions is usually accepted as the problem phenomenon of social psychologists. The orthodox will probably hasten to deny that there is

anything worth observing that is not individual behavior. So phrased, of course, the objection would distort the essence of the preceding distinction. The question is not, "Can sociologists find significant phenomena apart from human behavior?" No sensible person expects to do that. It is rather, "Must sociologists limit themselves to the arbitrary disjunction of the individual and the social process as implied in the assertion that the *behavior of the individual* constitutes the problem phenomenon?" Such a disjunction is repugnant to the prevailing organic conception of social process. If the individual and society are really aspects of the same thing, *it is incumbent on us to develop units of observation in which the organic character of our phenomena will be implicitly recognized.* So long as we think and observe in terms of the individual and his environment we shall find it impossible really to re-integrate our observations to advance our generalizations. This, it seems to me, is one of the basic reasons why the masses of "facts" that our empirical observers are accumulating crystallize so slowly into clarifying generalizations. *The very units in which the observations have been made frequently imply a social philosophy that has nothing to contribute to the future!*

The hypothesis on which we are proceeding, then, bases directly on three concepts: The unitary situation, interaction, and the project method. The theoretical foundations have been laid by Cooley, Follett, deRoberty, Simmel, Small and others.¹² The immediate stimulus for the present experiment is to be found

¹² As bearing on the unitary situation see Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, and *Social Process*; Follett *Creative Experience*; Köhler, *Gestalt Psychology*. On interaction see Sorokin's discussion of deRoberty, Simmel, Gumpłowicz and others in *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chapters VIII-IX, pp. 433-513.

in Sorokin's pioneering in the direction of sociological experiment and in the late Professor Cooley's interest in methodology.¹³ Behaviorism, the *gestalt* psychologists, and the new physics have all contributed toward producing a more dynamic mental atmosphere than existed even ten years ago. Developments in related fields, particularly in social psychology, constitute a clear challenge to sociologists to re-examine with some care the possibilities of experiment in their own peculiar field. Hence the hypothesis that interactions are observable and are related to controllable factors.

ATTACKING THE PROBLEM

In the nature of the case what has been done so far is merely to make a beginning. The work originally was planned by the writer in collaboration with Dr. Robert C. Angell, but Dr. Angell's absence on leave during the academic year 1928-29 necessitated some changes in the character of the experiments actually attempted. By way of providing mental background for the interaction experiments, seventeen out of the thirty-seven experiments actually carried through during the year were border-line experiments in communication, recognition of personality, personality refraction, recognition of group symbols, and the like. While these

¹³ Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Experimente zur Soziologie, Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, IV: 1-10, March, 1928. The conversation with Professor Sorokin already noted and many personal discussions with Professor Cooley.

experiments opened up a number of interesting problems on which further work will be done, they belong in the field of social psychology and therefore need not concern us here.

Of the twenty interaction experiments proper, seventeen were built on some variation of three basic projects: arranging and keeping a rendezvous at varying distances from the class room; disposing of a unit of time in common; and reaching an agreement on some controversial question or point of theory. The other three involved the planning and playing of a war game, the planning and executing of a class picnic, and the group invention of an original experiment.

The best way to give an idea of what the course attempted will be to reproduce a student's notes on an interaction experiment, an experiment chosen by one of the better students at the final examination as the one on which he had the most complete records. In some respects it was neither the most successful experiment nor the most typical, since it was the one experiment of the year in which the project on which the class worked was unreal, i.e., never intended for actual execution. In every other experiment execution was an integral part of the experiment, and on this occasion the students apparently proceeded on the belief that it still was and that they were actually to spend a free hour together as they had already spent two earlier in the year. The instructions were given in three parts.

STUDENT'S NOTES

Instructions for experiment (typewritten form)

Objective: To observe interactions involved in readjustment to a controlled change.

Persons involved: Three.

Procedure: Part I

1. Group by threes for the purpose of working out a plan for spending one hour together.
2. Place screens to ensure privacy.

3. One member of the group is to act as recorder.
4. The other two work out a plan for spending the next hour together.
5. This plan and the interactions necessary to produce it are to be written down by the recorder.
6. Notify the instructor before proceeding to execute this plan.
7. Further instructions will be given you at that time. Part II (on completion of Part I)
8. The instructor will regroup the subjects.
9. The regrouped subjects will now work out their own plan which will be recorded as before.
10. Notify the instructor when the plan is complete. Part III (given out on completion of Part II)
11. You are not to execute any of these plans, but to analyze the record of your interactions to determine what happened as a result of the regrouping of subjects, i.e.
12. Determine what interactions were necessary to readjust to the change thus introduced.

Record of Interactions (following prescribed form)

| Student A | Student B | Student C |
|---|--|--|
| | 1. I was thinking of something last time. | |
| | (The actual grouping then occurred) | |
| 4. It's hard for three to catch rides. (Goes to window) | 3. What's your objection? | 2. Let's go to Ypsi (nearby town) by bumming. |
| | 5. What're we going to do? | |
| | 6. Is there any lecture or concert or any place we can go to? | |
| | 8. We want to go to something free. | 7. Let's make two plans. If after a quarter of an hour we don't get a ride to Ypsi, we'll do something else. |
| | 10. How about the time? | 9. Isn't there an art exhibit in Alumni building? |
| 11. You can make that long or short. (Pause) | | |
| 12. We can see some one dead or chopped up in the medical building. | 13. Do you mean the anatomy lab? Not much to see. | |
| 14. Yes, I suppose so. | 15. Saturday is the best day to go. | |
| | 16. I could take you to the architectural building and show you a picture of a nude. | |
| 18. We want some excitement. | | 17. (Record illegible) |

| Student A | Student B | Student C |
|--|---|-------------------------------------|
| <p>22. I have thirty-five cents.</p> <p>23. Well, I have some sort of idea. Let's try to get a ride, and then we'll get reactions to people going by. Not necessarily exciting, but some bootleggers might shoot.</p> <p>25. I don't dream, so I wouldn't have any interactions.</p> <p>27. That's so tame.</p> <p>29. I know.</p> <p>30. We can go down to visit the county jail.</p> <p>32. This is such an unexciting time of day.</p> <p>34. Detroit. I've been there three times since vacation.</p> <p>36. My frontal lobes are all frazzled.</p> <p>37. We could roll up our pants and direct traffic.</p> <p>39. And we could see how long it takes to get out of jail.</p> <p>41. It's always nice to go down there. I used to have this difficulty when I was a child.</p> <p>44. Couldn't we give an impromptu concert?</p> | <p>19. We can go down town and do something.</p> <p>20. Let's go for an airplane ride.</p> <p>24. I have a good idea—let's sleep.</p> <p>26. I don't know. Ypsi is better than nothing. Everybody is going there.</p> <p>28. The bumming to Ypsi won't net us anything.</p> <p>31. I've visited the jail too many times.</p> <p>33. I know where we'd go, eh, Bill?</p> <p>35. I can't think of a thing.</p> <p>38. And see how long it takes to get arrested.</p> <p>40. We might go down to the Island, but what's the good?</p> <p>42. I'm trying to think up something good and desperate, but it doesn't work.</p> <p>43. It's taking us a long time to decide what to do.</p> <p>45. Hurry up, they're waiting.</p> | <p>21. Have you got five bucks?</p> |

| Student A | Student B | Student C |
|--|--|-----------|
| 46. Haven't you any ideas, Bill? | 47. Is there any place to go? How about the intramural? (New intramural sports building recently opened) | |
| 48. I haven't even seen the outside. It's better than seeing pictures. | 49. All right. Bill is a man of parts. He'll show us around. | |
| 50. All right. | | |

Time elapsed: thirteen minutes

Part II—Student A is placed in another group and Student D, a girl, is grouped with B and C

| Student B | Student D | Student C |
|--|---|--|
| 1. I wonder what we're supposed to do? | 2. Are we supposed to keep the time? | |
| 3. No, we merely keep the time to see how long the experiment takes. | 4. I don't think we can do the plan that the three of us decided on in the other experiment. That was to go to the Woman's League building. | |
| 5. We planned to go to the intramural. | 6. I'd like to go. I've never been there. | |
| 7. Can women go there, C? | | 8. You can call up and find out? |
| (Goes to call up. Absent for rest of experiment.) | 10. That's right. And it will be crowded at this time. | 9. Do you mind seeing fellows half-dressed? |
| 12. The line is busy. | | 11. Well, you can see the two gyms, the courts, and the building itself is worth seeing. |

(Instructor accepts this as concluding Part II, since the group had agreed on a common plan whose feasibility depended on extraneous factors)

The student's discussion of this record is omitted, but I may say in passing that the struggle to think of something to do loomed so large in the young man's mind that he completely forgot the point of the experiment, namely, the effect of changing the groupings. It is apparent, however, that the experiment was not well planned to bring this out, since D was not only a new member of the group but was of a different sex than the others and already had a plan of her own that had been devised in another group. Consequently the second part of the experiment is of interest merely to show how the thing should not be done.

As a part of the final examination the members of the class were required to analyze their most completely recorded experiment by means of an interaction diagram similar to the one given here. This diagram which was not thought of until the end of the year will be made a part of the report of every interaction experiment hereafter. Certain possibilities connected with it deserve exploration—such, for example, as the accurate spacing of the subjects along the Y axis according to social distance, attitude differences, or similar characteristics, and the spacing of the successive interaction-initiatives along the X axis according to time or intensity or some other measurable attribute. It may not be impossible

to develop a quantitative picture of social process in face-to-face groups.

Unfortunately, of course we cannot expect to do very much in the way of discovery until more adequate means of record are available. Despite this, however, the venture is not without its intriguing aspects merely as an experiment in methods of teaching. Experience indicates that the experiments in social psychology should generally precede the interaction experiments instead of being interspersed with them as was the case this year. More attention will have to be paid to introducing the interaction point of view gradually instead of starting with it abruptly at the first meeting as we did this time. And a great deal more emphasis will have to be placed on round table discussions even at the cost of reducing the number of experiments. The one thing that stands out at the end of the year is the extreme difficulty that the average person seems to have in actually attending to the processes of social interaction.¹⁴

¹⁴ Experimentation with interactions among children seems to offer somewhat different problems than those discussed in this article. For a summary of research projects now in progress or recently completed dealing with interactions among children see W. I. and Dorothy S. Thomas, *The Child in America*, pp. 518-537. The work of Miss Marjorie Walker under Anderson and Goodenough at the Institute of Child Welfare at Minneapolis is particularly noteworthy.

NOTE ON PRESERVATION OF RESEARCH MATERIALS

ROBERT C. BINKLEY

THE development of research in social science, and the application of the scientific method to social problems threatens to encounter a mechanical limitation to which the attention of those who are interested in this field should be directed. This limitation

is set by the quality of the paper that has been used for printing over the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

Between the 60's and the 80's of the 19th century wood pulp paper replaced rag paper in the publishing trade. The use of wood pulp and of cheaper manu-

facturing processes effect a revolution in publishing comparable to the revolution brought about when paper replaced parchment in the 14th and 15th centuries. Wood pulp paper made possible an increased publishing of newspapers and magazines in the same decades in which the spread of popular education was creating new multitudes of readers for the increased mass of printed matter. These same decades witnessed administrative reforms in many countries, and gave rise to practices of issuing government publications on a scale previously unknown. More and more we have come to depend on these government publications, administrative, statistical, and legislative, for the information upon which to base policies.

Meanwhile on the level of purely intellectual life the sciences were dividing and subdividing, replacing the encyclopaedic natural philosophies (of which Spencer's was the last) with highly specialized disciplines, each of which made use of its professional journals to coördinate the work done in its own field. There were very few specialized scientific periodicals before mid-century, but today they are numbered by thousands. Contemporary civilization is implemented, on the intellectual side, with wood pulp paper, as surely as it is implemented on the mechanical side with metal. Our organization of opinion, of administration and of scientific research takes this cheap paper supply for granted. The limitation which rag paper would place upon our organization of intellectual life is illustrated by the fact that the rag paper edition of the New York Times costs \$170.00 per year.

The wood pulp paper serves well enough for carrying on the practical affairs of the day, but if we depend upon these publications to serve also as permanent records for research use we shall be disappointed.

This most decisive epoch in the development of our civilization has been recorded on paper that will not last.

The poorest of the wood paper lasts only a few years. Newspapers of the Russian Revolution of 1917 in the Hoover War Library are in some cases illegible because of the decomposition of the paper stock, although they have never been handled or read. The better wood paper has a life probability of decades, but rag paper lasts for centuries. Cotton and linen fibres are chemically more inert than prepared wood pulp; wood pulp oxidizes. That is why a fifteenth century Bible is better preserved today than a 1910 magazine.

It is easy enough to make durable paper. The difficulty lies in this: there has not been in the past, and there is not now, any correlation between the record-value of a publication and the durability of the paper upon which it is printed. The best paper is often used to publish new editions of Boccaccio while the worst suffices for scientific reports and statistical publications.

The paper situation threatens to limit in an arbitrary way the development of research in the social sciences. Librarians already hesitate to permit teachers to set loose their research students to devour newspaper files. The purchase policies of the libraries are trimmed to avoid the acquisition of many types of documents which should be saved, but which the librarians will not gather because the paper is too poor. These are already matters of inconvenience. As paper deterioration goes on apace, certain types of research, especially those which have to do with the establishing of trends from 1880 to date, will become not merely difficult but impossible.

Quite without prejudice to any general question of method that may be raised, it seems clear that the social sciences cannot

permit a mechanical fact like paper deterioration to cut away from them a large amount of useful data. It may be that we can't help it, but at least we should make a fight before it is too late.

In the logic of the situation, some such remedial action as this seems to be required:

1. An investigation of the life history of paper and a survey of the life probability of different classes of publications. We must know where the weak spots are—where the records are breaking down.
2. The discovery of reliable and cheap means of preserving or copying paper. The means must be cheap enough to permit large scale salvaging operations.

3. The timely selection, from among the materials which are doomed, of that which is worth saving, and the coordinating of the efforts of libraries and other institutions that are working to save decaying materials.

4. The effective introduction into publishing and library practices, of some standard policy whereby a few record copies of every publication that has record value will be printed upon durable paper for library purchase.

Such a task as this must be envisaged in terms of years. The enterprise is worth the serious interest of the social science students generally. One of our many organizations of scholars should take the thing in hand.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY CREATED

Hitherto at the University of Wisconsin sociology has been joined with economics in one Department. Now, however, the Department of Sociology and Anthropology has been created and all the work in sociology at the University will be coördinated. The teaching and research in rural sociology has been in the Department of Economics in the College of Agriculture. Other phases of sociology have been in the College of Letters and Science in the University Extension Division. The new Department will unify teaching and research work in sociology throughout the University.

At present there are nine persons of professorial rank in sociology at the University of Wisconsin as well as some instructors and a considerable number of assistants. It is intended to add in the course of the next two or three years a full professor of Social Statistics, an additional professor in Theory, a second man in Anthropology and two new people in Rural Sociology.

The research program will be expanded by placing on the staff two or more research assistants. The amount of money to be devoted to research in sociology has been increased this year and will be added to as rapidly as possible.

PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

PSYCHIATRY AND THE MASSACHUSETTS COURTS AS NOW RELATED

WINFRED OVERHOLSER

DURING the past few years evidences have been noted of a growing interest on the part of the legal profession and of the general public in the possibilities of psychiatry as an aid to the administration of criminal justice. Some of this interest, to be sure, has been stimulated by the exaggerated, but in some cases not wholly unwarranted attacks which have been made upon the use of expert medical testimony, attacks which in some instances have led to the passage of rather hasty and unwise legislation. At the same time, however, various organizations engaged in serious studies of the defects of criminal procedure have come to a realization that psychiatric advice can be of great aid in assuring the accomplishment of justice, from the point of view both of society and of the accused. The National Crime Commission, for example, at the outset organized a Subcommittee on the Medical Aspects of Crime, which so far has devoted most of its attention to psychiatry. Some of the state and local crime commissions, such as the State Crime Commission of New York and the Missouri Crime Survey, have given the subject considerable attention. As illustrating the interest of the medical profession may be mentioned the

creation by the American Psychiatric Association of a Committee on the Legal Aspects of Psychiatry. In the reports made by these various organizations Massachusetts is not infrequently mentioned as being one of the leaders in the practical application of psychiatry to the penal machinery. It, therefore, seems not inappropriate at the present time to offer a review of what has been accomplished, and a statement of the present situation as regards the employment of psychiatry in the courts of the Commonwealth. No attempt is here made to deal with the use of psychiatry in the correctional institutions,—the pioneer work of Dr. Guy Fernald at the Concord Reformatory, of Dr. Edith Spaulding at Sherborn, and of Dr. A. Warren Stearns at the State Prison is well known, as is also the recent innovation of psychiatric examinations of prisoners in the jails and houses of correction. This paper will discuss only the use of psychiatry as an aid to courts and prosecutors in determining the criminal responsibility and the triability of defendants, and the most suitable disposition of their cases.

Before dealing with the outside facilities which are available to the courts, we may first consider what facilities the courts

have provided for themselves. It is probably a matter of common knowledge that the Boston Municipal Court was the first adult court in the United States to establish a psychiatric clinic. This clinic was set up in 1913 with Dr. Victor V. Anderson as its head, and under Dr. Edouard Sandoz is still in operation. It functions as well as a general medical clinic and examines mentally or physically more than one hundred individuals per month. The Boston Juvenile Court has employed the Judge Baker Foundation in a considerable proportion of its cases; for practical purposes the Foundation approaches being the official clinic of that court. The district courts at East Cambridge, Fall River, and Springfield, have provided for themselves, usually on a volunteer basis, psychiatric clinics.

In this connection, reference may be made to a nation-wide survey conducted under the auspices of the National Crime Commission, the results of which were published in the October 1928 issue of *Mental Hygiene*.¹ So far as addresses could be obtained, a questionnaire was sent to every criminal court in the country; sixty-one replies were received from courts in this Commonwealth. Six courts reported that they employ psychiatrists regularly on a part-time basis, and in addition one court reported itself as employing with considerable frequency members of the staff of one of the state hospitals. Thirty-three courts reported that they refer doubtful cases to psychiatrists for mental examination, while twenty-eight answered that they do not follow this practice. Ten stated that they employ trained social workers in addition to their probation officers; forty-nine reported in the negative, and two did

not reply. In thirty-five courts the probation officer assists the psychiatrist in obtaining data for his examination; fourteen replied in the negative, thirteen made no answer. Finally, twenty courts gave unqualifiedly favorable comments on the value of ascertaining the mental and physical condition of defendants as an aid in the disposition of their cases. Nine courts only gave unfavorable comments, whereas thirty-two refrained entirely. In short, it may be said that from the facts disclosed by this survey Massachusetts compares favorably with her sister states in showing an enlightened interest on the part of her courts and an encouraging degree of employment of court psychiatrists.

From this consideration of the employment of court-controlled facilities, let us turn to the general provisions of law relating to the use of psychiatry in the courts. The first law on this subject was passed in 1849, as Chapter 68 of the Acts of that year, and provided that:

"whenever any person indicted . . . shall be at the time appointed for trial found to the satisfaction of the court to be insane, the court is hereby authorized to cause him to be removed to the State Lunatic Hospital at Worcester."

This law remained in effect in substantially the same form until 1904. Chapter 257 of that year provided for the appointment by the court of two experts in insanity, allowed the commitment at any time prior to trial as well as at the time appointed for trial, and permitted observation commitment as well as commitment of those cases in which a definite adjudication of insanity had been made. This provision, which is now familiar as Section 100 of Chapter 123 of the General Laws, has proved highly useful. In any doubtful case the court may appoint its own expert or experts to make examination and report. If upon such examination a further period

¹ W. Overholser, "Psychiatric Service in Penal and Reformatory Institutions and Criminal Courts in the United States," *Mental Hygiene*, XII, 801-838.

of observation appears desirable the court may commit to a state hospital "under such limitations as it may order." The patient is thus kept under the authority of the court and if he recovers or is found not to be insane he is returned to the court for further disposition. The advantages of such an informal and simple procedure over that existing in some states, where a jury trial on the issue is required before such commitment is made, is obvious. Under this law defendants suffering from mental disease are spared the necessity of coming into court and are cared for in the proper institutions, their criminal cases being continued or placed on file until they are in suitable condition to be tried. About 150 persons are committed to the hospitals of this state yearly under the provisions of Section 100.² In addition, a considerable number of defendants are examined by experts appointed by the courts whose mental condition does not render their commitment desirable or necessary. In a recent (unpublished) study by the author of the use of this section in the Superior Court of Suffolk County, it was found that in a period of two years (1926-27) seventy-one prisoners had been examined, of whom twenty-five had been committed to a mental hospital. The charges against these defendants were various, twenty-eight of them being misdemeanors only, so that we may infer that in the Suffolk Superior Court at least the legal gravity of the offense is not the criterion for reference to the examiners. This is, of course, as it should be. On the other hand, it may occasion some astonishment that so small a proportion of the 10,000 or more defendants coming before

the court in that period were thought to be in need of mental examination.

When an examination is made under Section 100, a fee is paid by the court. In order to encourage courts to feel free to consult and obtain psychiatric advice, who might otherwise be hampered by the prospect of incurring expense, a statute was passed in 1918 which is now known as Section 99 of Chapter 123 of the General Laws. This provides that any court may call upon the Department of Mental Diseases to make an examination of any person coming before it. In such a case a member of a State hospital staff is assigned to examine and report; no fee is paid for this service. It seems somewhat unfortunate that with such facilities available the courts have not seen fit to employ this section more than they have. During the two years 1926 and 1927 thirteen cases were referred from courts in Suffolk County and twelve from courts in other counties, an average for the state of only about twelve cases a year. During the year 1928, twelve cases have been referred from Suffolk County and six from the rest of the state. There is every reason under this section, as under Section 100, why the courts should feel confidence in the reports given them, and in general the advice given appears to have been followed. In 1928, for instance, of those prisoners reported as insane or as in such condition that observation was desirable, all but one were committed to a mental hospital. That one, a girl of about nineteen, quite obviously in the manic phase of manic depressive psychosis was, in spite of a clear report, committed to the Reformatory for Women. She was promptly identified there as psychotic and committed to a state hospital. It seems unfortunate, of course, that such a person should have been placed on trial and com-

² K. M. Bowman, "Medical and Social Study of One Hundred Cases Referred by the Courts to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital," *Mental Hygiene*, XII, 55-71, January 1928.

mitted to a penal institution in the first place.

Section 101 of Chapter 123, General Laws, requiring the commitment for life to a state hospital of any person acquitted of homicide "by reason of insanity," and making his release contingent upon the clemency of the Governor and the approval of the Department of Mental Diseases, though used infrequently, is a provision the value of which is not fully realized. Suffice it to say that its existence has been to a considerable extent responsible for the fact that no such travesties upon justice as the recent release of Remus from an Ohio state hospital have occurred in Massachusetts.

One disadvantage of the provisions of law just discussed is that the initiative for the examination comes from non-medical persons. With the exception of the few cases which come to the attention of the jail physician while awaiting trial, the prisoners referred for examination must have aroused the suspicion of the judge, probation officer, lawyer or a member of the family. The possibility is not at all remote that all these may fail to recognize a case of mental disease,—the number of psychotic persons found under sentence indicates that. Nor is it inconceivable that an attempt may be made by the defense to raise an issue of insanity upon the flimsiest of grounds. One danger of this latter contingency is that the very tenuousness of the evidence may set up a prejudice in the minds of the examiners. Aside from the possibility of bias, one must bear in mind the likelihood that once the issue is raised the matter may go on to trial, with the appearance of experts on either side, the introduction of conflicting testimony, the obfuscation of the jury, and the further denunciation by the public of all experts as incompetent, venal, and dishonest.

The mere fact that at some stage after the commencement of the case the court has appointed experts will not act as a guarantee against such situations, for in many cases the defense is prone to regard such experts as emissaries of their opponent, the district-attorney. The decisions, too, are not in agreement as to the status on the witness stand of experts appointed by the court,³ some tribunals having decided that such appointment gives undue and unfair weight to their testimony.

It remained for Massachusetts to introduce a new principle, namely that of a *routine* mental examination of certain classes of persons held for trial. In 1921,⁴ Dr. L. Vernon Briggs, the distinguished Vice-President of the Massachusetts Psychiatric Society, secured the passage of a law which has attracted the attention of students of criminal procedure throughout the country. This remarkable piece of legislation called for the examination by Department of Mental Diseases of (1) all persons indicated for a capital offense and (2) all persons bound over or indicted for a felony (a) who have been previously convicted of a felony or (b) who have been indicted for any other offense more than once. Provision was made that the report of such examination should be forwarded to the clerk of the superior court, should be admissible as evidence, and should be accessible to the court, the district attorney, and counsel for the accused. The examinations are thus made under the auspices of an independent medical organization, not even a part of the court system, and the professional ability of the examiners is passed upon by

³ Favorable: *Meek v. Wheeler, Kelly & Hagney Inv. Co.*, 251 Pac. Rep. 184 (Kansas, 1926). *State v. Horne*, 171 N. C. 787 (1916). Unfavorable: *People v. Dickerson*, 129 N.W.R. 199 (Michigan, 1910). *People v. Scott*, 326 Ill. 327 (1927).

⁴ Chapter 415, Acts of 1921.

the same authority. Since the examination is based upon the legal status of the prisoner, rather than upon a suspected or alleged mental disorder, there are no presuppositions or prejudices to be overcome. Finally, a reasonable assurance is given that within the group delimited by the statute, no court need act in ignorance of the defendant's mental condition.

Several changes in the law, designed to facilitate its administration, have been made, but none of these has affected the fundamental principle. In 1923⁵ provision was made for the payment of a nominal fee (four dollars) to the examiners. In 1925⁶ on legal advice the report was no longer declared admissible as evidence. A penalty was also imposed upon clerks who wilfully neglected any duty imposed upon them by this law. Even with this provision, however, many cases were not reported that should have been. Up to October 1926, for instance, of three hundred sixty-seven defendants reported, one hundred seventy-three, or forty-seven per cent, were indicted for a capital offense. That many accused of other felonies were not reported is obvious, the reason being that the clerk is not required to know of any previous record of a defendant. Fortunately, in 1926⁷ a law was enacted calling upon probation officers to investigate the records of all persons accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. Taking advantage of this fact, an amendment to the "Briggs Law" was passed in 1927⁸ imposing upon the probation officer the duty of notifying the clerk of previous convictions or indictments as specified, and upon the clerk the duty of acting upon such information by reporting these cases to the Department.

⁵ Chapter 331, Acts of 1923.

⁶ Chapter 169, Acts of 1925.

⁷ Sec. 1, Chapter 321, Acts of 1926.

⁸ Chapter 59, Acts of 1927.

The response to this modification was immediate; although the amendment became effective only July 1, 1927, by the end of the year ending October 15, 1927, the annual number reported had been increased from an average for the preceding five years of 84 to 138. From this latter date until October 15, 1928, 239 persons were reported, only 33 or 14 per cent of whom were held to answer for a capital offense.

Statistics concerning the practical operation of this law have been collected. Earlier studies were made by Dr. Sheldon Glueck of Harvard University, and by Dr. D. A. Thom.⁹ Figures for the past three years have been collected by the author in such a way that they are comparable with the earlier figures of Dr. Glueck, those now presented covering the operation of the law since its passage in 1921 through October 15, 1928. An intensive study has been made of the cases

⁹ For other articles on this subject see: D. A. Thom: "Medico-Legal Provision in the State of Mass. Relative to the Mental Condition of Certain Persons Held for Trial," *Amer. Journ. Psychiatry*, III, 219-224. S. S. Glueck: "State Legislation Providing for the Mental Examination of Persons Accused of Crime," *Bulletin Mass. Dept. of Mental Diseases*, VII, 16-26. "Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime," 36 *Yale Law Journal*, pp. 632-648, March 1927. Reprinted in *Mental Hygiene*, XI, 287-305. *Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law*, Boston, 1925-55-56, 58-72, 474-476. L. V. Briggs: "Conditions and Events Leading to the Passage of the Massachusetts Law commonly called the 'Briggs Law,'" *Bulletin Mass. Department of Mental Diseases*, XII, Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 2-5. W. Overholser: "Psychiatric Examination of Prisoners in Massachusetts," *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal*, Vol. 195, 1065-1067. "Psychiatry and the Courts in Massachusetts," *Journ. American Institute Criminal Law and Criminology*, XIX, 76-83. "Practical Operation of the Mass. Law Requiring the Psychiatric Examination of Certain Persons Accused of Crime," *Mass. Law Quarterly*, XIII, 35-49. (Reprinted from *Bulletin Mass. Dept. Mental Diseases*, XII, Nos. 1 and 2, October 1928.)

reported during the year ending on the latter date, some of the results of which will be discussed later.

Seven hundred and forty-four persons accused of felony have been reported to the Department of Mental Diseases for examination, of whom 561 have been actually examined. One hundred and fifty-six of the total number were on bail and not located, had been previously sentenced or discharged, or for some other reason were not available. Twenty-seven others were found upon investigation not to be examinable under the provisions of the law. Against the 561 persons examined, there stood 231 indictments for first degree murder. Six others were indicted for second degree murder, and were examined before it was definitely ruled that such cases are not included unless a previous record exists as specified in the statute. Against the remaining 324 persons stood 445 indictments¹⁰ as follows: 39 for sex offenses; 128 for larceny; 148 for breaking and entering (including what in most states is called burglary); 47 for robbery; 29 for assault with intent to rob or kill; and 54 for various other offenses. Against the 156 persons not examined for any of the various reasons previously given there have stood 20 indictments for homicide, 15 for sex offenses; 26 for larceny; 51 for breaking and entering; 17 for robbery; 15 for assault to rob or kill; and 24 for other offenses—a total of 211.

Considering now the mental condition of the 561 persons examined we find that 37 were reported to be suffering from a definite psychosis, that is, to be legally

"insane;" 14 others were in such mental condition that a period of observation in a mental hospital was recommended as desirable before the expression of an opinion; 55 were reported as being mentally defective or as "defective delinquents;" and 15 as psychopathic personalities. In all then, 121 or 21.5 per cent of the total number were found to be suggestively or clearly abnormal mentally. Assuming that the same percentage holds good for the group not examined we should expect that about 39 out of the 183 reported but not examined probably likewise had a definitely abnormal mental condition.

In general it may be said that the courts have been inclined to follow the recommendation of the examiners as regards those cases reported to be definitely or possibly psychotic. During the current year, for instance, six prisoners were reported to be insane and in six other cases commitment for observation was recommended. Among the former group one prisoner committed suicide in the jail before steps could be taken to have him committed. In one other case the court called in other examiners who reported the prisoner as "not insane." It may be added that in this case the original examination was a very hurried one, the prisoner being in the dock at the time. The remaining four were committed to mental hospitals. Of the group recommended for observation commitment, four were so committed. One of the other two cases was disposed of before the report of the examiners was received, and in the other case the prisoner was sentenced in the court of another county than that which had reported him to the Department. In the cases where medical evidence has been required, (the report now not being admissible as evidence) it has been possible to place the examiners on

¹⁰ Some of these cases were bound over by the lower court for action by the grand jury, and therefore, were not technically indicted at the time of examination. Since the court has found "probable cause" and since the statute operates alike upon both classes, except in the case of capital offenses, no distinction has been made in presenting the figures for felonies other than murder in the first degree.

the stand. In such cases their neutral status has been recognized, and they have usually been able to make a succinct, dignified statement of their findings and opinion. The advantage of this arrangement over the traditional partisan procedure, with its hypothetical questions, "yes or no" answers, and its heckling by cross-examiners, is obvious.

The concept of "insanity" is an old one in the criminal law. Apparently, however, the realization is not particularly widespread, among the members of the legal profession, that mental defect is to be distinguished from mental disease or that there is among the mental defectives a group who, although not of sufficiently low mentality to classify as "insane" in the eyes of the law, are of limited responsibility, or at least call for special penal treatment. This is the group to which we refer as defective delinquents. Massachusetts, as is well known, was the first state (1911) to recognize such a group legally, although an institution for their reception was not available until after New York had already established one. Pennsylvania has recently passed a defective delinquent law but as yet has not authorized the construction of an institution; no other state has yet advanced to the point of recognizing this group. The Massachusetts law formerly provided¹¹ that a mentally defective person convicted of an offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment might be committed for an indeterminate period to the Department for Defective Delinquents, provided that his mental defect was certified by two qualified physicians and that he had a record of a previous conviction in Massachusetts within three years. This latter condition was entirely arbitrary, and as a result of it a considerable number of serious

menaces to society could not be committed as defective delinquents by reason of not having had such a conviction in this state within the specified time. In 1928 an amendment was passed¹² providing for commitment to the Department for Defective Delinquents "if the court finds the defendant to be mentally defective and after examination into his record, character and personality, that he has shown himself to be an habitual delinquent or shows tendencies towards becoming such, and that such delinquency is or may become a menace to the public and that he is not a proper subject for the schools for the feeble-minded or for commitment as an insane person." This amendment by enlarging the definition of delinquency makes the law considerably more effective. The courts even yet, however, have shown some little hesitancy in employing this provision. Some judges, in fact, take the attitude that the penal institution is the proper place to sort out the cases, and as a result commit to the house of correction or reformatory, thinking it to be entirely a simple matter for that institution to commit the prisoner if he seems to be a suitable candidate for the Department for Defective Delinquents. As a matter of fact this is far from being the case. It is true that inmates of penal institutions and of schools for the feeble-minded may be committed as defective delinquents, but only in case they become serious disciplinary problems while in their respective institutions.¹³ As is well known, many of this group are entirely well behaved while under discipline, and consequently the heads of correctional institutions are often faced with the inability to request the commitment of an individual who they feel is almost certain to become a serious problem upon release and who

¹¹ Section 113, Chapter 123, General Laws.

¹² Chapter 333, Acts of 1928.

¹³ Sections 114, 115, Chapter 123, General Laws.

would classify much better at the Department for Defective Delinquents. It is to be hoped that the courts will come to a growing realization of the desirability of disposing of such cases properly in the first place.

During the year ending October 15, 1928, twenty-one of the persons examined by the Department of Mental Diseases were reported to be mentally defective. Of these, only three were committed to the Department of Defective Delinquents. One other, who was likewise epileptic, was committed as insane to the Bridge-water State Hospital. The dispositions of the other cases were as follows: State Prison, seven; Reformatory, two; House of Correction, four; Fined, Not Pleased, Not Guilty, and Probation, one each. The case of one of these individuals who received a three months sentence in the House of Correction is of some interest. He is a man about 33 years of age, who since 1918 has accumulated a record of 25 arrests. In addition to being feeble-minded, he is a drug addict and an alcoholic. He has served six sentences in the Reformatory or House of Correction, for assault and battery, assault with a dangerous weapon, breaking and entering, larceny from the person, and drunkenness. At the time he was examined by the department he was awaiting trial for larceny and the report of the department was submitted nearly three months before the court acted; that such a disposition hardly serves to protect society is a mild statement of the fact. Already since his release from the sentence under discussion he has been convicted of larceny and given another (suspended) sentence.

The diagnosis of psychopathic personality is one which has been made very charily, only 15 of the 561 cases having been so designated. This fact is interest-

ing, particularly in view of the ill-founded claim sometimes heard that psychiatrists if given their own way would label most, if not all, offenders as psychopathic. Unfortunately, the law does not recognize psychopathic personality either as a ground for lessened responsibility¹⁴ or as a reason for specialized treatment. As a result the only hope of society at present as regards the psychopathic offender is that he may be given long sentences. In the future it would seem that the desirability of specialized treatment for the¹⁵ psychopathic delinquent must be recognized. Unfortunately, however, the tradition of definite predetermined sentences based upon the supposed gravity of the offense still obtains to a considerable degree, with the result that often the judge, even though aware that the defendant is a dangerous individual on account of a psychopathic make-up is considerably hampered in his disposition of the case.

A brief survey of the reasons for failure to examine 60 of the persons reported to the Department in 1928 may be of some interest here. Two were found to be not examinable under the law. In one instance the attorney refused to permit his client to be interviewed. So far as can be learned this is the only instance of the sort since the law became operative. It is of some interest to note that this attorney came from a city some distance from Boston and presumably was not familiar with the law. In one other instance the prisoner refused examination although his attorney advised him to allow it. In seven cases the notation was

¹⁴ See *Commonwealth v. Cooper* 210 Mass. 1 (1914).

¹⁵ See, B. Glueck "Concerning Prisoners," *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. II, 2, p. 177 (1918). L. Vervaeck, "L'Assistance et le traitement du Psychopathe delinquant," *Journal de Neurologie et de Psychiatrie*, April 1928, (No. 4).

made that the prisoner "could not be located." In some instances this may have been due to the fact that he had defaulted on his bail. Twenty persons were not examined because although they were known to be out on bail they could not be seen. It should be said, however, that in a number of other instances the bondsmen produced the accused for examination at the convenience of the psychiatrists appointed to make such examination.

The largest and in some ways the most disquieting group is that of 21 whose cases were disposed of by sentence before the Department's report was received. Eight others were discharged by reason of rendition to other states, *nol pros*, or failure of the Grand Jury to indict; no exception, of course, can be taken to this group. Among the twenty-one cases were two men, charged with first degree murder, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter and were sentenced to State Prison. In some of these cases the clerk had not sent the defendant's name to the Department until after sentence had been passed, thus following the letter of the law, while disregarding entirely the spirit. It is likely that this obstacle to the efficient operation of the law, will continue to exist to some extent until the courts come to a greater realization of the value of these reports. It should be added that some of the judges when informed that examination has been requested of the Department have insisted upon having the report before they would proceed with disposition.

One difficulty in the practical working of the law has been that on occasion the Department has been requested to make examinations on very short notice. A telephone call may be received that a defendant whose case is being then reported is to appear in court the following day, and that report is desired by that

time. In a few instances, in fact, the Department has been asked to make examinations in the dock or in the prisoner's room at the court-house, the judge waiting in the meantime for the report. It is hardly necessary to say that the intention of the law was to give ample time for a thorough examination, not for a hasty or cursory one hardly worthy of the name. The Department has encouraged the examining psychiatrists so far as possible to have a psychometric examination and a social investigation made, just as would be done in a mental hospital. Instances are on record where failure to do this has resulted in demonstrably erroneous conclusions. It was for the purpose of allowing sufficient time that the law was drawn to provide for reporting by the lower courts, even before indictment was found, as well as to give opportunity for examination as soon as possible after the commission of the alleged offense. A few of the lower courts, notably the Boston Municipal Court and the District Court of Lowell, have been especially faithful in following this clear intent of the statute. Most of the others, however, in spite of the duty laid upon the probation officer of investigating the previous record of defendants⁷ have chosen to pass on this work to the Superior Court, with the result mentioned above. If the lower courts would carry out the intent of the statute there would be no occasion for this criticism, since by far the majority of felony cases originate with a preliminary hearing in the court of first instance, comparatively few starting with indictments. Furthermore, such an arrangement would obviate the criticism that the making of these examinations may result in delaying action upon pending cases.

A study of the reasons for the disposition of some cases has indicated that there is a

possibility that the reports by being sent directly to the clerk and not being available to the probation officer are likely to be overlooked when the matter of disposition comes up. When the report is returned to the clerk, he notifies the district attorney and the counsel for the accused, as provided by the law. The report is then filed with the other papers in the case, and after the matter of guilt is determined the papers are handed to the judge for him to look over before disposition. In the rush of affairs it is more than likely that a report of some abnormal condition other than frank mental disease (which would have been noted previously by counsel or by the clerk) might be completely overlooked and that this omission might affect the disposition made of the case. It would seem desirable to make the report accessible to the probation officer as well, as it is his official duty to present to the court any facts of interest relating to the defendant in order to guide the court in its disposition.¹⁰ If he were notified by the clerk whenever such a report is received he could incorporate the salient features into his recommendation, doing so at some leisure, rather than in the haste of the court-room. It seems highly probable that such a modification of the procedure would increase materially the efficiency of the law by calling more forcefully to the court's attention the result of the studies of the examiners.

A few words concerning the nature of the reports themselves may not be here amiss. It seems quite clear from a study of them that many of the examiners are not thoroughly aware that the statute calls for reports on two rather distinct matters. The wording is as follows: "the Department shall cause such person

¹⁰ The law has since been amended to this effect by Chapter 105, Acts of 1929.

to be examined with a view to determine his mental condition and the existence of any mental disease or defect which would affect his criminal responsibility." In most cases the psychiatrists have satisfied themselves with a statement to the effect that the prisoner is or is not criminally responsible, failing to make any further statement regarding his mental condition. There are, of course, prisoners who present deviations from the normal which might very likely be of interest to the district attorney, to the counsel for the accused, or to the court, even though they do not constitute in extent or degree of severity legal "insanity." One prisoner, for instance, was reported as being "feeble-minded to a slight degree." On another case the notation was made "moron of higher grade, suitable to stand trial." Still another was reported as being "low normal, but responsible." One district attorney, to be sure, has recently objected that he wishes nothing but the categorical statement of the presence or absence of criminal responsibility, but some of his colleagues certainly do not agree with him. It may be borne in mind, too, that these reports are designed for the information of the court and counsel for the defense as well as of the prosecuting officer. In order to make the reports to a higher extent useful it would seem desirable to give a brief summary of the facts upon which the opinion is based. Such facts might well include a statement as to the result of a psychometric examination and of the social investigation which should ideally be made. Certainly no one interested in the most efficient operation of the criminal law, be he district attorney or judge, should object to having as many facts as possible available concerning the mental make-up of the individual whose case is to be disposed of. The day has long since passed when psychiatry attempted to

draw a hair-line between the normal and the abnormal, and the day is passing as well in the legal world when all offenders are considered to fall either in the fully responsible or the wholly irresponsible class. The recognition of borderline states must eventually lead to a more enlightened and individualized method of dealing with the offender. The psychiatrists of Massachusetts have an unequalled opportunity, by means of clearly and simply written reports giving not only their opinion but some of the facts upon which it is grounded, of educating the courts to an appreciation of the value of psychiatry as a practical aid in the administration of criminal justice. Much has already

been accomplished—"battles of experts" have been almost entirely eliminated; a marked advance has been made in demonstrating the usefulness of psychiatry in court procedure; the expense of numerous long-drawn trials has been avoided by this early examination, and many persons coming before the courts have been sent at once to the special institutions where they properly belonged. With the increasing coöperation of the courts and (equally important) the continued assistance of the psychiatrists of the state, Massachusetts may safely be expected to go forward to still greater accomplishments in the harmonious union of psychiatry and the criminal law.

THREE METHODS OF STUDYING AGENCY INTER-RELATIONSHIP

IDA R. PARKER

THE Social Service Department of the Massachusetts Homoeopathic Hospital in studying the problem of the interrelationship of social agencies has experimented with three methods.

In describing these methods we wish to emphasize their tentative nature and the fact that we are still groping for light on this problem. It will be seen that the purpose of the three methods is the same, i.e., to learn exactly what each agency involved did in a particular instance and how its action geared in with that of the other agencies dealing with the problem. Emphasis is on agency interrelationship rather than on case technique. What happened to the client is important in this study only in so far as it reveals whether the agencies concerned so co-ordinated their efforts as to carry him as far as was humanly possible towards health—physical, social and spiritual.

Method A. This is an experimental method of studying a case in process of being diagnosed and treated and while it was the joint responsibility of two agencies working closely together. The procedure was as follows: A children's agency and our Social Service Department agreed that the next case which became the concern of both organizations should be chosen for study. The first problem selected by this method proved to be a good average case suitable for such study. The patient was a fifteen-year-old girl with a serious medical problem. The day after the case was referred by a physician and 9 days before her discharge from the hospital, Agency A (the medical agency) referred the case to Agency B (the children's agency). Before the refer was made Agency A's worker conferred with Agency B to learn whether this case was a suitable one for reference. From the

moment of reference Agencies A and B were jointly active on the case, Agency A treating medically and also socially, Agency B diagnosing and treating socially. It will be noted that both agencies were treating socially for a time. This is because there were certain things which each was in a peculiarly favorable position to do. For example, Agency A could best interpret to the bewildered father as he visited his motherless daughter in the ward her need of Agency B's counsel and supervision and persuade him to go and see the worker from that organization. Agency B, on the other hand, could best visit the family with which the father had been boarding his daughter and adapt it to the treatment of the new needs of the patient. It must be emphasized that this joint treatment was given by mutual agreement. Each agency kept the other informed of every move.

The executive of each organization supervised her worker personally. The workers were taken into the plan which was fully explained to them. They, therefore, understood why their work was being observed with particular care and became participant observers. The research worker sat in on conferences whenever the problem was discussed by the executive and case worker of her organization in order to see as far as possible just what was happening, i.e., to watch the machinery in operation. After the case had become the minor responsibility of Agency A with which it originated and the major responsibility of Agency B to which it had been referred the executives of the two agencies and the workers who had handled the case came together to review the problem and to discover the strong and the weak points in coördination. The research worker participated in this conference and wrote

it up. This account was submitted to those who were present for their suggestion and criticism. This experiment was characterized throughout by good sportsmanship and mutual confidence—confidence which the two executives, it should be noted, communicated to their workers. It demonstrated to our satisfaction that a case in process can be studied to advantage. An important by-product of this method was a greater appreciation on the part of those participating in the experiment of the significance of agency interrelationship and a clearer understanding of the methods and functions of the other participating organizations.

Method B is a small and incomplete experiment in the exchange of experience through the exchange of workers. This was actually coördination in process. This experiment was tried with a public department whose executive feels the necessity of an interchange of points of view between public and private agencies if they are to work together effectively and understandingly. The executive and two workers from the public department and the executive and one worker from the private participated in this experiment over a period of eight weeks. One week a worker from Agency 1 spent a morning in the office of Agency 2, the alternate week a worker from Agency 2 visited Agency 1. This afforded an opportunity for workers from one agency to observe those from another in action on their own job and in their own surroundings. Executives and case workers alike made every effort to give the visitors from the other organization an opportunity to observe, to read records, to discuss cases and policies and ask questions as to the treatment of certain puzzling situations and the reasons for certain decisions. At the Out-patient Department of the hospi-

tal it was an easy matter for the visitor to overhear an interview without embarrassment to the patient.

Each week following the visit to or from the other agency the research worker, through conference with the hospital social service executive and her worker, tried to analyze the visit, to get at *first* exactly what information had been given through explanation and through opportunity for observation; for example, the hospital social service worker was able to show the routine of the Out-patient Department, the system of the several clinics, the method of selecting and rejecting social service cases, to cite cases to illustrate the development of medical steering into social treatment, the dovetailing of social treatment with that of other agencies, to explain policies, etc.; *second*, likenesses and differences in the processes of the two agencies; *third*, the range of interest of the workers; *fourth*, the attitude, point of view, and response of the workers at first and later as they learned more of the other agency. The research worker probably should have held conferences with the executives and workers of both agencies rather than with those of one. It is still hoped to arrange a conference between the executives and all the workers of both agencies who participated.

Even when this experiment is finished it will fall far short of being ideal. The actual number of hours spent by each agency representative at the coöperating organization will still be too small, the experiment will have been carried on over too short a period of time and it will not have allowed for participation by one agency in the work of the other agency. Moreover, it is probable that more careful planning would have rendered the observational method used more effective than it was. In spite of all its shortcomings,

the experiment has, in our judgment, been worth while. It brought about participation in viewpoint. It holds possibilities for the building up of a coöordinating sense. It signifies desire on the part of two agencies for better coördination of their work—a desire sufficiently real to cause their executives to put time, thought, and effort into an experiment to bring it about.

Method C. This approach was made through intensive analysis of actual cases dealt with by a number of social agencies of which the Hospital itself was one. Certain cases were selected because they showed good coördination, others because they showed lack of it. To discover just why coördination was good here and poor there has been our aim. Our procedure has been: *First*, to assemble all the available facts by carefully reading the case as it is recorded in the records of the several agencies, and by talking with the workers who actually handled the case; *second*, to set down as concisely and as accurately as possible under certain headings which have been worked out each agency's every action which related to another organization. In the analysis, the organizations are designated by number and type instead of by name as an aid to impartial thinking. The analysis in tentative form has then been submitted to the agencies concerned. This has usually been done by conference with the workers and executive or supervisor of each agency involved. This affords an opportunity for the agencies to correct any inaccuracies or misconceptions of the research worker, to challenge any conclusion and to offer suggestions. You will notice that this method is an assembling of facts, opinions and points of view. Without this data one is helpless to arrive at sound conclusions.

Such a method is time-consuming both for the research worker and for those

consulted by her. The working out of this problem is in itself an undertaking in coördinated effort. Scarcely a worker has seemed to feel that she was being required to spend time which she should be putting into current cases crying over spilt milk. On the contrary, interest in the impartial setting forth of the strong and weak points of each agency's handling of the problem has replaced the irritation and impatience sometimes present earlier in the case. A fine spirit of give and take and good sportsmanship has characterized our contact with the agencies.

Some interesting points have come out of the experiments tried. Perhaps the most outstanding fact shown by all three of the methods with which we have experimented indicates that much of the ineffectiveness of interagency effort with its frequent misunderstanding is due to unnecessary or incorrect referring and transferring. Put in positive form, this means that our social effort would be better coördinated if we appreciated the significance of and practiced correct referring and transferring. To know whether the assistance of another agency is actually needed, to recognize the moment it is needed, to know which organization to call upon and how best to assist it to make its contact with the client and to take over wholly or in part the problem with as full an understanding and as little

delay as possible, to know how to prepare the client for the interest of the new agency and to interpret intelligently its work to the client requires training, still, knowledge, discrimination, the ability to think straight, and sound ethics.

The problem of coördination is not merely a problem of research, it is a practical matter which concerns all social workers. Some of the queries which have grown out of the analysis of actual cases follow:

1. Should a public relief agency be equipped to act as a coördinating agency?
2. Was there a definite understanding between agencies A and B when the latter closed the case?
3. Should a highly specialized agency be expected to act as a coördinating agency?
4. When is an agency justified in refusing to take up a case?
5. What obligation has an agency to treat the situation referred?
6. What difference would it have made in this case if each agency before closing had consulted the agency from which it accepted the case and the agency or agencies to which it had referred it?
7. What procedure in referring or transferring results in the best understanding between the client and the agency to which referred or transferred?
8. What kind of information should be withheld in referring or transferring a case?

THE COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD

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CONTROL IN AN INTEGRATED SOCIAL GROUP

GRACE E. CHAFFEE

THE relationship of the family institution to the wider community is a matter of some interest, as well as practical significance. Theories in regard to this problem fall into two major classifications. One group of theorists, represented by Cooley,¹ Dewey,² and Simmel,³ holds that the family as the chief primary group is the essential nursery of human nature and society, effective in establishing attitudes that carry over into wider relationships. The other group, characterized especially by the Freudian school of psychoanalysis, holds that family control is repressive rather than permissive in its action, and that the aims of the individual are constantly in conflict with the aims of society. The family, according to Flügel,⁴ a representative of this second point of view, is a necessary evil, whose emotional attachments should be superseded by complete individual autonomy as rapidly as possible. Sex and not sympathy, is both the uniting and disturbing force in the family group. Studies made of the division of labor that

exists between family and community controls ought to yield facts that would be of use for the interpretations of social theorists as well as for the understanding of modern community and family life. It may be that it is the community and not the family relationship that needs exploratory analysis and habit clinics.

In order to clarify the theoretical relationship that is assumed to obtain between the individual and the group, or between human nature and the social order, it is the custom of sociologists to postulate the existence of a preliterate age when the problem of social control and the production of the desired type of personality was relatively simple. It is the assumption that so long as the group influences remained homogenous and the social stimuli consistent, the life organization of the individual would be in harmony with group standards. The immature member of the group was introduced into a uniform set of pre-existing institutions and practices. His impulses were evoked by them. His wishes were defined and his habits organized with respect to them. He became a carrier of a uniform group tradition. In this simple situation, the individual was known in all aspects of his life. There was no room left for interstitial relationships or activi-

¹ Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 23 ff.

² John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*.

³ Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of George Simmel*, p. 179 ff.

⁴ J. C. Flügel, *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family*, pp. 4, 217-28, 241-42.

ties. No areas for individual freedom existed. If, for any reason, the individual dissented, he was brought into conformity by the pressure of group attitudes. This pressure ranged from spontaneous gestures of disapproval manifested by the group itself to final ejection from the group. The result was, on the individual side, a personality organized and integrated by the ethical standards of the small, inclusive group. The other aspect of the relationship was a stable, homogeneous society. The success of the group lay in its ability to make its own more effective by circumscribing the contacts of the individual member and defining his wishes within that area.

Simple situations, such as this analysis assumes, are relatively unknown in modern society. The problem is one of greater complexity. There are, however, certain culturally isolated groups, where conditions approach the homogeneity characteristic of primitive times. The sectarian community, as it is found in contemporary America, with its separatist beliefs, its negative attitude toward the outside world, and its protective philosophy, presents an analogy to the preliterate situation. For the unique type of control that operates in a sectarian group, and which is similar to that assumed to be true of a primitive tribe, two explanations are offered. One is the central principle of conflict which organizes and integrates the sectarian group. The other is the concentric type of social organization which is characteristic of a theocratic community. The sect originates as a conflict group in an effort to reform the mores. It goes through a phase of persecution and conflict in which migration to a pioneer area is apt to occur in an effort to protect the group personality. Here in a situation of relative freedom and isolation, integration and organization into a com-

munity form of life takes place, with a possible community of goods following as a part of the technique of consecration to a supreme principle. The communistic sectarian group makes objective the state of mind ordinarily belonging only to the more tense periods of crisis. Secondly, the sectarian community is an organized neighborhood rather than a community. That is, the control is immediate and of uniform intensity. Instead of an organization based upon a number of overlapping interest groups, there is a centralization of control under one organizing principle, religion. The church community is the economic community, the school community, the political community. To be a good citizen is to be a good sectarian.

THE AMANA COMMUNITY

Specifically, the Amana Society, a German communistic group in Iowa presents an analogy to the primitive tribe and yields some interesting material in regard to the relationship between the family and the community that has been assumed to be true of those simpler situations. Amana represents one of a series of protests against the formalism and worldliness of the Lutheran church in post-Reformation Germany. Chance and circumstance located it in the Mississippi Valley, where surrounded by a typical Iowa farming and village population, it remains a romantic bit of the old world, an anachronism, a vestigial remnant, of an earlier and different type of social organization. The community embraces a population of 1500 persons living in seven different villages of the long-street type, each village numbering from one to four hundred inhabitants. While these villages have their own institutions and system of government, all are subject to the organization and control of the whole group. An economy divided be-

tween manufacturing and agriculture is practiced. Amana woollens are sold all over the country. The product of the fields and gardens which form a part of the 24,000 acres owned by the society is consumed mostly in Amana.

The Amana family is the typical small family group and shows none of the extreme peculiarities that characterize the institution in other communistic religious groups. Communism was adopted relatively late in the history of the society and is limited to the production and distribution of economic goods. It has not invaded the small monogamous family pattern. Whatever aspects of great family organization exist at Amana are due to a high rate of intermarriage within the community, characteristic of sectarian organization, and are not ascribable to communistic practices. The sectarian bias toward asceticism and purity of life has colored the sex mores to some extent, but there are no vagaries at Amana such as practiced by the Shakers, the Normons, or the Perfectionists at Oneida. It is true that approval of the celibate life is implicit in the Amana religion, but this is due partly to the fact that Barbara Heinemann, one of the prophets, like Ann Lee, had difficulty in her own married life, and contributed out of the wisdom of her experience certain precepts for the guidance of her people. Although this emphasis upon celibacy has fluctuated with the years, traces of it are evident in the regulations surrounding the institution of marriage. The young people today are still admonished that a single life is blessed of the Lord. The newly married couple is still reduced temporarily to the lowest spiritual rank, from which it is possible to emerge only through the deepest piety. With the birth of each child in the family, the parents suffer the same spiritual reduction. In spite of all

these handicaps, however, marriage is still consummated in Amana, courtship and love being in the hands of the young people themselves, and the control by the elders over the marriage being more nominal than actual. Neither communistic practices nor the revolutionary sex codes usually associated with the sectarian movements have affected the Amana family to any great extent.

Nevertheless, the wider claims of the community register their effect upon the family, in many subtle ways. Each individual member of the family, women and older children as well as men, has a community function and participates directly in community undertakings. Each has status in his own right rather than through membership in a family group. Each is responsible in his corporate activity to the community rather than to family authority. This confers upon the individual a certain freedom and sense of personal worth and dignity. The system of allowances relieves him from the pressure of family oversight and criticism of expenditure. The surety of his inheritance in the holdings of the community compensates him for the absence of a separate family economy and inheritance rights. The community kitchen removes from the home some of its traditional activities. A community kindergarten looks after the children too small to go to school so that their mothers are released for community activities. It would seem as if the individual and not the family were indeed the unit of organization and that the situation would approach that of our American urban family.

A survey of the facts, however, does not warrant such a conclusion. After all, social control consists in the organization of habit, and the Amana community, in removing certain economic features from

the family group has substituted other elements, so that the function of the Amana family as an agency for social control is unimpaired. As an institution for the training and control of children, it is unique. In spite of the employment of both parents in community functions, their prestige and authority are unimpaired. The kindergarten, the school, the factory and the farm, are organized to assist the parents in producing the kind of children the community wants as citizens. Informal methods of control, such as spontaneous gestures of disapproval and gossip, are used by the whole community. The parent need only remind the child of this state of affairs and he will conform.

Said a mother to a boy who was carrying a ball-bat when the prohibition against playing ball was in force, "You had better not let them see you with that." The boy went into the house immediately and left the bat. Obedience and disobedience are not personal matters between parents and children. Both alike must answer to the community. All formal methods of control are in the hands of the elders. In case of a violation of the mores, the parents are held responsible jointly with the children and suffer a reduction in religious status. If a young person leaves the community, the mother is compelled to go to church with the young girls for six months, while the father undergoes a similar punishment. This system of joint accountability to the community promotes a close, sympathetic relationship between parents and children, and exercises an added restraint upon the young people.

Thus a girl, debating whether or not to have her hair bobbed two years ago, "I would not have my hair cut for anything, because the elders are going to have a big meeting, and the girls who have had their hair cut will be kept out of

church along with their parents. My father is an elder. I would not want to do that to him." And later, "But it is no sin to have your hair cut." Neither parent nor child feels any vindictiveness toward the elders, however. The pressure of community opinion and the prestige of the spiritual leaders makes for acceptance. Somehow, the situation is inevitable and must be borne. Children, parents and community are all a part of an inclusive group control.

Although it is not within the province of this paper to describe the process of control nor the mechanisms by which it is effected, brief mention should be made of some of the ceremonials which are significant from this stand-point. Their effect upon the immature member of the group is similar to that of the initiation ritual practiced by the primitive tribe. The first of these ceremonials is the renewal of the covenant, when every member of the community, including the fifteen year old children, renews his faith with the society and the principles upon which it was founded. This is a most solemn occasion marked by prayer and exhortation and the "giving of the hand" to the Head Elder. The *Untersuchung* is a yearly examination into the spiritual state of every man, woman and child in the society. It is during the examination that members are promoted or demoted in spiritual rank. Finally, the *Liebesmahl*, held once in two years, is a festival marked by great religious fervor and the ceremony of foot-washing. On alternate years, a Conference of Elders is held at which there is a discussion similar to the "mutual criticism" of the Oneida community. It is during these ceremonies when the attention of the whole community is held that the individual member enters most fully into the objectives and purposes of the community.

The problem of the relationship of the individual to the complex groupings of modern society presents no such simple solution as this at Amana. The equation should read, "the individual equals the group, but which group?" Instead of a highly integrated, organized personality, he represents the subjective aspect of all the conflicting claims and standards of the different groups to which he belongs. Mental conflicts are always, in the final analysis, group conflicts. The ethics of Christianity and of modern business fight out their battle in the strivings of the man on the street. The ideals of the patriarchal immigrant family in conflict with the ambitions of the gang are mirrored in the records of the Juvenile Court. To be a "nice girl," according to her mother's standards and a "good date" at the same time, is more than a sixteen year

old flapper can accomplish. In the accommodations worked out between the different rôles demanded by these multiple group relationships, the phenomena of conscience and will appear, which are simply sets of habits pulling against each other. The moral self arises in arbitration of the clashings of different group demands, resulting in an organization on a higher plane. The responses of the individual may, on the other hand, be a growing restlessness and dissatisfaction leading to complete demoralization, or the adoption of an attitude of cynicism and disbelief in the historical institutions. The problem of control in the family or in the community is that of building up or of capturing dominant groups of attitudes or "experience complexes," which may assume an organizing rôle in these subjective conflicts.

EVALUATION OF COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION IN RURAL COMMUNITIES

ANNA M. CAMERON

ANY social committee operating locally for whatever purpose, is a community committee, and in the middle west where there is considerable economic, social, and educational equality as well as leisure time, participation in community committee work, often for state agencies, is quite general. The rural haunt is no longer a place for those seeking unmixed interests. There is a breathless shifting of attention from one important committee to another in small towns that cannot be matched in similar circles in the cities. The function and value of such committees varies. The difference between them naturally lies partly in the nature of the parent organizations.

The more successful committees seem to

thrive for the simple purpose of raising money to support work done outside the community. A few are specifically educational in aim. Of another small number are required only local contacts and correspondence. Insofar as the organizations which the committees serve have any excuse for being, local representation has its place. Insofar as the committees serve as an outlet for altruistic impulses otherwise bottled up, they are a justifiable end in themselves, provided of course that their projects do no special harm. Insofar as the members acquire a certain amount of sound theory about infant hygiene, child placement, or the rehabilitation of disabled veterans, they have an educational value.

The small informal committees composed of two men and one woman in each of the ninety-one rural counties of Nebraska and organized for the Bureau of Child Welfare of the State Department of Public Welfare were originally as specific in aim as any of the other numerous community committees. The state has the Civil Administrative Code system whereby the Governor appoints to his cabinet one secretary as head of the Department of Public Welfare who in turn has jurisdiction over such bureaus as that of Child Welfare. The function of this bureau is to investigate cases of child abuse, exploitation, neglect, delinquency, or defect not adequately handled by local representatives. Inasmuch as Nebraska has only one trained social worker outside of the two cities, and because the staff of the Bureau of Child Welfare consisted of only two field workers, it was impossible for the state to be even roughly covered. The suggestion, therefore, was finally made that local representatives might be a temporary, partial solution. It was decided that the joint worker for the Bureau of Social Work of the University Extension Division and the Nebraska Conference for Social Work during a tour of the state should organize special committees to act as local correspondents and advisors to the Bureau of Child Welfare.

During the preliminary preparation for the organization, it became increasingly evident how very many types of committees there were actively at work in the communities. A half dozen executives and field workers of state agencies with community committees were consulted and contributed the names of their local representatives. A comparison of the lists revealed the expected overlapping of personnel. It was evident that at least certain volunteer persons in each county were practicing several branches of social

work at the same time through committee participation. This fact seemed significant for the new organization about to be attempted.

It was possible to see many of the persons whose names were on the lists for other agencies when the visits were made to the counties. It appeared that many of them were also serving on committees for state organizations whose executives had not been consulted and the value of whose work was sometimes doubted. Without any desire to further increase the duplication of personnel it often appeared wise to appoint persons for the State Department committees who were already identified with several other organizations. These persons possessed a surprising amount of local information; they seemed to be in touch with many of the more acute social maladjustments of all kinds and showed a readiness to cooperate.

It was known at the outset that many of the committees in the very small Nebraska counties would not be called on by the State Department from one year's end to the next. The obvious warning was continually being given by social workers that unless something was regularly given the committees to do, they would forget their existence and fail to function when needed. With this danger in mind, the members were forewarned that their duties would fortunately be light in view of their many other connections and obligations. It was impressed upon them, however, that they were especially valuable to this committee because of their many contacts and that they would be expected to place at its disposal the results of their community experience.

The family agencies of the two cities approached the three organizations when the work was completed and asked the privilege of using the committees for

correspondence. Permission was given, and the committees, theoretically at least, became volunteer family and children's case assistants. The function thus far seemed definite and specific although the value would depend upon the way in which they proved out.

In the effort on the part of the University Extension Division and the Nebraska Conference to keep the committees reminded of their existence, new possibilities opened up. While the State Department and the family agencies settled down to using the committees when needed, the other two organizations began to establish relations in four general ways: (1) by circularizing the committees with short bulletins, simply written and containing information on specific phases of such subjects as care of the aged, delinquent and dependent children, etc.; (2) by asking members from time to time to insert stories in their weekly newspapers which would not be printed if they went to the editors through the usual channels; (3) by asking assistance in filling out questionnaires requiring simple and concrete investigations, perhaps of public records; (4) by asking for suggestions on program making for annual meetings. The immediate aim of these contacts has evidently been realized inasmuch as the members are quite conscious of their committee connection and answer calls with promptness and interest.

Some of the responses, however, have shown that the technique which apparently comes most naturally to them is traceable to the influence of other agencies upon whose committees the members serve and whose work is less efficient. Since there can be no doubt as to the three pedagogical principles that people learn to do by doing, that the more simple the project, and the more the reiteration, the deeper the impression, it

is quite clear that the disadvantage lies with agencies asking volunteer assistance on a scattering of all types of children's and family cases at rare intervals. Unless the calls upon this committee increase or unless the standards of other agencies using the same personnel improve, the educational function will be practically nill.

This fact raises the question as to how far the educational effort of the Extension Division and the State Conference, used up to date chiefly for the sake of keeping the committees intact, can be made an end in itself. If the members can be made to think of themselves as responsible for promoting the most forward looking social theory and practice in their communities through newspapers, club programs, and in actual local activity, there can be no doubt as to the committee value. The point has been made, however, that lay persons cannot be interested in anything so abstract for more than short periods of time.

The results of previous efforts in this line are not conclusive proof, to be sure, that the laity can be interested in long-drawn educational social projects. We do know, however, that for the short period of the two years just past, the response has shown interest and intelligence. The questionnaires have been filled out at the expense of serious effort, weekly newspapers from one end of the state to the other have carried the social work stories given them by committee members. When suggested outlines for discussions to be held at the State Conference were submitted to the committees, they met, talked over, not only children's problems, but matters relating to care of the aged, delinquency, and the relation between public and private agencies, so that the final program was prepared to some extent upon the basis of the replies.

The decision as to what the final function of the committees shall be will probably not be reached without more experimentation. The suggestion has come frequently that they be formalized into County Welfare Boards. Two committees have broadened out on their own initiative into this form already, and one of the two is looking toward the employ-

ment of a social worker. Since there are no other committees acting as clearing houses for all types of social work and social education in the counties, it seems fairly certain that more and more will be required of them until they evolve into some form or a number of forms which will be valuable to their respective communities.

CITY PLANNING FOR NEIGHBORHOOD LIFE

CLARENCE ARTHUR PERRY

MUCH of the confusion in the use of the word "community" arises from the fact that it can be, and is, applied to such widely different types of populated districts. The suggestion I have to offer concerns the city elementary school district. Why should we not—for the purpose of study and promotion—give to this area of common educational service the specific name of "neighborhood community"? There are of course many existing urban school districts exhibiting little of what most of us think of as "community life." School districts are not neighborhoods in the sense, employed by Cooley, of being the home of primary groups, or cultural areas with local sentiments and traditions as defined by Park. On the other hand, one does find here and there school districts which exhibit both of these characteristics and which are entitled literally to be called "neighborhood communities," a label which I propose for the following hypothesis.

The physical conditions which favor the development of an urban neighborhood community are present when we have a district of the following description: It has a population of 5,000 or 6,000 people and 800 or 1,000 children of elementary school age. In single-family-per-lot sections such a population requires an area

of about 160 acres which in the form of a square is one-half mile on a side. In apartment house areas the size shrinks in proportion to population density. This in broad outlines is a description of the physical environment that is best adapted, in my opinion, for the growing of an urban neighborhood community. Obviously, no district precisely fits this formula and the pertinent question is to be asked: Of what use then is the theoretical description? In the first place there is a demand in the real estate market for developments exhibiting what are called "community" features. More than ever before, families which have gained a quick prosperity are discarding old houses and buying new ones. They seek homes which are not only beautiful in themselves but which also have attractive surroundings, good schools, public playgrounds and convenient shops. Residential districts of that character do not grow wild. They have to be planned and cultivated. From the nature of the case they have to be of large size and it requires a city planner to design them properly. But the planner who is called upon to lay out a community has to have some sort of pattern to serve as a basis for his own plan. The neighborhood unit scheme was evolved to meet that need. Whole neighborhoods, towns and even

cities are now being planned and built to order—from the ground up.

There is also another practical use for a neighborhood formula. The automobile is working a great change in our city maps. To accommodate the ever growing stream of cars the engineers, in practically all our large cities, are building boulevards, parkways and super-highways. These wide, deep channels are cutting up residential sections into irregularly-shaped islands around which raging streams of traffic will soon flow. Should we not take some steps to formulate the size and the contents of these residential islands? If we permit highway specialization in the interest of the motorist, why should we not insist upon equal municipal care and forethought in the interest of the pedestrian and the resident?

The neighborhood-unit scheme proposes a remedy for precisely this emergency. It provides a protected residential cell within which the principal destinations of normal families—schools, playgrounds and local shops—can all be reached without crossing a single main highway. It would seem as if the time should not be far off when that principle of residential protection would be the slogan and the demand of every association devoted to the interests of the home and a safe neighborhood life.

The principle of a special and individual street system which the neighborhood-unit illustrates is exemplified in Forest Hills Gardens. The provision of planned open spaces is to be found in Sunnyside Gardens, New York, in Mariemont near Cincinnati and in many other similar projects. In the Hampstead Garden Suburb, in the outskirts of London, there is a delightful group of neighborhood institutions around a central square. As to conspicuous boundaries, Forest Hills Gardens, which is somewhat triangular

in shape, has quite visible limits on two sides, and its citizens have taken steps to demarcate the remaining, irregular edge by means of brick markers or monuments. The neighborhood unit formula is to be regarded then as a composite of planning principles which either have been carried out or have been indicated as desirable in existing real estate developments.

THE NEIGHBORHOOD-UNIT SCHEME AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

There are several ways in which this scheme may have significance for community organization. In the first place it illustrates a method of producing homogeneity. When the real estate plan is dangled before the public, automatically it draws together a group of people of similar living standards and similar economic ability to realize them. McKenzie has pointed out that the segregation of a city population "along racial, economic, social and vocational lines" is a normal process and one which is constantly at work. Already coöperation in housing schemes is being taken up by various occupational groups. There are also signs of racial and religious ventures in the same direction. The use of a neighborhood formula in suburban building and slum rebuilding schemes is going to promote this grouping process. Whether we favor the tendency or not, a situation is arising that will require a fresh study and revaluation of this fundamental social phenomenon.

The second way in which the neighborhood planning prescription has a community significance relates to the formation of primary groups. The function of face-to-face relations in the development of character and personality has already been so fully treated by Cooley, Thomas, Ellwood and others that

it needs no emphasis here. Face-to-face neighborhood life is created and exists for a time in every large real estate development carried out in a city suburbs. Community consciousness is stimulated by the emergence of a number of common needs. Street lights, postal facilities, a school, sidewalks, a number of such necessities are lacking and the only way they can be obtained is by concerted effort. The settlers form an association. Every property owner is brought into it. They get acquainted at the meetings, and through the activity of committees. Once associated for mutual protection and support, they further associate for social and cultural purposes. The face-to-face fabric is constituted.

But when those early needs are all met and there are no further occasions for active coöperation, when the city population spreads out to the settlement and erases its boundaries, and filaments of business with all their blighting effects begin to penetrate the district,—then the local community features begin gradually to disappear and are all wiped out. The neighborhood-unit scheme on the other hand supplies remedies for many of these defects. In the first place, its common

open spaces and definite residential character supply a basic need of association that is permanent. Its special street system and main highway boundaries give it a conspicuous and lasting unitary character which, McKenzie has pointed out, constitutes the physical basis which is favorable for the existence of neighborhood sentiment. The local shopping districts being exactly adapted to population needs can be and are sometimes confined by covenants in deeds and by municipal zoning to the areas where they were first located.

Once the neighborhood-unit scheme is adopted, it becomes possible to approach from a new angle a number of vital questions in the field of community organization. For one example: The neighborhood community, as tentatively described in this scheme, does not center upon a business district. The traditional idea of a local community is one with a business district. I assume that the welfare districts which have been delimited by the St. Louis Community Council are mainly of the business-centered type. The first provides a basis for strong local community association; the second only for specialized organizations.

ADULT EDUCATION AND THE COMMUNITY MOVEMENT

JOSEPH K. HART

IN 1919 the great cry of the day was "community organization." This cry became a sort of slogan and it came to mean a number of things, many of them undesirable, including methods for manipulating the community so as to make foreigners as uncomfortable as possible, and closing the public mind so as to make the development of new ideas as difficult as possible. During the reconstruction

period it seemed to me, as it does now, that the real problem was primarily that of adult education; trying to get men and women to face the problems in the new world as they had been thrown into relief by the war. The war had revealed not merely problems; it had uncovered "forces" and "dangers" as well. Our American communities were afraid of the unsuspected energies hidden under their

old inertias. They wanted little thinking about problems. They wanted to hush up and cover up. The dominant public wanted nothing going on which it could not label. Certain organizations felt the pressure of this public opinion and private fear, and, as was expressed at least on one occasion, the sentiment was, "This is not a time to be talking about a philosophy of community life; this is the time to *do* things." The best way in the world to avoid thinking is to engage in a fever of activities.

All schooling is futile that ignores the realities of community influences in the lives of children and adults and, on the other hand, all community work is futile that ignores the community's own processes of education of children and adults. Perhaps the greatest social waste in the world is found at this point; the reconstructive programs worked for by all sorts of social agencies are being always thwarted, voided, denied by the education of children to patterns of behavior which make it certain they can never freely support those social programs when they become adult. There is nothing all forms of social and community work need so much these days as a realistic understanding of the concrete

educations now being practiced upon men, women and children in our American society, and the enormous conflicts, antitheses and contradictions inherent in these varied educations. We are constantly engaged in trying to educate children for a world that exists nowhere in reality; and we are equally continuously engaged in defeating, by our educational programs for children, all that we hope for and work for among adults.

I do not belong to any community association, at present: but neither does the American community. I may not be officially authorized to do what I am doing, these days, but I find a good deal of fun in doing it. Much good work has been done in this world outside the official organizations. So until such time as our local communities have been taken over by some "community movement" with the result that thereafter interested individuals must get permission from the movement to do community work, I shall feel free to go on doing what I can do to discover the secret springs of community life and to help develop that greater American community, and even world community, that we all at times long for, in one way or another.

FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MENTAL HYGIENE

The First International Congress on Mental Hygiene will be held at Washington, D. C., May 5-10, 1930. It will be sponsored by mental hygiene and related organizations in more than twenty-six countries. The officers are: Honorary President, Herbert Hoover; President, Dr. William A. White, Washington, D. C.; Secretary-General, Clifford W. Beers. For information address the Administrative Secretary, John R. Shillady, 370 Seventh Avenue, New York City.

RACE, CULTURAL GROUPS, SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, program and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

PUBLIC OPINION AS A SOCIAL FORCE: RACE REACTIONS

EMORY S. BOGARDUS

THE studies of race relations on the Pacific Coast¹ furnish excellent case studies of public opinion. The coming of Japanese immigrants to American shores has created dynamic public opinion situations. At once there may be noted several different overlapping phases of human reactions, which taken together constitute what is commonly known as public opinion. It is to be hoped that many case studies of public opinion will be made, not only in connection with race relations, but also in industrial relations, in religious relations, in social disorganization relations. In each instance there would doubtless come distinctive findings, and out of the whole a better grasp of the nature of public opinion than is now available.

1. A cross section made roughly for the year 1900 finds the people of the Pacific Coast curiosity-interested in "the little brown men," who were migrating in small numbers from the Land of the Rising Sun, a tiny empire that had shortly before delivered a sharp crisp blow upon the staggering Russian giant. As the Japanese immigrants made their quiet, rather insignificant appearance on the

Coast, there were only interested comments.

However, there was a definite but sleeping mores. The Japanese immigrants were Orientals, of course, and as such, were in danger of arousing the dormant mores. Previously, the Coast had gone through an anti-Chinese whirlpool of public opinion. The subsidence of this whirlpool had been brought about by decisive anti-Chinese and anti-Oriental legislation. The stirring experiences relative to the Chinese had left in their wake definite elements in the mores of the Pacific Coast, for example: (1) Orientals shall not become citizens of the United States, (2) Orientals possess unwelcome, pagan religions, (3) Orientals possess unconceivably low standards of living and easily drive out "good labor," (4) Orientals have so high a birth-rate that natives will be quickly out-populated.

To understand what is called public opinion in any social situation it is essential to know the underlying culture traits. A knowledge of the related antecedent experiences and resultant attitudes of the people is vital. It would seem that on no other basis could a complete case study of public opinion be made. The basis of public opinion is an apriori culture or mores stage, highly potential but not in

¹ Inaugurated in 1924 under the direction of Dr. Robert E. Park.

motion. In a very real sense the groundwork of public opinion is the mores, characterized by definite convictions, accepted fully, but often not analyzed. The mores, or the indiscussable, are the omnipresent foundation of public opinion.

2. By 1906, the incoming Japanese had attracted more than curiosity. They had begun to arouse questionable attention in industry, by virtue of their congregation in numbers as laborers displacing American laborers, and in the public schools where Japanese boys learning English were thrown into classes with young American children. As a result, adverse gossip, the forerunner of a public opinion whirl, grew apace. Many persons only indirectly concerned joined with their fellow Americans who were suffering loss of work or whose children were affected. Public opinion concerning Japanese immigrants thus appears in the form of numerous centers of pronounced antagonistic expressions. These centers have as foci the points at which, in this case, natives were suffering loss of status, where the "invaders" were successfully competing, and where slumbering mores were being irritated.

It appears that the natural disturbance leading to the rise of public opinion is likely to be rapid and formidable to the extent that the status of persons, particularly of persons who are well organized and influential in a population region, is endangered. Its formidable nature becomes irresistible to the degree that underlying and well-established mores are challenged. The forming of small groups of persons expressing and repeating reactions in support of a disturbed mores is a second phase in the rise of public opinion.

3. The sporadic adverse reactions against Japanese immigrants rapidly

reached organized form.² They gained headway easily, for there were powerful organizations almost instantaneously ready to champion them.³ This quick response was due to the fact that these are defense organizations. Any seeming attack on the mores of the Coast and of the nation is a stimulus to which these organizations naturally respond. The public opinion in support of the mores reacts quickly to "danger" stimuli. When the sporadic and aroused groups become expressed in organizations, and initiate propaganda in support of the threatened mores and against the impending danger, a third phase of public opinion is disclosed.

4. Overdone propaganda in defense of the mores and against the Japanese⁴ brought forth expressions of injustice from many persons scattered here and there. They protested against "the calamity-howlers," the chauvinists, the overzealous defenders of the mores. Righteous indignation was aroused against the epithets that the anti-Japanese Americans were hurling at the Japanese, the alleged falsehoods, the gross injustices that were being done to a high-spirited people. A fourth phase of public opinion thus comes to the fore.

5. But the pro-mores and anti-Japanese opinion⁵ developed volume. It grossly exaggerated. It reproduced the worst reports against the stranger, the foreigner, the "Jap." It hurled unbelievable epithets at the "invaders."

² First, in 1907, then in 1916, 1921, and in 1924.

³ Such as the California and other state Federations of Labor, the American Federation of Labor, the Native Sons of the Golden West, the Exclusion League (a holdover from anti-Chinese days), and after the World War, the American Legion.

⁴ Particularly in the movements that culminated in the anti-Japanese land laws of 1916 and 1921, and in anti-Japanese legislation of 1924.

⁵ In 1916, 1921, and 1924.

In the meantime the sporadic fair-play opinion became organized, and articulate church people, internationalists, the world-minded, reinforced each others' opinions. It was championed by numerous organizations. Pro-Japanese propaganda began to be spread. This development constituting a fifth phase of a public opinion situation, brings the major structure of public opinion in its entirety into light. The whole process may be seen in full operation.

The two sets of contradictory opinions act as counter irritants. Each become more active, better organized, more efficient. A thrust is followed by counter thrust. Public opinion possesses one main issue and two sides. Shall the mores be changed—is the problem. The appearance of the Japanese in ever-increasing numbers is the incident that brings the issue forward. All sides to this issue are resolved into two, and public opinion turns out to be two sets of opposing opinions over one burning issue. These sets of opinions clash like two storm clouds charged with positive and negative electricity. As armies in war line up on one or the other of two sides, so people in a public opinion situation line up, for and against. As a drama has a plot, a representative and an opponent, and moves forward from act to act,⁶ so "a public opinion" has an aggressor and an opponent, and moves forward. As a law suit has its opposing sides but advances toward a decision, so "a public opinion" has its conflict and its forward motion. The nature of public opinion becomes clarified as soon as it is referred to as "a public opinion."

6. In each of the public opinion crescendos (1906, 1916, 1921, 1924) involving Japanese immigrants, many persons defined their positions more clearly than they

had done before. Some developed reasons why they were anti-Japanese; others began to define their pro-Japanese attitudes with clearness for the first time. Many who had been neutral, took one side or the other. Some persons who had been at least lukewarm toward Japanese turned against them. A few, moved by the bitter attack made upon the Japanese, moved from an antagonistic to a protagonist position. This development of a public opinion may be labelled a defining of personal attitudes phase. It begins as soon as the earliest gossip appears⁷ but culminates when the conflicting propaganda movements are at their height. This is the opinion-changing phase.

7. Then came the formal decision phase. In 1907, President Roosevelt, acting for the Coast, entered into a Gentleman's agreement with Japan; in 1916 and 1921, the people went to the polls and voted; in 1924, the United States Congress voted. These general decisions all went in the direction sought by the pro-mores and anti-Japanese leaders. The decisions ward off effectively the impending danger. At least a two-thirds decision was rendered in each case where votes were cast; the results were decisive. Public opinion in both of its phases, anti- and pro-Japanese subsided. The subsidence phase was rapid. Not simply a majority but a two-thirds decision seemed to be final in a representative democracy.

8. Post-eddies occurred. The anti-Japanese forces announced, in 1924 for example, that since the Japanese were no longer "a menace," friendly attitudes would be shown toward the Japanese already in this country. They responded to the strong anti-American attitudes expressed toward Japan keeping the Japanese off the Quota by saying that immigration in the United States is purely a national

⁶ Cf. C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, p. 379.

⁷ In phase two.

affair, and that no offense to Japan had been intended. The pro-Japanese forces felt that the anti-Japanese legislation had gone to an extreme and urged a movement to put the Japanese on the two per cent Quota. The anti-Japanese groups announced that a new movement against the Japanese, would be started if any program was inaugurated to admit Japanese to the two per cent Quota.⁸ This keeps the pro-Japanese sentiment quiescent, although its spokesmen proclaim that no question is settled until it is settled right.

Public opinion thus arises out of a disturbance or proposed change in the mores.⁹ It assumes the characteristics of a play, a debate, a war, with two sets of contending opinions: one usually defending the mores, and the other supporting a change.¹⁰ Organization is the chief mechanism, and propaganda is the main weapon used by both sides. Many persons as a rule do nothing but define more

accurately their already established positions. A smaller percentage are influenced "to change sides." In a democratic society a decisive vote one way or the other results in a change or in a further entrenchment in the mores.

It is proper and more accurate therefore, to speak of a *public opinion*, composed of two lesser but conflicting public opinions, or sub-public opinions, representing two sub-publics. The main public includes all who are giving attention in any way to the given issue, but this public is rarely the whole of the social group in which it is located.¹¹ Within the main public develops a major issue, with the especially interested forming two conflicting circles or sub-publics.¹² A public opinion turns out to be a conflict over a change in the mores, that usually ends in general acceptance or in rejection by the group of the change. As soon as the conflict is settled decisively one way or the other the public opinion subsides at least temporarily within the unchanged or the modified mores.

⁸ Or about 175 a year.

⁹ A most comprehensive source book of readings on public opinion has recently been published, namely, by W. Brooke Graves, *Readings in Public Opinion*.

¹⁰ The vigor with which the mores resist change was ably described by W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 79-83. Changes in them are made possible only "by slow and long-continued effort." *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹¹ For a discussion of the relation of the general public to the democratic state, see John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, Ch. III.

¹² This analysis aims to be more inclusive than Lippmann's "either for or against conception of a public," *The Phantom Public*, p. 61.

TWENTY YEARS' PIONEERING IN RACE RELATIONS

HERBERT J. SELIGMANN

PERHAPS the best measure of the social change which has taken place since the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, in 1909, is the wide acceptance and endorsement of a program which had then few protagonists or defenders.

A race riot, late in 1908, in Springfield,

Illinois, erstwhile home of Lincoln, crystallized the thinking and brought together the people that were to form the N. A. A. C. P. A Southerner, William English Walling, in Chicago when the riot occurred, went promptly to the scene. He saw sights that horrified and shocked him. His investigations and studies of the conditions that had produced this

breakdown of civilization took form in public lectures, and in articles.

One of his articles attracted the attention of a northern woman, Miss Mary White Ovington, who had been studying the Negro's adjustment to conditions in New York. Others were communicated with, Charles Edward Russell, Bishop Alexander Walters, Miss Lillian D. Wald, Mrs. Florence Kelley, Oswald Garrison Villard, then editor of the *New York Evening Post*; and Henry Moskowitz, later an officer in the administration of Mayor Mitchell.

This group of people augmented by others were agreed in feeling that there was "pressing need for an organization to combat the tide of race prejudice that was then rising throughout the nation."

To the white and colored people who first held meetings was added a colored leader of national prominence, Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois, at that time professor in Atlanta University and leader of a group of Negroes known as the Niagara movement, seeking justice for their race.

In writing of the foundation of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 1909, Mr. Walling has "dated" it from the time Dr. Bois came inasmuch as "we all felt that the organization itself had to give an example of successful coöperation of the races and that it must be founded upon the American principle of self-government and self-development."

From its inception the Association, concerned with the fundamental citizenship status of the American Negro, studied the most flagrant violation of his rights through lynchings by which mobs deprived him of court trial and of his life. A statistical study was made, derived from the Chicago Tribune's records and other available sources, and published as "Thirty Years of Lynching." In addi-

tion, investigators were sent to the scene of mob murders to study the individual instance and the conditions producing it.

The result of this work was to disprove the current assumption that rape was a determining cause of most lynchings: this charge being made in the case of less than one in five of mob victims, and an accusation stimulating mob action being far from proof of guilt.

The struggle against lynching took the form of publications, a press campaign, lectures and mass meetings, and even of legislative action. It was gradually made clear that lawlessness was no cure for crime, and that the barbarities of lynching were a national concern. The repeated introduction in the House of Representatives of a federal anti-lynching bill—passed there in 1922 by a vote of 230 to 119, though blocked in the Senate—fostered the sentiment which helped to lessen the number of lynchings in 1928 to their lowest record, eleven.

Its defense of the Negro's citizenship rights necessarily made legal action an outstanding part of the Association's work. By good fortune, its President, Moorfield Storey, one of the most distinguished lawyers of the country, a former President of the American Bar Association, was able actively to prosecute a number of its more important actions; and was the only representative of any private organization to file a brief in the celebrated case in which, in 1915, the United States Supreme Court held Grandfather Clauses to be unconstitutional.

Five victories in all have been won by the Association before the United States Supreme Court, each of them arising out of a question that affected not alone the Negro, but all minority racial groups in the country. Thus, in 1917, in the celebrated Louisville Segregation case,

(*Buchanan vs. Warley*) it was established that state laws or city ordinances ordaining separate residential districts for white and colored people were unconstitutional, a decision reinforced by the Supreme Court's opinion of 1927 in the *Louisiana Segregation* case, also fought by the Association.

The Association's investigation of the peonage conditions which produced the Arkansas riots of 1919, eventuated not only in the liberation of colored farmers unjustly sentenced to death and long prison terms; but, again through the United States Supreme Court, established a vital principle, namely, that trials held in an atmosphere of mob domination did not constitute due process of law.

The fifth of the Association's victories before the Supreme Court, in the so-called *Texas White Primary Case*, 1927, attacked the bulwark of Negro disfranchisement in the South. The law enacted in 1924 by the Texas legislature, excluding Negroes from Democratic party primaries in that state, and therefore from any real voice in elections, was held unconstitutional. The attack thus begun against disfranchisement of properly qualified Negro citizens, is being carried forward through the courts in cases challenging the right of state political committees to exclude Negroes from primaries by passing upon the qualifications of party members and requiring that only party members so accepted may vote.

The victories won before the Supreme Court and state courts of last resort, are only part of a comprehensive scheme which has included the framing of New York's model civil rights act and the contest of innumerable civil and criminal cases. Altogether, the legal and legislative work of the N. A. A. C. P. has been aimed at equal public status and equal administration of the law for all

citizens, irrespective of race. One of the most significant effects of this work has been the increasing number of appeals from white men in the South, who recognize the impartial nature of the program of the N. A. A. C. P., and wish its help in obtaining justice where colored people personally known to them are the victims of discrimination or brutality.

Two kinds of courts are essential to more enlightened contact between the races, the courts of justice and the court of public opinion. Recognizing this fact, the N. A. A. C. P. has consistently worked with leaders of public opinion in the South toward the common end. Representatives of the Commission on Interracial Coöperation have spoken at N. A. A. C. P. meetings, and communication has been frequent with this body and with outstanding editors of Southern dailies.

The positive contribution of the Negro has had a prominent part in the Association's educational campaign. Before the present era, in which Negro authors, singers, musicians, actors, playwrights take such a prominent part, the N. A. A. C. P. had begun to award annually the Spingarn Medal; utilizing the occasion to call public attention to outstanding achievement by Negroes in music and literature, in science, business, and in the fields of government and public service. The award of the Spingarn Medal came to be recognized as an event of national and even international significance. To its staff the Association attracted those men who were able to voice its program and, in the form of essays, social studies, poetry interpreting the Negro, the Association's staff have published some twenty-odd books of general circulation leaving out of consideration numerous contributions to leading magazines and newspapers. Moreover, its staff has been

in close contact with many men and women, white and colored, North and South, writing and publishing works bearing on race relations in the field of science and art.

The social and political affiliations of the N. A. A. C. P. are no less varied than its racial constituents. It has mattered nothing whether a man or woman were of the shade of opinion labeled radical or conservative, so long as the Association's general program furnished a point of focus. In this way it has been able to bring into contact varied talents toward peaceful progress in the adjustment of the interracial relations that threatened more than once to degenerate into violent and brutal dislocation.

Two of many tributes received on the occasion of the Association's Twentieth Anniversary, illustrate the close understanding by thinkers, of its aims and direction. An American, Waldo Frank, whose *Our America* and *The Rediscovery of*

America, have formed significant episodes in the interpretation of the national life, wrote that what he liked most about the organization and its activity, "is that its special field—the welfare of Negroes—has been far transcended by the universal spirit in which you have worked." This tribute is reinforced in the words of a celebrated British sociologist and editor, L. T. Hobhouse, who wrote: "There is nothing of greater importance for the future of white civilization itself than the establishment of more just and humane relations across the color line. I find the information given in your yearly report quite invaluable for judging the symptoms of improvement and occasional relapse, and I could wish that the same thing were being done in respect of the coloured peoples in Africa, and particularly those under the British flag. Your work must have the hearty sympathy of all who have any respect for social justice."

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

The Social Science Research Council has elected the following members under the recently created classification of Members-at-Large: Professor Henry M. Bates, Dean of the Law School of the University of Michigan; Dr. Adolf Meyer, Professor of Psychiatry and Director Henry Phipps Psychiatric Clinic, Johns Hopkins University; Dr. C. E. A. Winslow, Graduate School Chairman, Professor of Public Health, Yale University; and Professor Robert S. Woodworth, Department of Psychology, Columbia University.

GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP

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THE RURAL TAX PROBLEM

CLARENCE HEER

RURAL local government as embodied in our counties, townships, and school districts serves the needs of the county's most depressed and poverty ridden economic group—the nation's farmers. With the average farm operator receiving less than \$650 per annum for his labor and for that of his family, rural government ought to supply a maximum of needed services at a minimum of price. Actually, as at present organized and financed, it is the most expensive kind of government in the country.

That the American farmer pays out a larger percentage of his meagre income for governmental services than does the more affluent urbanite is abundantly evidenced by the findings of official surveys and reports. A report on rural taxation in Pennsylvania contains the following significant conclusion:

"Agriculture as a whole in the state carries a tax burden that consumes at least a 13 per cent larger share of the total earnings of the farm and the farmer than do all taxes paid out of the average earnings of the state with agriculture included in the average."¹

A study made by a New York state legislature committee on taxation reveals

¹ Bulletin, Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, Vol. 9, No. 24. Some Phases of Taxation in Pennsylvania.

the fact that local taxes absorbed 8.4 per cent of the net income of rural residents of that state in 1924, whereas they took only 4.7 per cent of the income of urban residents.²

The federal department of agriculture has coöperated with various state agencies in measuring the burdensomeness of taxation on rented farms in different parts of the country. Its investigations show that the percentage of net farm rentals absorbed by taxes is alarmingly high in every state in which information was gathered.³ In Michigan on 1,018 farms, taxes took 55 per cent of the net property income in 1926. On farms in three counties of North Dakota, taxes were found to take about 40 per cent of the net rent over a period from 1919 to 1924. In other states the percentages were as follows: Colorado, 33 per cent (1926), South Dakota, 30 per cent (1926); Virginia, 20 per cent (1926); Arkansas, 18 per cent (1921-1925); Indiana, 40 per cent (1923); Missouri, 20 per cent (1923); Ohio, 36 per cent (1919-1922). According to a recent study of the North Carolina Tax Commission, taxes absorbed 28.9 per cent of the net income

² State Expenditures, Tax Burden, and Wealth, New York State Legislature Document (1926), No. 68, p. 118.

³ Colorado Agricultural College, Bulletin 346, September, 1928.

of rented farm lands in this state in 1927.

Although the farmer spends a greater proportion of his income for taxes than does the dweller in cities, his return in governmental services is pitifully small when compared with the corresponding return of the urbanite. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate this point. Attention need only be called to such municipal services as police and fire protection, paved streets, water supply, sewerage, and garbage collection systems, most of which services the farmer cannot hope to purchase with his puny tax dollar. In the matter of health and welfare activities the deficiencies of rural governments are particularly apparent. The United States Public Health Service is authority for the statement that only about 19 per cent of the rural population of the country is as yet provided with local health service approaching adequacy under the direction of whole-time local health officers.⁴

Practically the only substantial equivalent which the farmer receives for his taxes are the services of schools and highways. In North Carolina over 80 per cent of all rural tax monies are expended for those two objects. Since the farmer spends such a large proportion of his income for highways and education, it might well be expected that the quality of the rural offering in those two fields, at least, would be on a parity with current urban standards. That this is very far from being the case is almost too obvious to require demonstration.

In North Carolina in 1926, over 11 per cent of all rural white children were still receiving their education in the antiquated one-teacher school. Over 19 per cent of them were receiving their schooling in two-teacher schools. Rural school

property represented an average investment of only \$95 per child whereas in urban districts the investment in school property was \$250 per child. The superior quality of instruction offered in the city schools was indicated by the fact that the average salary of urban teachers was \$1,223 per annum whereas rural teachers received on an average only \$730 per annum. The average training of teachers in city schools was equivalent to three years of college work. The average training of rural teachers represented little over a year of college work. Rural high schools did not measure up to urban standards as was evidenced by the fact that only 53 per cent of them were on the state list of accredited institutions, whereas over 95 per cent of all urban high schools belonged to that class.

Why does rural local government exact such heavy toll from the farmer and why does it give him such a small return for his money? Waste, extravagance, and inefficiency are undoubtedly important contributing factors. Governmental waste and extravagance, however, are not confined exclusively to our rural regions. City governments too may be sadly lacking in efficiency. To account for the wide differences in burdensomeness and operating results as between rural and urban governments, a more basic explanation is needed. This explanation is to be found in the nature of the functions which rural local government performs, in the size of the administrative units which have been selected to carry out those functions, and in the character of the revenue sources by means of which the functions are financed.

Basically there are two main reasons why the farmer is at such a serious disadvantage as compared with the city dweller in the matter of governmental benefits and burdens. The first of these reasons is connected with the fact that

⁴ Treasury Department, Public Health Reports, Nov. 30, 1928.

local governments in America are forced to rely almost exclusively on a single revenue source, the general property tax, as a means of financing their functions. Rural regions normally possess much less taxable wealth per capita than do urban areas. In order to finance a given standard of expenditure per inhabitant, rural governments must, therefore, apply a higher rate of property taxation and take a larger share of the tax payer's income than the same standard of expenditure would entail in the city.

In the second place, the per capita cost of supplying what from the financial point of view are the more important governmental services is, as a general rule, considerably higher in the country than it is in the city. The unfortunate farmer is thus caught between the two sharp blades of a pair of scissors. On the one hand, his tax rate is pushed up because he lives in a region in which wealth is spread out thinly. On the other hand it is increased because rural populations are widely scattered and the resulting difficulties of organization make the per capita cost of government high.

LESS TAXABLE WEALTH IN RURAL AREAS

Of the two factors contributing to the extreme burdensomeness of rural local government, the low average of rural taxable wealth is probably the most important. In North Carolina, for instance, the twenty-five largest cities and towns had an average assessed valuation of \$1,638 per inhabitant in 1926. For all the rest of the state, comprising mainly the rural regions, the average taxable wealth was only \$834 per capita. In several rural counties, in fact, the average taxable wealth was less than \$500 per inhabitant. It will thus be seen that to raise a given amount of revenue per inhabitant in the rural sections of the state requires a rate

of property taxation twice as high as is necessary to raise the same amount of revenue in the cities.

The fact that there is less assessed wealth per capita in the country than there is in the cities cannot be ascribed to the fact that rural property is assessed at a low percentage of its true value. The recent findings of the North Carolina State Tax Commission indicate that no class of property is on the average assessed at a higher percentage of true value than farm real estate. Nor is the differential between urban and rural values a phenomenon peculiar to North Carolina. In New York State in 1924, the equalized assessment value of taxable property amounted to only \$1,156 per capita in the rural sections of that state, whereas it amounted to \$2,001 per inhabitant in the cities.

The reason for the low per capita average of rural wealth is not far to seek. The bulk of this wealth consists of farm real estate, livestock, agricultural machinery, and household effects. The proportion of industrial, mercantile and banking wealth listed on rural tax rolls is generally relatively small. Moreover, with the possible exception of industrial property, non-agricultural wealth in many rural regions is on the decline, owing to present day facilities for cheap and rapid travel which induce the farmer to transact more and more of his business in the nearest city. It sometimes happens that a rural county or township is peculiarly fortunate in having a large mileage of railroad trackage within its boundaries. In such cases, the burden on farm property may be considerably reduced. Instances of this kind, however, are exceptional. As a general rule agricultural wealth carries the lion's share of rural local taxation.

With the growth of industry and com-

merce, farm property is rapidly losing the importance it once possessed in the aggregate of the country's wealth. This tendency is strikingly illustrated in North Carolina. In 1910 farm property constituted about one-third of the total wealth of the state. By 1925 the proportion had dropped to one-fifth. At the present time the investment in manufacturing in the state is approximately equal to the investment in farms.

Nearly four-fifths of the tangible wealth of the state consists of non-agricultural wealth, comprising factories, warehouses, office buildings, banks, mercantile establishments, corporate property of all kinds and private residences. The cities, like huge magnets, exercise a powerful attraction on this form of wealth, drawing the bulk of it within their taxing jurisdictions.

Many of the business activities centering in the city are not in any real sense local enterprises. Their operations may be state wide and even nation wide in scope. Factories may sell their products in every state of the union. Mercantile establishments may draw their patronage from a broad area of surrounding rural territory. Jobbing and distributing houses may do no local business at all. Nevertheless the fact that the property of such enterprises is physically or by legal fiction located within the confines of the city, gives the city an exclusive monopoly over that property for purposes of local taxation. To the extent that taxes on business property are shifted to the ultimate consumer, city residents are placed in the enviable position of being able to enjoy governmental services which are paid for, partially at least, by outsiders.

GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES COST MORE

Even were there no complicating factors, the low per capita average of agricultural

wealth would be sufficient to make the support of most rural governments an exceedingly burdensome proposition. As previously indicated, however, the farmer is the victim of an additional circumstance which still further increases the size of his tax bill. To supply the more important services of local government on a basis comparable in quality and quantity with prevailing city standards, normally entails a higher per capita cost in rural than in urban districts.

The foregoing statement may seem to be contradicted by the well known fact that per capita governmental expenditures for urban areas are invariably greater, in the aggregate, than the corresponding figures for rural districts. Per capita total expenditures, however, furnish no indication of the relative costs of supplying identical services. The per capita expenditures of cities are high because the services they supply are greater in variety as well as superior in quality to the services available to rural residents. If consideration be limited to comparable functions, it is easy to demonstrate that per capita costs are as a general rule markedly higher in agricultural regions.

The reason for the higher per capita cost of rural local government admits of no easy and simple explanation. The fact that rural populations are thinly and irregularly scattered over wide areas is undoubtedly an important consideration, especially as regards the carrying on of functions whose cost depends on the extent of the territory to be covered. Thus regions where habitations are few and far between obviously require more miles of highway per inhabitant than thickly settled regions. The dispersion of rural population also affects the cost of public instruction. Agricultural communities are faced with the choice of maintaining numerous small schools easily accessible

to the school population, or of transporting pupils over long distances to central consolidated schools. Both alternatives are expensive. The small school has an excessive overhead expense and provides an inferior kind of education. The consolidated school covering a large territory involves heavy charges for transportation.

The high per capita cost of rural government cannot, however, be accounted for solely on the basis of low population density. A more important factor is the matter of organization. Rural government is administered and operated by a multiplicity of agencies each of which serves a comparatively small population group. North Carolina probably supports fewer local governmental agencies than many other states, since in this state the township and school district are of small importance and the chief functions of rural government are carried on by the county. Nevertheless, to serve the needs of a rural population which scarcely exceeds two million persons, North Carolina has set up no less than 100 separate county governments. Three of these counties had less than 5000 inhabitants at the last federal census. Twelve counties had less than 10,000 inhabitants. Twenty-seven counties had less than 15,000 inhabitants and only thirty-four counties comprising principally those containing cities, had populations in excess of 30,000.

A careful enumeration of the various conditions and circumstances which have resulted in organizing rural government on a basis of small population units is not necessary to the present discussion. Sparsity of population, topographical conditions, difficulties of transportation and communication, and local pride and particularism have doubtless all played their part. Whatever the original causes, the important fact is that the typical

agency of rural government is an exceedingly small scale enterprise.

SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS

Small scale operations in government as in business are usually attended by high costs per unit of product. There is abundant statistical evidence to warrant the generalization that most governmental functions are, up to certain limits, subject to the law of decreasing costs. Within those limits, the larger the population served, the greater the likelihood that personnel and facilities will be utilized to their maximum capacity, the lower the relative proportion of overhead costs, and the more numerous the opportunities for adopting the economical methods and facilities associated with large scale operations.

The close relationship existing between the small population unit and high per capita costs may be illustrated by a few examples applying to widely different governmental functions. In the field of general administration the following conclusion of an Ohio research body possesses a high degree of significance.

"Of all the county agencies, the work of the general executive offices (auditor, treasurer, prosecuting attorney, recorder and county commissioners) is most standardized in nature and extent. Yet the per capita cost of operating these offices is 50 per cent greater in the smallest counties than in the large ones. The average-size rural county pays about 30 per cent more per capita for performing these standard services than do counties of more than 50,000 population."⁸

In the field of public poor relief the greater costliness of the small county while not as strikingly evident is nevertheless clearly apparent. Ninety counties of North Carolina maintain county homes or poor farms for the aged, infirm, and indigent. Figures on the cost of operat-

⁸ *The Ohio Citizen*, published by the Ohio Institute, Columbus, Ohio, September 18, 1925.

ing these institutions are available for the year 1921. In counties having a population in excess of 50,000, the annual contribution per inhabitant required to maintain such homes amounted to 13.9 cents. In counties with populations between 30,000 and 50,000 the per capita contribution required was 14.6 cents. Finally in counties with populations below 30,000, the average maintenance costs represented a burden of 15.1 cents per inhabitant.⁶ Had it been possible to make proper allowance for differences in the character of the maintenance offered inmates at various institutions, the differential in favor of the larger counties would be much greater than appears from the figures. In some of the smaller counties, the county home consists of nothing more than a cheap cottage or shack with no conveniences or sanitary improvements.

A final illustration of the costliness of governmental agencies serving small population groups may be drawn from the field of education. Despite the fact that city high schools pay better salaries to their teachers and offer on the whole a better quality of instruction, it costs somewhat less, per child in attendance, to educate pupils in the city high schools of North Carolina than it does to educate them in the rural high schools of the state. The reason for the higher per pupil costs in the country high schools seems to be due entirely to the comparative smallness of the average rural school which in many cases renders it impossible to utilize the services of teachers in the most economical manner. In 1925, the average rural high school in North Carolina employed one teacher to every 17.4 pupils in daily attendance. The average urban high school which was nearly three times larger was able to get along with one teacher to every

20.3 pupils.⁷ Had the rural schools been able to secure the same numerical ratio between teachers and students as the one in effect in the cities, they would have been able to cut down their per pupil cost of instruction by 14 per cent.

The gist of the rural tax problem may be expressed in two sentences. Because rural communities are poor, the raising of a given sum of revenue requires a relatively high rate of taxation. Because rural governments serve comparatively small populations scattered over wide areas, a relatively large sum must be expended to produce a given result. These two tendencies explain why farmers in all sections of the country are complaining bitterly over the weight of their taxes, while at the same time educators and social workers are pointing to the low standards of rural governmental performance as a subject for state-wide concern.

LARGER ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS NEEDED

Is there any way out for the farmer? One obvious avenue of relief is to reduce the present high cost of rural government by increasing the size of administrative and operating units. The consolidation of small schools and the abolition of school districts as independent financial units has been going on apace. The extension of the consolidation idea to other fields of local government has at least reached the stage of concrete recommendations, although such recommendations are as yet rarely enacted into laws.

In his message of January 5, 1927, Governor Smith of New York said:

"One year ago, I made a definite proposal that a study of county government be made in order to effect a consolidation of counties wherever practicable and an

⁶ Special Bulletin No. 4, North Carolina State Board of Charities and Public Welfare.

⁷ See *Biennial Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction of North Carolina for the Scholastic Years 1924-1925 and 1925-1926*, Part IV, p. 21.

elimination of the very palpable waste of conducting county government throughout the state."

The New York State legislature failed to respond to this suggestion. Virginia, however, under the leadership of Governor Harry Byrd, has manifested a more progressive spirit. A recent report on county government in Virginia, prepared by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research for the Governor's Committee on Consolidation and Simplification recommends the immediate creation of administrative areas consisting of two or more adjacent counties, in which certain county functions such as schools, roads, health and public welfare will be merged under one administrative head. Complete merging of county governments is urged in the case of unusually small counties.⁸

A report of a special tax commission appointed by the Governor of North Carolina contains the following trenchant observations.

"The county as a unit basis for maintaining public roads is in the very nature of the case an uneconomic unit. Efficient and economic maintenance of public roads has become largely a matter of skillful use of expensive power-operated machinery, with a continually developing knowledge of technique in operation. County areas are not large enough to employ the use of such machinery at maximum efficiency. Knowledge of the most suitable machinery and the technique of operation cannot be developed by one hundred county boards, frequently changing, with the degree of efficiency of a central agency."⁹

One of the most radical of consolidation plans has been put forward by two state tax officials in Tennessee. It is proposed

⁸ County Government in Virginia, Richmond, 1928. See also P. W. Wager, *County Government in North Carolina*, and the Surveys of County Government and County Affairs on file in the Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina.

⁹ Report of The Tax Commission of North Carolina, Raleigh, 1928, p. 11.

that the 95 counties of that state be reduced to 11 administrative units comprising eight or nine counties, which will give each unit an area of some 3,800 square miles and a population in excess of 200,000. As an immediate measure of reform, a program of mergers is proposed, reducing the existing number of counties by approximately one-half.¹⁰

It will be expecting too much of consolidation, however, to rely on it to solve the farmer's tax problem. If recent experience in the field of education is to be taken as any criterion, consolidation may be expected to yield its dividends in the form of higher standards of governmental performance rather than in reduced tax bills. Consolidation will bring in more value for each tax dollar spent but, in view of the many inadequacies and lacks of present-day rural government, it is scarcely likely that any fewer number of dollars will be required.

As long as rural governments continue to have their present functions and as long as these functions are financed by means of a general levy on local property, the tax lot of the farmer will continue to be hard. Twenty-six per cent of the population of the country lives on farms. Agricultural wealth, however, represents only about 17 per cent of the country's aggregate wealth. The bulk of the tangible wealth of the country is invested in the instruments of industry and commerce, and under our present system of taxation this latter class of property is practically monopolized by the urban centers. Debarred from tapping the rich sources of industrial and commercial wealth, the position of the agricultural classes is comparable to the situation in which city wage workers would find themselves, if they were segregated into special

¹⁰ *American Political Science Review*, August, 1928, p. 733.

districts and were obliged to finance the education of their children and other needed services through taxes on their cottages, flivvers, and radio sets.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS AGENTS OF THE STATE

Friends of the farmer, people interested in equalizing educational opportunities and in raising rural standards in health and public welfare are beginning to call attention to certain fundamental facts concerning the nature of local government and of the functions which it performs, the neglect of which facts, it is claimed, is in large part responsible for the existence of a rural tax problem. It is being pointed out that many of the most burdensome of local governmental functions, such as education, highway maintenance, health, and public welfare, are from an historical and legal point of view not local functions at all but duties which devolve primarily upon the state. The adequate performance of these functions is a matter of more than mere local concern. It is affected with an interest which extends to the whole state. Even were this point of view not supported by history and law, it is claimed that the trend of modern economic development would nevertheless compel its acceptance. The integrating forces of the modern industrial era bind together the most widely separated communities by a multitude of economic ties. It is no longer possible for a locality to exist in isolated independence.

In carrying on activities which affect the interest of the people as a whole, local governments are merely acting as agents of the state. Their functions have been prescribed for them by the state, and their only financial resources for discharging those functions are such as the state allows them. The quality and effectiveness of their work is, therefore, dependent both

on the inherent difficulties of the tasks assigned to them and upon the adequacy of the financial resources which they are permitted to tap.

In delegating some of its functions to local governments, the state does not thereby relieve itself of the primary responsibility. It is still the duty of the state, as guardian of the people as a whole, to see that the powers it delegates are exercised uniformly and efficiently throughout its jurisdiction. This duty, moreover, imposes certain corollary obligations. The first of these is that the boundaries of local administrative areas be determined with some regard to the operating exigencies of the tasks to be performed. Administrative areas should be sufficiently large to permit the economic employment of modern facilities and technical methods. A second requirement is that local governments be held to some minimum standard of performance in the discharge of the duties assigned to them. Finally, since the state gives its local agents certain tasks to perform in accordance with certain minimum standards, it is on its part bound to furnish the financial support necessary to produce the required results. If this support is supplied through a delegation to the localities of a part of the state's taxing power, the resulting burdens should be uniform throughout the state. There would seem to be no valid reason why one class of citizens should be more onerously taxed than another class for the support of standard governmental services which are supplied in the interests of the state as a whole.

It is the failure to observe the last of these requirements which is chiefly responsible for the present tax woes of the farmer. For the purpose of financing services, the per capita costs of which vary considerably from place to place, local

governments in America are in the main restricted to a single source of revenue. They are permitted to tax such property as happens to be located within their jurisdictions. Under such an arrangement it is impossible to secure any state-wide uniformity either as to services or tax burdens except on one condition. The per capita taxable wealth in each local jurisdiction must be in proportion to the per capita amounts needed to supply that jurisdiction with the desired services.

When our present system of local government took form, the condition stated was probably approximated. We were an agricultural nation, and the territorial distribution of agricultural wealth is, as a rule, fairly even. Moreover, the services supplied by local governments were of a relatively simple and inexpensive nature. When public instruction was typified by the one-room school and when citizens contributed their personal labor toward the maintenance of the highways, there was slight room for local variations in per capita governmental costs. Nor, in view of the greater degree of local isolation, was there the same need as at present for uniformity in standards of performance.

The process of industrialization and urbanization has brought about a profound change in the factors conditioning local government. The territorial distribution of wealth is no longer even. Commerce and industry tend to concentrate in the urban centers. There are broad variations in average wealth as between one locality and another. The services expected of local governments are no longer of a simple and inexpensive character. The furnishing of many of these services now requires a highly trained personnel and expensive facilities. Where physical conditions or the smallness of administrative areas militate

against the economic employment of such facilities, wide discrepancies in the quality of the services rendered or in the per capita cost of supplying these services are likely to appear. Finally, as all parts of the state become more and more tightly knit into a closely woven economic whole, the need for certain minimum standards in governmental services assumes increasing importance.

It is perfectly obvious that the maintenance of state-wide standards in the matter of services and of equality in the matter of tax burdens is not possible on the basis of the present method of financing local government. The ultimate solution of the rural tax problem depends upon the degree of success obtained in equalizing the burden of taxation as regards those standard minimums of various governmental services which are considered essential to the welfare of the state as a whole. Generally speaking this equalization may be secured in two ways. The state may directly assume some of the functions it has hitherto delegated to the localities to perform, or, without fundamentally disturbing the present allocation of functions, it may equalize local tax burdens through the apportionment of grants-in-aid raised on a state-wide basis of taxation.

For a long time state governments have been expanding their activities in fields formerly considered the exclusive province of the localities. The spectacular growth of state highway systems offers a striking example of this tendency. The principle of state aid, however, seems to be making little headway. At the present time, state subventions to localities are confined mainly to education, although some states give aid for local highways and other purposes. The absolute amount of state aid has increased considerably during recent years. In certain states, notably

in the South, there has been a large relative increase in state support for local schools. This is not true, however, of the country as a whole. The percentage of school revenue derived from state taxes and

appropriations was no greater in 1926 than it was in 1920. A much more liberal policy on the part of state legislatures is required, if the rural tax problem is to be satisfactorily solved.

DO SCIENTISTS MERIT POLITICAL POWER?

T. SWANN HARDING

THEORIES of government grow more luxuriantly, perhaps, than any other species of scientific flora, certainly more prolifically than theories in the more exact physical sciences. Odum in *Man's Quest For Social Guidance* says that "in a single hurried survey of the writings of some four score philosophers and social theorists one may find approximately fifty different concepts of government." No more depressing comment upon the ineptitude and fallacy of expert ideas on government ever appeared than Pitirim Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*. Those who specialize in the social sciences seem almost bankrupt of practical ideas about government.

As to laymen, each, of course, has a full and complete theory on the subject of government because, as Blackstone long ago observed, the government of his fellows is the only profession which requires absolutely no apprenticeship nor preliminary study. Where exact scientific data are lacking speculations inevitably abound. That is why there are so many and such conflicting theories as to the cause of cancer and the cure of souls, for instance.

But profound philosophers and brow-furrowed savants often sit down and elaborate schemes of ideal government for ideal, and non-existent, commonwealths. They spin Utopias from pure mind substance. It is somehow a custom in the social sciences, as Sorokin tartly reminds

us, to produce more volumes of exegesis to clarify the gospel according to some idealized St. Marx than to strike out boldly seeking to trace out exact scientific correlations between economic, social, and political phenomena. Of course the latter course does involve real work and it calls for good intellect. The theological technique is far easier, and produces a book quite as imposing in appearance and more weighted with foot-notes.

Plato's idea of government was perhaps as good as any, in theory. He postulated rule by philosophers in his ideal commonwealth. Today's variant of this thesis is rule by scientists. We hear it said that those who have power lack knowledge and those who possess most exact knowledge (the scientists) altogether lack power. Utopia, modernistic style, may then well be achieved by giving power to those who have most knowledge, the scientists, and letting them rule us. So goes the theory.

Of course such rule must be quite distant in the future. The correlation between social and ideological phenomena often seems as low as Adolphe Coste insisted. Christianity, Buddhism and Mohammedanism all appeared among peoples far from powerful or advanced. Little Greece produced marvels of art and mind yet her social life was but slightly influenced thereby. The Romans were far more ignorant and less cultured than either the Egyptians or the Greeks, but they

achieved governmental, military, juridical and social machinery of a remarkable character. Italy and France of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were incomparably superior in ideology to Germany, Holland and England but the latter three countries were far superior in commercial, governmental and political organization.

So also the lag between scientific ideology and the practical utilization of that ideology must be considerable. It may be seriously questioned, indeed, whether the inventions of material culture even spread as rapidly as inventions in non-material culture or pure ideology. Which have spread most rapidly during recent years—the radio, the automobile, or the ideas of communism? Have "jazz," the Charleston, or the bathtub diffused more rapidly in our time? Do tractors and vacuum cleaners or pattern-behaviors in sex-freedom find more ready adoption? When we consider, as Wolfe demonstrates in his *Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method*, that the method and ideology of science differ almost diametrically from the ideas and concepts of the average lay mind we must realize that any transition to government by scientists must take place very slowly. It is probably very much better so. Scientists have not yet mastered their method and realized its limitations and its philosophical character sufficiently well to make good rulers.

There is, it is true, a sort of metaphysical ecstasy particularly prevalent among individuals of much more than average intelligence who have turned their backs upon organized religion and mystical theology to believe piously in the soterial and regenerative efficacy of science and present-day scientists. Some of these people actually affect to believe that the scientist differs in kind, not only in degree, from the ordinary man, and that the salva-

tion of humanity can only be achieved by so changing environmental conditions that the scientific "type" can be bred as rulers over men, or "the swinish masses" as one such elegant enthusiast wrote.

It sometimes seems that Vilfredo Pareto was far from wrong when he called attention to what he named "residues." Thus there is superficially an immense difference between the savage who deifies his fetish or king and the atheistic socialist, yet both have the same deification residue in Pareto's sense. The one refers his to a magic code and the other goes for corroboration to a magic Marx, Lenin, Rousseau, or Voltaire. Dresses change; residues remain.

People seem bound to make legends of individuals or ideas—of movie, baseball or tennis stars, of Shaws, Menckens, Lenins, Haeckels, Marxes, Bryans, Ingersolls. Instead of historical religion a city population may idealize socialism, communism, anarchism, liberalism, pacifism, nationalism, progress, rationalism or what we may call "scientificism." Yet, in spite of their pseudo-scientific terms, the ideals of many such people are unscientific, mystical and superstitious.

People who thus worship science are astoundingly shocked when you use such an expression as "scientific metaphysics" and insist that they face facts and every day reality every minute of the day and have no time for such "bunk." They are dogmatic materialist monists or realists and so exaggerate the importance of facts that they forget the necessary correlation of facts into hypotheses which is obviously a philosophic venture and amounts to a synthesis of a scientific metaphysics, or a science of first principles, as a foundation upon which to build knowledge.

After all, ideas stand back of experiments. Until the idea hits us to try so and so in such and such a way we are helpless in the

laboratory. A good organic chemist can, in fact, almost intuitively plot out syntheses of complex compounds and then, following experimental methods, get the desired compound in every instance. We cannot get away from ideology even in science.

Perhaps we do wrong to undermine this pathetic faith of worshippers so pious. We are told that invalid beliefs often have distinct survival values at certain levels of mental evolution. Indeed Kidd regarded religion as a valuable "ultra-rational sanction" for a large class of individual conduct. We are asked for something better to replace the errors we demolish. But should an error be coddled even though we cannot immediately replace it with a "truth" majestically finished for all time? Our new truths will be errors tomorrow but we can only progress by recognizing and excising patent error as quickly as we can.

An intimate association with scientists would disabuse many persons of their illusions. For today scientists are men of somewhat intense but very, very limited curiosity who are about as unfitted to rule mankind as would be so many evangelical parsons or book agents. This is not to imply for a moment that scientists are on as low an intellectual level as the other sub-groups mentioned. It implies merely that scientists have so long, so consistently and so deliberately limited their interests to their specialized spheres and their method to their laboratories that their extra-mural conduct is not above that of other men, while their general knowledge is deplorable in its paucity.

Worse still scientists usually try deliberately to keep their knowledge very narrowly specialized and to restrict their interests to that end, while they are so much alarmed by attempts to generalize or to popularize their methods that it is

next to impossible to get true scientists (more particularly the smaller and the medium-sized intellects) to display serious interest in any broad, general human problem. By the time a man has grown prominent enough to dare display such an heretical interest, his attitudes are far from well balanced because scientists have failed quite as much as laymen to educate and discipline their emotions.

Seventeen years association with scientists of sorts compels the admission that they are just about as mean, self-seeking, unjust, vituperative, dollar-greedy, and dishonest as the average person of intelligence in any other sphere of activity. So long as this is true, so long should we "view with alarm" their rule of mankind.

This is not a general and dogmatic condemnation of scientists and of science. Far from it. It simply means that, operating as they do in a realm where truth, justice, and impartial adherence to fact and to the highest ethics are constantly necessary, it is incumbent upon scientists to broaden their interests, apply their special technique to other problems and above all to discipline their emotions. These things they do not do, as a class, any more than other human sub-groups do. As a matter of fact a humanitarian philosopher or a philosophic liberal is much more likely to achieve such discipline than the average scientist of today. To labor this point in detail seems unnecessary; it is bad enough viewed in abstract!

It means simply that scientists are human, all too human indeed; yet they singularly fail to humanize knowledge. It is very questionable whether they are competent to be rulers over many, a task requiring besides mere knowledge—the ability to make knowledge clear to laymen and to apply it practically, definitely disciplined emotions, sound judgment, a detached, skeptical attitude of

mind which appraises its skepticism as a means rather than an end in itself, breadth of view-point and an entire freedom from dogmatism. Let us briefly and far from exhaustively examine the scientist from a few of these standpoints.

Laymen are not alone in "swearing by the facts." Scientists repeatedly make dogma out of what should be pure hypothesis. This is a theological attitude. True scientific thought is analytical, hypothetical and non-dogmatic, as de Roberty rightly held. Symbolic truth constitutes art while apodeictical truth is the sphere of religion or of philosophy, not of science. Although the common man makes legends and expounds great and permanent "truths" scientists should not indulge this fad.

As a leading Yale physicist not long ago remarked scientists tend to assume the absolute reality of concepts which are actually metaphysical. They think and talk, for instance, of genes, electrons, and protons as if these things actually existed whereas they are really but dealing with an hypothesis adopted tentatively because it best fits the facts at present known. New facts time and again require new hypotheses and true science dares not dogmatize its theories because that is the surest way to deter the progress of knowledge.

How sure can a scientist be anyway? When a chemist says that this substance is gold he merely means that this substance fulfills all the tests he knows to apply to it and that these same tests proved that other substance there to be gold. He works always with a limited certainty of inference and a positive region of doubt nearby. The investigator must take a metaphysical leap when he assumes, as he finally must, that the two substances are identical, for science is grounded in metaphysics.

When a mathematician thinks of a circle he thinks of a circumference having a definite mathematical relation to its diameter. But when he draws a circle and attempts by refined instruments of precision to prove that the circumference is 3.1416 times the diameter he cannot get within one part in five hundred or so of that value and must make a metaphysical leap, as Jevons did, to sustain his science. These metaphysical leaps on pure faith are absolutely necessary, but they amount to a process of making postulates whose content is limited by definition; no more, no less, and that requires philosophy, not dogmatism.

Science today is too much afraid of philosophy and its correlations; it is rather in the position of having accumulated building materials of all sorts, of having these carefully stored away and classified, yet of deploring any effort that is made to erect therefrom a finished edifice. But to become fully useful as a governing principle science must become philosophic; there must be correlation and synthesis to make one complete continuum, Science, classified of course into various sciences, but not so unalterably divided up that no connections exist.

It is a defect of a predominantly experimental age that an exaggerated respect for and interest in isolated facts and data should cloud our minds to the importance of coördination and correlation. To be effective, science must become whole and integrate itself into life. Not only must scientific method be used in the laboratory, but the public at large must be sufficiently impregnated with the scientific attitude to enable it to judge rationally, using facts and verifiable data as criteria.

In *The World As Will and Idea* Schopenhauer says "Moreover the special philosophical disposition induces a man to make the universal of phenomenon his problem,

while the investigators in the natural sciences wonder only at exquisite and rare phenomena, and their problem is merely to refer these to phenomena which are better known. . . . The lower a man stands in an intellectual regard the less of a problem is existence itself to him." Since Einstein science has become more and more nearly a constructed work of art. The old fundamentals have been removed and it is now realized that there is no logical necessity for any scientific theory; instead the theory is accepted because it offers the most convenient temporary explanation of phenomena.

Hemmeter has so well defined the necessity for broad, philosophic views in science in his *Master Minds in Medicine* that a paragraph from him will scarcely go amiss here—

"This has resulted in an accumulation of a vast amount of scientific building blocks, but there is no coherent, complete architecture in the modern science of medicine, and this is at least in part due to the perfectly unnatural separation of the three methods (subjective thought, observation, experimentation) for medical progress. It is very rare to find in modern medical literature even an attempt at a complete scientific plan, and this is largely explained by the fear of most investigators to use the method of medical thinking, or the subjective method, in association with the objective method. Martius ("Pathogenetische Grundgedanken") says 'It is a curious thing that the more scientific, the more exact the method of an investigator in medicine the more inimical to thinking are its advocates.' This is, indeed, curious. Why should exactness of a method be associated with hostility to our subjective powers of research, the power of thinking as a help for the solution of medical problems? Darwin, Haeckel, Julius Robert Mayer, and Helmholtz were not only great investigators but even greater thinkers. What is all this exactness (of observation and experiment) but frequently the translation of much complicated thinking into manipulations of science. The thought preceded the experiment, the subjective preceded the objective method."

Not only does the average scientist of today ignore universal ideas, he rather

deplores all attempts to popularize science or to attract the attention of laymen to scientific methodology. Pious worshippers of idealized scientists would be rather amazed at the scientist's contempt for popularity. One repeatedly hears experimental scientists voice anger when asked to write semi-popular treatments of their work for semi-popular publications. The man who makes an attempt to translate science into terms laymen can comprehend is regarded as a sort of half-breed by "pure" scientists though he be a J. B. S. Haldane. The man who is himself engaged in research and dares to write popularly inevitably loses caste among scientists of the blood, unless he be already so firmly established that it is practically impossible for him to lose caste. Then it will be said, "O poor old Arrhenius (or Soandso) is in his dotage; he's talking philosophy now; he's taken up cosmic physics and he writes for the public."

Yet it is most unfortunate that the people who hear and know facts and who do scientific work do not write sufficiently about science. If they do write they persist in a style which Slosson once dubbed in *Science* as so over loaded with negatives that it reminded him of Chinese boxes; you opened one after the other to attempt to get the meaning. As a matter of fact—this is a state secret—scientists have actually ceased to be comprehensible to each other! British *Nature* of Oct. 8, 1927, had this to say on the subject; it is discussing the papers presented at the meeting of the British Association at Leeds:

"Some of the subjects are so specialized in scope that it is improbable they could have been of interest to more than a few members of the particular section in which they were delivered. Many of the summaries are couched in such highly technical language that even the special scientific correspondents of the

great newspapers find them unintelligible. . . . There would be little occasion for lengthy comment were it only the youthful aspirants for scientific honors against whom this charge of obscurity could be brought. We could rely upon time to purge them of the conceit of demonstrating familiarity with their newly acquired form of expression in order to win a reputation for erudition. Unfortunately, some of the addresses delivered by sectional presidents at Leeds displayed the same weakness. From the point of view of titles, subject matter, and form of presentation they were alike calculated to produce in many members of the association a feeling of bewilderment. . . . The advancement of science depends upon the encouragement of research. The public must be better informed if it is to appreciate to the full the need for more and more research. It will not willingly endow what it cannot understand. . . . Clear exposition of science should also dispell the idea that scientific experiment is mere legerdemain, its mysticism heightened by a rigmarole of complex terminology. Explicit statement is the necessary precursor of wide publicity; without such there cannot be general appreciation of the aims and method of science, of what science has achieved and what it might achieve for the human race."

Nothing could be added to this severe indictment of obscure scientists coming, as it does, from a scientific source. If the members of the scientific associations themselves are bewildered by their colleagues it is no wonder that laymen often regard science as a newer necromancy expressed "by a rigmarole of complex terminology." Yet the trend actually is towards stricter specialization, greater complexity, and increased obscurity. To-day physical chemists and organic chemists not only fail to comprehend each other but also regard each other as operating in altogether different spheres. Just where will this trend ultimately land us? Will scientists finally work altogether for their own diversion and deliberately let the public go hang?

This masterful statement from *Nature* helps considerably to explain why so many laymen remain in a mental state wherein they fail to differentiate between the scientist and the sciolist. When a

popular article from a government scientific bureau or from *Science Service*, embodying true scientific data, stands in the press beside the pseudoscientific dicta of some quack or the subjective speculation of some mystical charlatan, people of considerable education very often evaluate these two as of equal validity and usefulness. While millions are spent to promote scientific investigation and to spread its results abroad it is constantly complained that people do not stick to science in their practical, everyday affairs, but pursue and enrich the quack as they did in bygone ages.

One reason is that science is so ill expressed to laymen that ready comprehension would be difficult even if they were trained to analyse statements and to make dispassionate judgments. When you consider that our educational system rather carefully avoids training in fundamental things which make efficient living possible, things like making impartial judgments using all available facts as criteria, you can very well understand why science quite seriously fails to be utilized efficiently.

Perhaps it would be just as well to define science at this point. We mean by science that small but gradually broadening body of knowledge which is exact, verifiable, demonstrable and communicable. A brief, attentive consideration of these four adjectives, so effectively used by Jesse Lee Bennett, would actually supply anyone with criteria of judgment to enable them to distinguish scientific facts from sciosophy, or organized ignorance. There are many systems of organized ignorance. Grant certain ill founded premises and you can erect upon these a system quite as logical and as orderly as science.

But is the description of the facts given exactly? Can you yourself verify these

facts? Could you, similarly equipped, perform the experiments described and demonstrate the propositions? Can the essence of the experiments be communicated to others so that any person of average intelligence could perform them himself and get identical results? If the answer to all these questions is "Yes" we have to do with science, otherwise we are dealing with some system of organized ignorance.

Yet to answer these questions intelligently a new educational technique will be necessary. For the public has not been trained (1) to use verifiable facts as criteria of judgment; (2) to see knowledge and science as connected wholes, embracing all known facts and requiring a generalization to be consistent with the body as a whole before it can take on validity; (3) to believe in principles—exact observation, precise description, cautious deduction etc.—but to hold theories and hypotheses very tentatively; (4) to understand that education is a continuing life process, not a thing contained only within walls or textbook covers and definitely ended at "Commencement." To teach these principles implies nothing more nor less than a new and scientific educational technique.

We thus see how unfortunate it is that scientists are not even sufficiently interested in power over their fellowmen to write interestingly and comprehensibly about their method so that our educational technique may be revised. This leaves popularization in the untrained hands of totally unskilled writers who altogether lack the scientifically critical-skeptical attitude and the vision of knowledge as a whole. We therefore greatly need popular writers and speakers who comprehend the scientific attitude to show adults how to appreciate science and to give them a vision of this method,

thus enabling them intelligently to absorb the information they now so largely misunderstand or ignore.

Today when some mystic declares he hooks on to the infinite sources of power with his medulla oblongata and revivifies himself by thus "scientifically" increasing the velocity of his protoplasmic molecules, the public sees little incongruity in associating this statement with truly scientific statements regarding ultra violet energy or inter-atomic physics. Yet the latter statements are exact, verifiable, demonstrable, and communicable, while the former are hazy, unverifiable, undemonstrable, and cannot be so communicated that any intelligent person can go and do likewise. To make science efficient people simply must be taught to adopt scientific facts as criteria of judgment in practical matters and so to visualize science as to recognize when any particular statement is inconsistent with its fundamental premises. This is a duty the scientist must perform when he has power.

It is, indeed, an open question whether we do not err grossly when we spend so extravagantly upon experimental research and the broadcasting of its results while we so completely ignore the integration of this body of fact with life in general and the faulty conditions at the receiving end. We may broadcast isolated scientific facts forever, recognizing them as tiny parts of the great coherent, consistent, coördinated whole, yet failing in our ultimate objective. The great broadcasting station at Arlington, Virginia, would be utterly useless if all the receiving sets in the United States were so imperfect that they brought in only distorted static and verbal nonsense no matter what was put on the air. It is time that we gave more attention to and spent more money upon the mechanism of

public receptivity to scientific data in order to close the chasm between science and the public.

Yet such problems as these do not interest research investigators in the experimental sciences at all. They go their way alternately scoring the public for its ignorance and indifference and damning it for begrudging funds to pure research. They publish their highly technical little papers, hoard their precious little reprints, view with disdain and complete scorn the similar little papers and reprints of workers in other sciences, and have a jolly good time. At a recent meeting of physiological and biological chemists in Ann Arbor brief, really trivial, but highly technical papers, were eructed by such little scientists at the rate of one every ten minutes for six hours on three consecutive days, sans discussion, sans comprehension. Paper after paper announced itself as a preliminary report from which some results might be expected in time and proceeded further to befuddle and anesthetize an audience already asleep or half insensible. Verily scientists have much to learn before they are fit to have power over other men.

In his masterful *Anatomy of Science*, G. N. Lewis speaks as follows: "It must be admitted that science has its castes. The man whose chief apparatus is the differential equation looks down upon one who uses a galvanometer, and he in turn upon those who putter about with sticky and smelly things in test tubes. But all of these, and most biologists too, join together in their contempt for the pariah who, not through a glass darkly, but with keen, unaided vision, observes the massing of a thundercloud on the horizon, the petals as they unfold, or the swarming of a hive of bees. . . . In the snobbery of science each branch attempts to rise in the social scale by imitating the method and phenomena of the sciences beneath.

Indeed, it is a common fault of mankind to refuse to recognize the existence of a phenomena unless some mechanism has been devised, or, as we say, some explanation is offered."

Scientists are not well rounded. Scarcely any group of human beings on earth (or imaginable) could possibly exceed in distorted development a group made up of average graduate students in experimental science at some really good university. Their interests are devoted morbidly to their specialty; their sex life is largely suppressed; they find it indecent to admit art, literature, or philosophy into their narrowly restricted lives. Day and night they stick exclusively to their laboratories and their pet experiments, and one wonders that minds never aired out by the winds of robust life and reality, never attuned to universal connotations, can accomplish as much as they do. How much more valuable science might be to mankind if scientists dared be well rounded human beings!

Scientific method is the finest method man has so far devised for the solution of his problems. When science is correlated properly into a scientific metaphysics or philosophy, as you please; when scientists have educated emotions; when they are no longer afraid to be understood popularly and to carry their message out into the world; when they learn to think about emotionally exciting ideas without loss of *sui compose*, calmly and judicially as they now do about a specified experiment or analysis—then we may hope that scientists and their method may remould our society. But power without disciplined emotions and very broad knowledge is disastrous. At present, therefore, scientists are totally unfit to rule and it would be unfortunate to see them make the attempt only to fail and thus discredit their supremely useful and valuable technique before the eyes of the lay world.

SOCIAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

PRESENT-DAY SOCIAL INSURANCE IN GERMANY

MOLLIE RAY CARROLL

ALTHOUGH much has been written about German social insurance, there is distinct need for a brief and convenient survey of the system as a whole to which the American student of social movements may turn. Also, perhaps because students in both countries tend to interpret social institutions of the other nation in the light of their own, some of the facts of German social insurance are surprisingly misunderstood by us. It is in the hope, therefore of bringing out the salient points of the system that the writer makes bold to set forth facts which are in part well understood.

Social insurance in Germany was inaugurated in the 1880's by Bismarck as part of his campaign against the labor movement. At first it was bitterly opposed by the workers, but later, when trade unionism and socialism were legally permitted in that country and when people saw the benefits of social insurance to themselves, the attitude changed completely. Insurance against sickness was inaugurated by German law on December 1, 1884. Accident insurance followed on October 1, 1885, and protection against the economic ills of invalidity and old age came on January 1, 1891. Then a series of alterations and amendments was passed, especially noteworthy being the expansion of health insurance in 1892 and 1903, of

invalidity insurance in 1899, and of accident insurance in 1900.¹ These laws were codified into a general Social Insurance Act on July 19, 1911.² The extent of the system in that year may be appreciated by the fact that insurance against sickness in 1911 covered 14.5 million persons; against accident, 9.4 million; and against invalidity and old age, 15.8 million. The benefits paid for these three types of insurances during that year totaled 768 million marks and the reserves built up amounted to approximately 2660 million marks. Moreover, these figures do not include the miners' insurance funds which were at that time organized upon a state-wide rather than national basis and that granted some 41 million marks in benefits during the same year. In December, 1911, further legislation was passed providing special insurance for salaried employees.

During the war the reserves built up by the social insurance funds and the securities offered by the system as a whole helped to maintain the workers' morale.

¹ An admirable brief account of the development and principles of German social insurance is to be found in *Deutsche Sozialpolitik, 1918-1928. Erinnerungsschrift des Reichsarbeitsministeriums*. Berlin, Hobbing, 1929.

² Translated by Henry J. Harris and published as Bulletin No. 96 of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, under the title, *The Workmen's Insurance Code of July 19, 1911 of Germany*.

However, the fact that many able-bodied men were in the army necessitated temporary modifications of terms of payment and resulted in marked decrease in the reserves. Nevertheless, the terms of grant of benefit were broadened. The qualification for old age pensions was reduced from 70 to 65 years. Maternity benefits were extended. The health insurance program was expanded to include prophylactic measures because venereal disease had increased during the war. These extensions of the social insurance measures combined with the great increase of widows and orphans resulting from the war, caused the number of recipients of insurance immediately after 1918 to triple that of 1913. As a result, the funds were depleted, the system was burdened with unfavorable risks, and special consideration had to be given to war participants who were unable to maintain regular payments. In spite of these difficulties the social insurance system was a potent force in exerting a moderating effect upon the revolution that followed upon the heels of the war. The workers, although disorganized and radicalized, felt that they had a vested interest in the state because of their insurance claims and the surprising lack of violence in the change from monarchy to democracy is frequently attributed to this fact.

During the disastrous inflation that followed the war the insurance reserves depreciated along with all other forms of savings. Furthermore the constantly declining value of the currency forced increase in the amounts paid out in benefits, although the living standards of the pensioners for the most part deteriorated rapidly, their expanded grants generally lagging far behind the change in buying power of the mark. In consequence, at the close of 1923 when the currency was stabilized, the insurance system with an

empty treasury faced a large membership dependent upon its funds. It had lost about four billion marks through the inflation. The system had to be rebuilt, therefore, from the ground up and considerable legislation to that end was passed in 1924. The first to be reestablished was the invalidity and old age insurance fund. It received a subsidy from the national government. Then followed the revival of the salaried employees' insurance. In 1924, also, the miners' fund became a part of the national scheme of insurance against sickness. Accident insurance received special legislative attention in 1925. In July of 1927, the Unemployment Insurance Act was passed. In December of that year the seamen's insurance fund, which had developed separately, was incorporated into the health insurance system. This brief survey of the development of the scheme as a whole serves as background for short analysis of the separate types at the present time.

Health insurance today covers persons employed as workers, assistants, journeymen, apprentices or household assistants foremen and people in similar capacity; journeymen, apprentices or clerks in drug stores; actors and musicians without reference to the artistic quality of their performance; teachers; those employed in education or instruction, social work, or care of the sick, if this be their main occupation; industrial home workers; and seamen. These are compulsorily insured against sickness if they earn less than 3600 marks annually. Persons who have previously fallen within this category but who exceed the income limitation may continue within the insurance fund if they so desire. About one-ninth of the present membership is composed of those voluntarily remaining within the protection of the system. The total membership is

about 20 million, or approximately one-third of the entire German population, 13 million of them being men and 7 million, women.

The health insurance fund is supported by compulsory contributions for each member. The dues are paid two-thirds by the worker and one-third by the employer. The task of forwarding them to the local insurance fund is obligatory upon the employer and they must be sent each pay-day. The amount may be set according to the necessities of the fund, with due regard to the establishment of reserves. It may, however, not exceed, in the total contribution of employer and worker, $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the wage rate. During the time of insured sickness payments to the fund are not required. The rate of contribution is not uniform throughout the nation, but depends upon the exigencies of the particular fund of which the person is a member. There are, moreover, half a dozen different kinds of organizations for collecting these health insurance dues, for in the national development of health insurance the earlier, local groups have retained their identities when incorporated into the government system. Some of these receiving and paying offices are local, others are state. Others are organized according to industrial establishments or occupational groups. The miners have their separate funds. Each organization requires dues sufficient to cover its current disbursements and to contribute something to a national reserve. When the maximum payments allowable by law do not meet the expenditures, the reserve is drawn upon. When a lower figure serves, rates are set at that point. At present the average of these dues throughout Germany amounts to 6 per cent of the wages, in contrast to the pre-war rate of about four per cent. The peculiar problem of certain occupational

groups, and particularly of the miners, combined with the effects of inflation, account for the present, higher figure.

Title to benefit obtains after a person has for three months uninterruptedly contributed to the insurance fund the normal amount for his wage. Assistance to which he is then eligible consists of money payments and of medical services. The money payments may begin within four days of the onset of sickness or of incapacity to work following illness. It may reach 75 per cent of wages and is based upon the customary remuneration and the particular demands of the situation. It is not limited to those in necessitous condition. Far more emphasis, however, is laid in Germany upon the services rendered to members of the health insurance fund and to their dependents, numbering an additional fourteen million persons, than to money payments. Medical care afforded by the fund includes the physician's treatment, drugs, lenses, surgical appliances, treatment to prevent disfiguration or crippling consequent upon illness, and any other care necessary to maintain health or prevent incapacity to work. Hospital care may be substituted for medical aid in the home. The person may also be sent to an institution for convalescents should that treatment seem expedient. Care continues until the patient is cured or for the duration of 26 weeks. It can be extended to a year, in certain cases of long continued illness, such as tuberculosis though in general after six months the case is turned over to the invalidity insurance branch. Services rendered by the health insurance fund include also medical aid to obstetrical cases and maternity benefits. In case of the death of the insured person, funeral expenses are paid. The most important aspect of the health insurance movement today consists in the wide-spread develop-

ment and continued expansion of preventive measures.

Some conception of the scope of the services rendered by the health insurance system may be gathered from the fact that in 1926 there averaged 46 cases and 1182 days lost through sickness for every one hundred members of the insurance fund. A greater percentage of illness was found among the men, who averaged 48 cases per 100 members, whereas there were 40 per hundred among the women. Duration of sickness for the men, however, was 25 days on the average, as against 29 for the women. In general, throughout the year, about three to four per cent of the membership was incapacitated for work on account of illness. This was a higher rate than obtained before the war. In 1927 the total expenditures for health insurance amounted to 1537 million marks, while the total income was 1634 million. This left a fund for the reserve of 97 millions. In 1926 the excess of income over expenditures was 124 million marks. The difference may be due to the unusual sensitivity of the health insurance system to both illness and unemployment, the year, 1926, having been one of exceptionally great unemployment. The administrative costs of the system in 1927 approximated 100 million marks.

There are moot problems in German health insurance today. Malingering represents a certain danger, but strict attention is given to this difficulty by the physicians themselves. Further difficulty is found in the criticism frequently lodged against the system, that it encourages persons to consult the doctor needlessly, upon the occurrence of slight aches or pains. On the other hand ease of application for medical advice is likely to facilitate the discovery of disease in its incipency and therefore to aid markedly in the promotion of general public health.

Another problem concerns the rate of payment to the physician for his services. This is undoubtedly, in many cases far below reasonable charges for the care required and tends not only to encourage slipshod work but to create an antagonism between the medical profession and the health insurance scheme. It thereby offers little solution to the problem of reasonable medical fees on the one hand or of maintenance of standards in the profession on the other. All of these problems are receiving attention and offer indications of increasingly satisfactory adjustment.

A second branch of German social insurance, which provides security in the event of invalidity or old age, covers workers, journeymen and household assistants; industrial home workers; assistants and apprentices not expressly exempted by the national insurance law; and seamen. Soldiers and state police and small, independent entrepreneurs are permitted to become members of the system. Foreigners and certain other groups chiefly those temporarily employed, who are students, or who have independent means sufficient to maintain them in the event of invalidity, are exempted. Provision is made for voluntary extension of insurance to persons whose change of occupational status excludes them although they were previously compulsorily comprehended within the scope of the act. Others are also allowed independently to join. The total membership at present is about 18 million persons.

Funds for the support of the invalidity and old age insurance scheme are provided partly by the national government and partly by fifty-fifty contributions of employers and workers. Persons voluntarily insured, of course, pay their own dues. Contributions of employer and worker to the fund are graduated, there being six

wage classifications. The contribution for workers in the highest wage category exceeds that of the class below them, and so on. Usually dues are payable by the employer weekly, on pay-day. Where there are long-term contracts of employment, however, accounts may be settled quarterly. Payment is made by means of the purchase of stamps, issued for the purpose by the national government. They are attached to receipt cards in the possession of the employee. The worker may himself arrange to make the payments and to receive recompense therefore from the employer. The national government, in addition to issuing and selling the stamps free of charge to the fund and in assuming the administrative costs of paying benefits, grants additional sums in the form of subsidies to recipients of pensions. Necessity for such a policy has, of course, increased since inflation and stabilization.

Title to benefit ordinarily obtains after a person has contributed for 500 weeks uninterruptedly. Under certain circumstances the period of payment necessary for eligibility may be reduced to 200, or at the very least, to 100 weeks. Claim to benefit is exhausted if a person fails to make payments for 20 weeks within a period of two years, if he is compulsorily, or 40 weeks, if voluntarily insured. Claim may be retained if three-fourths of the required contribution is made. If the individual is prevented by sickness or by military service, or other conditions which may be accepted by the Minister of Labor as adequate, from making payment to the fund, these arrears do not affect his eligibility. If he is unemployed, his payments to the fund are maintained as part of his unemployment insurance benefits.

Claim to old age pension begins with the sixty-fifth year. Title to invalidity insurance commences with the twenty-

seventh week of disabling illness, following normally immediately upon the expiration of claim to health insurance. Invalidity as defined by the law is the condition consequent upon sickness or other infirmity, which prevents the individual from earning one-third of what may be reasonably expected of a physically and mentally sound person of his training and previous occupational history doing the same type of work in such instances. The customary wage-rate of the community is taken as the normal. Payment of benefits begins with the first day of the month of invalidity. This form of insurance, furthermore, covers widows of the insured. It also provides care for widowers who are incapacitated for work upon the death of their wage-earning wives. It includes orphans under the age of 18 years, and applies to legitimate children of an insured man, and to the illegitimate children of an insured woman. It covers the necessitous children of an insured woman, whose husband is incapacitated or has deserted and whose own earnings are insufficient to care for them. Payment of benefits begins with the first day of the month and is made in full for that month in which the death of the supporter of the family occurs. The amount of invalidity insurance averages, nationally, 33 with a maximum of 57 or 58 marks monthly. The sum granted to those living in industrial communities usually ranges from 35 to 40 marks, while those in the agricultural regions usually receive between 25 and 30, because of the lower living costs. The sum granted widows is generally three-fifths, and that given orphans, one-half of the invalidity benefit. Instead of money payments, care in an infirmary or an orphanage may be substituted. Curative treatment for invalidism, as in the case of sickness, may be substituted for assistance in cash.

Attempt is made to return the person to such physical condition that he is capable of work. At present approximately 1,850,000 invalids, 340,000 widows and 780,000 orphans are cared for through this form of social insurance. Their number, in fact, has exceeded the expectations of the actuaries. The scope of insurables is about the same as before the war, but those cared for represent an excess of nearly $1\frac{3}{4}$ millions over the figure for 1913. This is partly a result of the war and the consequent premature ageing of many persons. It is partly caused by the introduction of scientific management, and the accompanying increase of tension and tendency to discharge older workers. The cost of invalidity insurance in 1927 amounted to 875 million marks, 210 millions of which were supplied by the government. Administrative costs totalled 44.4 million and curative treatment, 59.2 million marks.

A third branch of German social insurance makes special provision for salaried employees. The purpose of the fund is practically identical with that of invalidity and old age insurance. The differentiation in organization arises from the strict distinction drawn in Germany between the wage earner and the salaried employee. Administration of this form of insurance is placed in the hands of a special central office composed of a director and an administrative council comprising twelve representatives of employees and employers. This form of security covers employees in administrative positions; office executives, foremen, or other employees of similar or more important positions in industrial establishments; office employees, including apprentices and clerical force in the workshop, in so far as they are not occupied mainly in messenger service, cleaning or similar work; members of dramatic or musical occupa-

tions, without regard to the artistic quality of their performance; salaried employees in teaching, social work and care of the sick; those occupied in navigation; and soldiers and members of the state police. Persons in these categories who earn a salary below a yearly sum stipulated by the Minister of Labor are comprehended within the compulsory terms of the law. At present the rate is set at 8,400 marks, a figure which includes a large proportion of the persons in these occupations. Provision is also made, as in the case of health and invalidity and old age insurance, for voluntary extended insurance for those excluded only because of an increase in salary which places them above the limits of compulsory membership in the fund. Others, not comprised within the terms of the law may also take advantage of the system.

Support of this form of insurance comes entirely from employer and employee, who normally contribute equal amounts. For employees, however, who earn less than 50 marks monthly and for apprentices the employer makes the full payment. Those insuring voluntarily pay the entire fee alone. No subsidy is granted by the state. Dues are scaled according to six salary classifications and usually do not exceed four per cent of the person's remuneration. For those voluntarily insured there are additional categories to meet their higher incomes. Payments are made through the purchase of stamps which are affixed to the employee's card. Usually this is done by the employer at the time of the monthly salary payment, although the employee may actually make the payment and claim return of his share of the cost from the employer.

Title to benefit is acquired after the payment of 60 months of contributions, when the assistance takes the form of old age pensions, or of 120 months of payment

of dues for life insurance made out in favor of dependents. Special exceptions have had to be recognized, however, for inability to make payments during the war and inflation periods, and three-fourths of the regular contributions when made by war participants is sufficient to maintain eligibility in the fund. In general, claim is exhausted, if less than 8 months' dues are paid annually for the first ten years of membership and less than four months' regular contributions subsequently. Benefits take the form of old age pensions, granted when the person is 65; invalidity insurance after the person has been sick for 27 weeks and has therefore normally exhausted claim to health insurance; or insurance to dependents in case of death. A flat rate is set for old age pensions and other forms of aid are scaled in proportion to it. In place of money payments, institutional care may be substituted, as in the case of invalidity insurance. The number of recipients of assistance in 1927 under the terms of the salaried employees insurance law reached 127,750. The expenditures for that year amounted to 140 million marks, while the receipts were 281 million. The discrepancy between income and outgo in the case of this form of insurance results from actuarial underestimation of the number carrying insurance as compared with the pensioners. Difficulty of calculation has arisen in part from the fact that only since the passage of laws of 1922 and 1924 have all salaried employees, and especially those with lower incomes, been included within this form of insurance rather than within that designated as invalidity and old age pensions.

Accident insurance, like that against sickness represents a fusion of several different older organizations for collecting dues and paying benefits. The scope of this branch of social insurance is extra-

ordinarily far reaching, covering practically all persons, without reference to the amount of their wages or salaries who are employed or assisting or apprenticed in or by industrial or commercial establishments, agriculture, forestry, and navigation. It covers household servants and allows small entrepreneurs to insure themselves. The number of persons included within the membership in 1927 was 26,600,000, although approximately 3.5 million of them were counted twice because they worked part time in industry and part in agriculture. Support of the system is derived entirely from the employer, in recognition of the principle of considering such hazards as a charge upon industry, commerce, or agriculture. For this purpose the employers are required to belong to coöperatives or joint liability associations. The dues to the coöperative are set according to the index of liability to accident of establishment. This index is determined from the ratio of payments for accident to the total wages bill for the year. Dues must be paid to the coöperative within six weeks of the expiration of the fiscal year.

A compensable case is any accident within the ordinary circumference or activities of the establishment. Only individual matters, such as eating, drinking, bathing or cleaning of clothing are excepted. The cause of the accident is not considered, except that bodily injury or death resulting from an intentional act of the person involved establishes no claim to indemnification. Occupational disease as well as injury or death are covered. Benefit includes medical, surgical or hospital care or treatment of whatever sort is needed, at home. It comprehends also vocational rehabilitation and re-education. Compensation in money may amount to two-thirds of the wage or salary, in so far as the latter does not

exceed 8,400 marks annually. The rate is scaled, however, according to the extent of the injury. In addition extra sums may be granted for dependents. Payment for injury begins with the day of the accident. Persons who are insured against sickness do not receive workmen's compensation until the beginning of the 27th week of incapacity. Persons learning or entering a new occupation may receive compensation while adjusting to the job. During the period of institutional care there is no payment of money to the injured person for himself. In case of death, one-fifteenth of the annual wage is paid for funeral and other expenses. Dependents receive specified amounts. The widow is granted one-fifth of the annual wage yearly for the rest of her life or until remarriage. If she is incapacitated for work, she may receive two-fifths. If she remarries she is given three-fifths of one year's wages in settlement of the account. The widower receives two-fifths of his former wife's annual wages yearly, so long as he is necessitous. Children receive one-fifth to the end of the 15th year, and other relatives who are dependents receive a like sum. Dependents of foreigners are not eligible to compensation. Claim to aid begins on the day of death of the victim of the accident. In addition to services and money, much effort is spent upon the development of the safety movement and the prevention of accidents. The extent of the services rendered by workmen's compensation may be appreciated from the fact that 1,300,000 cases of accident occurring in the course of work and 4,300 cases of occupational disease were cared for in 1927. The cost of compensation, care, and accident prevention during that year totaled 337 million marks.

The latest form of German social insurance, that providing security against

unemployment, includes practically the same occupations as do the health and salaried employees' insurance funds. The coverage is not so great, however, as in the case of these two, approximately 17½ million persons being compulsorily enrolled in 1928. Contributions to the fund are made qually by employers and workers. The amount is set in percentage of the wage rate, three per cent of which it may not exceed. The employer is required to forward the dues to the health insurance fund, which immediately turns them over to the district body administering the act. Benefits are based upon wage classification. Title to benefits normally obtains after 26 weeks of work in a compulsorily insured occupation, provided the person is able and willing to work and involuntarily unemployed. The amount of benefit is based upon the wage rate. The claim is normally exhausted after 26 weeks. After that time a special emergency relief is granted for a stipulated period of time from funds provided by the national government and the locality in which the unemployed person resides. The distinctive feature about the unemployment insurance law is its fusion of the employment exchange with unemployment insurance, both functions being supported by the funds provided by employer and worker. Furthermore the integration of these two services and the unification of local placement service throughout Germany have given rise to a unique and highly interesting form of administrative organization for carrying out the terms of the act.

This total organization of German social insurance includes one-third of the population and protects an additional 14 or 15 million dependents. The average payments to the funds within the last years have amounted to 6 per cent of wages for health insurance; 3 per cent for unemploy-

ment insurance; 5 per cent for invalidity and old age protection, with a rate for salaried employees of only 4 per cent; and 1.5 per cent for workmen's compensation. This totals about 15.5 per cent of the entire wage bill of those covered by the acts. Of this amount 8 per cent is contributed by the worker and 7.5 per cent by the employer. The rates in some cases are higher than before the war because of loss of reserves and increase in cases eligible to benefit through war,

inflation and industrial changes. Were the coverage of the acts still further extended it is believed that the rates of contribution could be decreased. For these payments the individual receives not only the security offered by money compensation in case of mishap. Even more important emphasis is laid in Germany upon individualized treatment of the person suffering from one of these disasters and upon measures for their prevention.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

On June 26 an international conference on the subject of "*Methods Promoting Satisfactory Human Relations in a Scientifically Organised Industry*" opened at Schloss Elmau, Klais, Oberbayern. Proceedings continued till July 3rd. Seventy representatives from fourteen different countries took part and a plan of lectures and discussions, covering the whole of modern industrial development has been worked out. Mr. G. A. Johnston, Chief of Section, Intelligence & Liaison Division, International Labour Office, Geneva, officially represented the I. L. O. and industrial experts from various countries opened the discussion. The International Industrial Relations Association (I. R. I.) under whose auspices the conference was held, regards satisfactory human relations in industry as a centre and aim rather than as a minor consideration and it was from this standpoint that problems of industry were considered.

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THE NEW NATIONALISM IN SPANISH AMERICA

L. L. BERNARD

- EL NACIMIENTO DE LA AMERICA ESPAÑOLA. By Juan B. Terán. Tucuman. n.d. 343 pp.
- HISTORIA ECONOMICA DEL VIRREINATO DEL PLATA. By Ricardo Levene. La Plata: La Universidad. 1927. 2 vols. xvi + 324, x + 324 pp.
- COMO SE FORMÓ EL PAIS ARGENTINO. By José Manuel Elizaguirre. Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso. 1928. 241 pp.
- MIRANDA ET LA REVOLUTION FRANCAISE. By C. Parra-Pérez. Paris: Librairie Pierre Roger. lxi + 474 pp.
- BOLIVAR. By C. Parra-Pérez. Paris: Editions Excelsior. 1928. 347 pp.
- DELPHINE DE CUSTINE. By C. Parra-Pérez. Paris: Editions Excelsior. 1927. 96 pp.
- LA CARTERA DEL CORONEL CONDE DE ADLERCREUTZ. Edited by C. Parra-Pérez. Paris: Editions Excelsior. 1928. 227 pp.
- THE DIARY OF FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA. Edited by William Spence Robertson. New York: Hispanic Society of America. 1928.
- INVESTIGACIONES HISTORICAS. By Dr. Vicente Dávila. Caracas: Imprenta Bolívar. 1927. 352 + 282 pp.
- HISTORIA ELEMENTAL DE CUBA. By Dr. Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez. Habana: Cultural, S. A. 336 pp. \$1.25.
- HISTORIA DE CUBA, Vol. I, 1492-1555. By Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez. Habana: Sociedad Editorial Cuba Contemporánea. 413 pp.
- LA MUERTE, META DEL HEROÍ. By Ramiro Guerra. Habana: Cultural, S. A. 31 pp.
- ANTECEDENTS Y SIGNIFICACIÓN DE LA GUERRA DEL 68. By Ramiro Guerra. Habana. 29 pp.
- LA ANEXIÓN DE CENTRO AMERICA A MEXICO. Compiled by Rafael Heliodoro Valle. Mexico: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. 1928. 469 pp. 4 pesos.
- DON JUAN PRIM Y SU LABOR DIPLOMATICA EN MEXICO. Edited by Genaro Estrada. Mexico: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. 1928. xxviii + 256 pp. 4 pesos.
- LA CONSTITUCIÓN Y EL RÉGIMEN FEDERAL. By Mario A. Carranza. Buenos Aires: Vial y Zona. 1928. 147 pp.
- LA CONSTITUCIÓN ARGENTINA Y SUS PRINCIPIOS DE ÉTICA POLÍTICA. By Rodolfo Rivarola. Buenos Aires: Revista de Ciencias Políticas. 1928. 233 pp.
- POLÉMICAS CON SARMIENTO. By Guillermo Rawson. Buenos Aires: El Ateneo. 1928. 260 pp. 2.5 pesos.
- MOTIVOS NACIONALES (CRONICAS QUITENAS). Quito: Escuela de Artes y Oficios. 1927.
- ORATORIA CUBANA. By René Mendez Capote de Solis. Habana: Editorial Hermeo. 357 pp. \$2.00.
- MIGUEL CANÉ: IMPRESIONES Y RECUERDOS. By Belisario J. Montero. Buenos Aires: G. Ricordi y Cia. 1928. 246 pp.
- VIDA ADMIRABLE DE JOSÉ PEDRO VARELA. By Alberto Lasplaces. Montevideo: Peña Hnos. 1928. 173 pp.
- UN CUARTO DE SIGLO DE VIDA INTELECTUAL. Ed. by Alfredo A. Bianchi and Roberto F. Giusti. Buenos Aires: Revista Nosotros. 1927. 513 pp. 5 pesos.
- MEXICO BEFORE THE WORLD. By Plutarco Elias Calles. New York: Academy Press. 1927. 243 pp. \$2.00.
- 7 ENSAYOS DE INTERPRETACIÓN DE LA REALIDAD PERUANA. By José Carlos Mariategui. Lima: Biblioteca "Amauta," 1928. 264 pp.
- PORTO RICO, PAST AND PRESENT. By J. Enamorado Cuesta. New York: Eureka Printing Co. 175 pp. \$1.00.
- EL PELIGRO YANKI. By Luis Araquistain. 2d ed. Valencia: Editorial Sempere. 279 pp.
- EL FUTURO DE AMERICA. By Bernardo González Arrili. Barcelona: Casa Editorial Araluce. 1928. 254 pp.
- EL IMPERIALISMO COMO FENOMENO ECONOMICO. By Paulino González Alberdi. Buenos Aires: Comisión de Extensión Universitaria del C. E. C. E. 1927. 20 pp.
- LA MISIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE LA RAZA HISPÁNICA. By José Pla. Madrid: Javier Morata. 1928. vii + 120 pp. 3 pesetas.
- POR LAS TRES AMERICAS. By José Maria Delgado. Montevideo: Palácio del Libro. 1928. 271 pp.
- LA SALUD DE LA AMERICA ESPAÑOLA. By Juan B. Terán. Paris: Casa Editorial Franco-Ibero-Americana. 206 pp.

There is a new spirit of nationalism in Latin America, not unlike that of a hundred years ago. That impulse to unity gave rise to a more or less concerted movement for independence from Spain. The new spirit aims primarily at the establishment of national personalities before the world, and not merely at political independence. It is a sign of the coming

of age culturally and spiritually of the Spanish American peoples, as the former movement was the assertion of their political majority. In this new movement are many cross currents, as will be seen from the notices of the books that follow. Very strong among these are a closer understanding with Spain and a lessening of confidence in the United States as the great republican leader of self-governing nations.

I

There is a marked tendency among the Spanish Americans to review their national origins and colonial history. Juan B. Teran, the learned and able rector of the University of Tucuman, has painted an absorbing picture of Spanish America in the sixteenth century in his *Birth of Spanish America*. He makes the men and the trends of the times live before our eyes, but first and always he is a philosophic historian and portrays for us the meaning of events. Ricardo Levene, professor of history in the University of La Plata, has given us, in his *Economic History of the Viceroyalty of La Plata*, a scholarly account of the influence of economic factors in shaping political and social history in the southern third of South America in colonial times. There is also some excellent discussion of the economic interpretation of history. Levene writes interestingly, and is one of the leading historical investigators of Argentina. Eizaguirre's *How the Argentine Nation Was Formed* is a very popular work showing the steps by which Argentina became independent, established its government, and adopted its flag, its national hymn, and its constitution. This book would make excellent reading in a course in Spanish.

One of the countries that fought hardest for independence from Spain and developed farthest a hundred years ago in the direc-

tion of a republican philosophy was Venezuela. The very able Dr. C. Parra-Perez, now Venezuelan ambassador at Rome, has recently done much to reconstruct this period of national birth in his several works on Miranda and Bolivar. His *Miranda and the French Revolution* is an excellent piece of research into the European exploits of one of the many daring and able characters that the era of independence brought into the lime light in South America. The story here told of this Venezuelan general in France is as interesting and as surprising as fiction. The same author's *Bolivar* is one of the best, if not the best, of the many attempts to give a connected and intelligible account of the political ideas and aims of the great liberator. His *Delphine de Custine, Good Friend of Miranda* and *The Portfolio of Colonel Count de Adlercreutz* are documentary studies throwing new light upon the revolutionary and prerevolutionary periods in Venezuela and Colombia. *The Diary of Francisco de Miranda* edited by Professor W. S. Robertson, of the University of Illinois, is the Spanish text of the travels of this remarkable man in the United States in 1783-84. His comments upon North American manners and customs are most interesting and not infrequently penetrating. The volume itself is a work of art. Dr. Vicente Davila's two volumes of *Historical Investigations* dealing with men and events in early Venezuelan history also throw much light upon that interesting country with which our ancestors of a hundred years ago had closer cultural connections than we now have.

Coming still nearer home, we notice the *Elementary History of Cuba* and the *History of Cuba*, Vol. I, 1492-1555, by Dr. Ramiro Guerra, superintendent of schools of Cuba and editor of one of the leading dailies of Havana. The former is a

delightfully written school history along the most modern lines of social interpretation. The latter is the first volume of an extensive work which also gives marked recognition to the social organization and economic factors in early Cuban history. In fact, the Latin American historians write much better history from the sociological standpoint than we do. They never forget to explain and interpret as well as to recount the bare facts. Two smaller works, *Death, the Goal of the Hero* and *Antecedents and Significance of the War of 68*, deal with the struggle of Cuba to free herself from Spain.

II

The Mexican government is publishing a valuable collection of documents, carefully edited and explained, in a series entitled Archives of the History of Mexican Diplomacy. Already nearly thirty volumes have been issued. One of these is entitled *The Annexation of Central America to Mexico*, edited by Rafael Heliodoro Valle, and presents a phase of early Central American history regarding which people of the United States are almost totally uninformed. Another volume, *Don Juan Prim and His Diplomatic Labors in Mexico*, edited by Genaro Estrada, tells the story not only of a very interesting type of diplomat—an ethical one—but of an incident very dear to the heart of patriotic Mexicans. When the rest of Europe was attempting to despoil Mexico in the sixties and seventies, Prim, the Spanish minister, was aiding her in preserving her national integrity.

III

Transferring our view from Mexico to Argentina, we encounter three works on the national constitution, by means of which in 1853 the Argentinans under General Urquiza abolished the tyrannical government of Rosas and entered upon a

long period of stable republican institutions. There has long been waged a controversy in Argentina as to whether this constitution was copied primarily from that of the United States or whether it had a more general origin. Dr. Mario Carranza's *The Constitution and the Federal Regime* takes the latter view and interestingly and vividly reviews the constitutional and political history of the country in an effort to prove his point. Rivarola's *The Argentine Constitution and Its Principles of Political Ethics* takes a similar view and undertakes in a treatise decidedly sociological in character to prove that the national charter was the conscious creation of a remarkable group of men who understood well the moral, economic and social needs of their country and constructed in this document a sort of socio-legal treatise on the fundamental principles of government as well as a set of organic laws. We are not unfamiliar in our country with this viewpoint, which seems to arise at a certain stage of national development. The reprinting of William Rawson's *Polemics with Sarmiento* recalls some of the problems that arose in making this constitution a working code in the sixties and seventies, when Rawson, the conservative constitutional lawyer, and Sarmiento, the great administrator and liberal republican consolidator (president from 1868 to 1874), were frequently on opposite sides of questions. Rawson's impressions of the United States, which he visited in the early seventies, and which he greatly admired, would interest every North American. His account of an afternoon on the floor of the United States Senate in 1873, during the Hayes-Tilden controversy, is a classic.

IV

Andrade Coello's *National Motifs (Chronicles of Quito)* gives a mellow sympathetic insight into the lives and aims of some of

the men who made the politics, literature, and art of Ecuador during the last century, and recently. This sort of half-reminiscent literature, with appreciation for the nuances of the folk mind and popular trends, is now very popular in Latin America. There are good chapters on the national novel and the social organization of Ecuador. Cuba is far from Ecuador, but the same spirit reigns in Señora Mendez Capote de Solis' *Cuban Oratory*. This remarkable volume bears testimony to the important position often held by women writers in Latin America. Her sketches of the work and motivation of nearly 100 orators, functioning in the century-long struggle for independence, are even more psychological and sociological than historical, but always piquant and interesting.

V

For half a century the struggle for popular education has been as marked as that for constitutional government in Latin America. Two interesting biographies, this time from the southern end of South America, bear witness to this fact. Miguel Cané was one of the leading figures—a dean—in the University of Buenos Aires, somewhat antagonistic to what passed as sociology in that institution nearly twenty years ago, and considerably of a classicist. This unfriendliness of Cané toward sociology gave rise to one of the most crushing bits of sarcasm—from the lips of a really distinguished sociologist, Ernesto Quesada—in any language. But Cané was devoted to the cause of education and these reminiscences of an old friend who has been before the literary and legal public of Argentina for nearly fifty years throw strong light upon the Argentine culture of a generation and more ago. José Pedro Varela, who died in his early forties in 1879, was the hero

of educational reform in Uruguay. He did for his country what Sarmiento did for Argentina, at about the same time, in giving elementary education a firm foundation in the national laws and affections. This account of his struggle for the cause and its ultimate success is interestingly and sympathetically told by the present head of the normal college of Montevideo.

VI

In 1927 *Nosotros*, the leading general Review of Argentina, issued a twentieth-anniversary number of more than 500 pages, covering a quarter of century of Argentine civilization in philosophy, letters, art, history, education, politics, etc. This volume is the best summary of recent Argentine culture in existence. Like *Nosotros* itself, it is ably written and edited and it contains a wealth of historical summary, critical opinion, and bibliography, which renders it indispensable to historian, sociologist, and comparative culturalist alike.

VII

Of different character, but as effective in its way, is the little volume of selections from the speeches and state papers of Ex-President Calles of Mexico under the title of *Mexico Before the World*. These pages reveal both Calles and Mexico in a very favorable light, although the words themselves were penned not for propagandistic purposes, but in the regular course of duty. Back of the almost 100 selections is the well-poised, sympathetic, always courteous and urbane, but vital personality of perhaps the greatest Mexican of this generation. From these pages one also acquires an excellent notion of the meaning and aims of the revolution in its broader sense, of agrarianism, of Mexican nationalism, and of the struggle for the education of the masses. We need a book like this

for every Latin American country that has had a recent president as able and public spirited as Calles. A fundamental and thoughtful work is Mariátegui's *Seven Interpretative Essays of Contemporary Peru*. The author belongs to the radical group and is editor of the review *Amauta*, one of the best journals interpreting modern advanced movements. Radicalism in Latin America is often very scholarly, and such is the case with this book. In Peru the agrarian revolution, promoted by Calles and his compatriots in Mexico, is yet to be accomplished. The present volume, which really has greater unity than is suggested by the title, traces the national evolution of Peru, always in the light of the economic situation and agrarianism. Public education, the religious problem, sectionalism and the national literature are also discussed historically and sociologically. I know no other book so competent to give an adequate picture of the social forces at work in modern Peru. Cuesta's *Porto Rico, Past and Present*, is much more matter of fact and less revolutionary. It is really a sort of convenient handbook covering such useful items of information as the geography, history, commerce, internal improvements, industries, agriculture, government, finances, and education of the island, with some discussion of labor problems. For purposes of reference this book is very convenient and useful and should be in every public library.

VIII

And now comes the other side of the picture—the protest against North American imperialism, which is also a fundamental part of this new nationalism of which we have been speaking. One might almost say that the center of this protest is in Spain, which does not argue wholly for its impartiality and complete

objectivity. Luis Araquistain is one of the ablest recent Spanish writers and his *Yankee Peril* is a by no means too sympathetic portrait of us as we are at home. We have been viewed askance and scantily by Europeans for a hundred years and we find it an interesting form of recreation, but it is also good for us. We are a nation of humorists and practical, albeit very idealistic, people. So we profit from the criticisms of others without getting angry. Their stock criticism is that we are crude, unaesthetic, dollar-chasers, and rich. Perhaps it is the poverty of our critics that causes them to write such books to sell, for they must know that a hasty flight by railway stations and a few nights in expensive hotels and a few days at pleasure resorts do not equip anyone for writing facts about the United States. We cannot take them seriously, especially we who have met the open palm everywhere in Europe and in Latin America, where money hunger is so intense as to be a mania. The latter part of *The Yankee Peril* deals with our political-financial policy in the Caribbean in a very critical manner. Gonzalez Arrili's *Future of America* takes up this theme in a more concrete and systematic way and extends it to a discussion of tariffs and to such purely Latin American problems as the perennial boundary disputes and the much needed means of transportation and communication, especially in the Andes region. Gonzalez Alberdi discusses briefly, but keenly and clearly, imperialism as an economic phenomenon. He has many tables and emphasizes the financial aspects of inter-American relations. It is one of the best and least passionate analyses of the economic aspects of imperialism I have seen. *The International Mission of the Hispanic Race* by Jose Pla, with an introduction by the Uruguayan minister to Spain, is a plea for cooperation

and mutual support of all the Spanish speaking peoples before the League of Nations. The book belongs in the main to the literature of the diplomatic reconquest of America by Spain and is an interesting study in propaganda. Delgado's *Through the Three Americas* does not attempt to be as profound as Araquistain's book, but is content to record the author's hasty impressions of the most striking things he saw as official guide to the National Football Club of Uruguay team when it visited Mexico, Cuba and the United States in 1927. There is no bitterness toward the United States, but there are sometimes amusement and wonder, even admiration. Most of it is simply objective, journalistic description rather than interpretation, and it is therefore very interesting reading, as a mirror in which we may see our national holiday predilections reflected through the eyes of another.

IX

Finally, we return to the writer with whom we began, Juan B. Teran. This time, in *The Health of Spanish America*, we behold the author's fine talents as a philosopher of history. Nowhere else is he so happily at home as in this vein. He reviews the course of Spanish American development in politics, economic life, in thought, and human relations. The romanticism of the past is largely gone, but it is necessary to keep alive the spirit of idealism to care for the opportunities of the future. The purview includes everything from Latin American constitutions and revolutions to the Spenglerian hypothesis, but not superficially or grandiloquently. Teran is one of the ablest social diagnosticians of South America and there are few books from which so clear an insight into their civilization, its motives, flavor and achievements, can be gained as from this one.

THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN MORALS AND RELIGION

F. H. HANKINS

- SCIENCE IN SEARCH OF GOD. By Kirtley F. Mather. New York: Holt, 1928. vii + 159 pp.
- THROUGH SCIENCE TO GOD. By Floyd L. Darrow. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928. 309 pp.
- DOES RELIGION NEED CIVILIZATION. By Reinhold Niebuhr. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 242 pp. \$2.00.
- THE MOTIVES OF MEN. By George A. Coe. New York: Scribner's, 1928. x + 265 pp. \$2.25.
- THE NEW MORALITY. By Durant Drake. New York: Macmillan, 1928. xii + 359 pp. \$2.50.
- THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD VIEW. By William K. Wallace. New York: Macmillan, ix + 316 pp. \$3.00.
- CHRISTIANITY, PAST AND PRESENT. By Charles Guignebert. New York: Macmillan, xxvi + 507 pp. \$4.50.
- RELIGION COMING OF AGE. By Roy W. Sellars. New York: Macmillan, 1928. xi + 293 pp. \$2.50.

A generation ago Andrew D. White wrote his famous work on *The History of the Warfare of Science with Theology*. It was an impressive tale of the efforts of religious orthodoxy to prevent the advancement of scientific knowledge in the various fundamental sciences, notably astronomy, geology, and biology. It contained also a record of the efforts of a theologically minded person to reconcile the established results of inductive research with the original utterances of churchly dogma. At this time the conflict between the scientific and the theological views of man and the world was sharp and bitter. Later, however, advanced theologians, seeing that science was making an en-

viable progress and that it was contributing enormously to the elevation of man's economic and social status, shifted their position sufficiently to effect a more or less workable compromise between traditionalism and the rapidly developing theory of things which science was shaping. Later, we have had numerous pronouncements both by men of science and by men of theology that there is no conflict between science and religion. In spite of these assertions, however, acute thinkers, both secular and religious, have seen that many problems involved in the differences of viewpoint have not been successfully resolved. We seem, in fact, to be now in the midst of a new era of intellectual turmoil, in which the old problems of the existence of God, the existence and immortality of the human soul, and the reconciliation of the orderly, self-regulating universe which science envisages with an omnipotent manipulating God pictured by theology are being discussed with renewed vigor. Fundamentalism would appear, in fact, to be a definite dogmatic-emotional reaction due to an increasing realization that one must choose finally and definitely between a theistic and therefore traditionally religious view of life and the distinctly secular and hence unreligious view of scientific determinism.

The above books taken collectively traverse the entire field. The first three are typical of almost a myriad others which start from the definitely religious viewpoint, posit an absence of conflict and seek, often by bold and bald rationalisations, to effect a working compromise. Mather's work is the least penetrating of all. Its quality is shown by such statements as the following: "That which we call the spiritual, permeating the universe, impinges upon sensitive protoplasm and the human soul is the result."

(P. 68.) "There is no satisfactory definition of spirit, known to me; it transcends definition." (P. 73.) In another place he tells us that knowledge concerning God is to be derived by "direct though mysterious contact with Him when spirit meets with Spirit." (P. 77.) In summary one can say that this book is almost wholly lacking in philosophical penetration and represents the most simplistic level whereby traditional faith is being reconciled with scientific concepts.

The book by Darrow is of almost exactly the same character. He tells us that it "tried to relate the everlasting spiritual truths of sacred literature to the changing forms of modern thought." "The underlying purpose of this book is religious. There is no conflict between spiritual and scientific truths. They arise from a common source." It may be said of Darrow's work, however, that it contains a very large amount of interesting scientific fact. Its total contribution, however, to fundamental religious questions is the repeated assertion that the nature of the world as revealed by science constitutes a revelation of the nature and workings of God, that is, it is exactly nil. "Natural selection implies a selector." Speaking of evolutionary changes, he says: "God is just as essential to the production of these changes, etc." Such a phrase as the following appears in endless repetition and many variations: "No explanation can ever supersede the necessity for a Divine Being as the energizing source and immanent guide of all creation." "Natural law is nothing more nor less than a divine mode of action." Thomas Aquinas got nearly that far; the eighteenth century deists sometimes went farther; but we are now in the twentieth century. There is no wrestling here with the famous problem of evil. There is apparently no realization of the difficulties involved in

scientific determinism. Nothing is said regarding the mind-body problem. Nor does the author seem to realize that a very fundamental question is whether a God who is represented in immutable and universal natural law has any utility whatever for the troubled mind seeking consolation by communion with the Infinite.

Niebuhr approaches a somewhat different problem. He is concerned over the question of determinism, to which he is violently opposed, and with the existence of God and the human soul. His interest, however, seems to be primarily to demonstrate that a religious view of man and the world has sufficient pragmatic value so that it should be retained for its social utility. His central thesis is that "Religion is the champion of personality in a seemingly impersonal world." He tells us that a humanistic, ethical idealism is not enough. "The value of religion in composing the conflict with which the inner life of man is torn is that it identifies man's highest values with the realities in the universe itself." He does not tell us what these values are. The sociologist would certainly ask whether they are anything other than the moral values of a good society. If not, how can they be discovered except by science? If they are, how then may man make sure of them? Again, he tells us: "Moral purpose itself is rooted in ultra-rational sanctions and may be destroyed by the same intelligence which is needed to guide it. Both humility and love, the highest religious virtues, are ultra-rational." Again one is impelled to ask: "Why so?" Is there not a scientific basis of ethical ideals and behavior? If it be true that critical intelligence "may easily lead to the enervation of the religious spirit itself," then one is led to suspect that there may be something false in the latter's foundations.

The result of his approach leads him into a hopeless dilemma. "Obviously civilization cannot afford to dispense with either the irrational moral will or the critical intelligence by which it is made effective in critical situations." Since, however, one of these destroys the other, the author ends in hopeless bewilderment. One could select numerous other points from this interesting human document which would indicate that it represents the struggles of a keen intelligence to effect a reconciliation between its youthful patterns of thought and emotion, which were apparently deeply implanted by religious traditionalism, with the fresher and more invigorating views of modern rationalism. Not being able to effect a reconciliation the author ends in hopeless dilemmas and pessimistic conclusions. He accepts the old-fashioned spiritual dualism, God and the Devil, or even some sort of ill-defined pluralism. He is unable to solve the problem of evil and seems unduly alarmed lest man, by throwing off his religious mysticism should take a "moral holiday." The work is, indeed, an acknowledgment of the defeat of thought.

One approaches Coe's book in high hopes both because of its subject and because of the distinguished reputation of its author. And one leaves it with mingled feelings. Its thirty chapters have brought entertainment and mental stimulation, and one unhesitatingly pronounces them worth the time and effort. But one has a feeling of disappointment. Being of a liberal caste of mind one finds himself warmly sympathetic with the general politico-economic views of the author, as also with his desire to see man make more of himself and of his wordly opportunities than he does. But one realizes that a quest hopefully entered upon, to make clearer why we do what we do when we do it, has ended in deplorable vagué-

ness and a more or less jumbled mass of wishful aspirations. The book covers a lot of territory and often wanders from its theme. It is so well written that one moves along through it with the delightful illusion that he is actually going somewhere, but at the end he finds himself very much where he started.

Professor Coe starts with the thesis that man has been passing through a disillusionment regarding himself. Man viewed himself formerly as the most noble handiwork of God, as divinely intelligent and as capable of loving sacrifice; but the recent war showed him to be a good deal of a beast. The modern industrial system, which the author obviously deeply dislikes, shows man to be selfish, grasping and greedy. Modern literature pictures him as essentially irrational, while modern science stresses his brute ancestry and his kinship with the anthropoids. Thus the creature that once thought of himself as a little lower than the angels now thinks of himself as little better than the apes. Having thus shown how man has nearly lost his self-respect, the author then proceeds to show that, after all, man is highly respectable, but is not making as good use of his powers as he might. What is needed above all is the development of a more vigorous technique of free expression. Man is capable of much higher motivation than he now permits or evidences. He is cramped even by his own intelligence, for what is the wisdom of today becomes crystallized in institution and authority and binds the succeeding generation. Let's have bigger and more powerful minorities and respect them more; let's learn to think and act co-operatively; let's overcome our intractable selves.

The book thus ends in a preachment; in fact, there is a preachment on every page. I selected by chance a page which turned

out to be 207 and picked out the following phrases: "most solidly hope-giving aspects," "what ought to be," "there is danger" (twice), "wayward impulse," "the better reason," "by far the greater danger," "by far the greatest evil," "the pseudo-wisdom of age." The author's scheme of social values obtrudes itself too obviously and too continuously into what sometimes comes close to an absorbingly interesting and suggestive scientific study. The reviewer often wonders why these semi-scientific, prophetic minds, who come close to catching the research attitude do not set for themselves two very pretty problems: (1) how account in psycho-social terms for their own scheme of values; and (2) how explain why, from the standpoint of such a scheme, human nature seems so perverse.

By the "new" morality Professor Drake means that "which basing itself solidly upon the observation of the *results* of conduct, consciously aims to secure the maximum of attainable happiness for mankind." As over against a "dogmatic, formalistic, haphazard and blind" morality he welcomes the signs of a scientific, experimental attitude toward morals. Pointing to the vast changes which have occurred in social life and organization in the last century, he demands that we "create a better technique for securing the common good" than is contained in age-old formulas.

Morality must be related to human need; it is not imposed from without. Supernatural authority for a moral code is dangerous because it produces rigidity, prevents criticism and sanctifies ignorance and error. Morality is not absolute and mystical. Conscience is not an unintelligible, spiritistic but infallible guide, but springs from human nature and the social situation. It is a product, not a source, of moral standards. It is essential to

recognize that morality is neither super-rational nor sub-rational, but rational, "a collection of formulas and models based solidly on experience of acts and their consequences" which, while permitting alteration to fit the infinite variability of life's situations, are nevertheless indispensable guides to the highest form of living.

Morals must in last analysis be judged in terms of human feelings; that is, happiness is the ultimate test, happiness of one's self and of those about him. The "greatest happiness of the greatest number" is too abstract to be of much use, for life is too full of immediate and concrete necessities. But the hedonistic principle does not mean that life should be devoted to pleasure seeking; the latter may have a place, but it may be more or less incidental to more desirable satisfactions. That which produces pain and suffering, unless counterbalanced by a concurrently larger happiness, could not be counted as moral. Moreover, while happiness is most abundant in the truly moral life, the latter will not inevitably guarantee happiness. This seems like a contradiction in terms, but the author points out that "man is at the mercy of too many forces to be able to insure his happiness by the most skillfully adjusted conduct that he can devise." "Life must remain an experimental enterprise." Nor will the commonly asserted ideal of "self-realization" do, for man has "bad" as well as "good" potentialities.

The sense of duty and spirit of sacrifice should not be overdone. They are incidental to chosen purposes and lose all claim when not instrumental thereto. Man has a moral obligation to be as intelligent as he can; and also, since the best solutions of life's problems are not always easy, to be tolerant of other's conceptions of duty. Self-interest is so broad that "the most enlightened and skilful selfish-

ness would be unselfishness." "Morality is at bottom only common sense."

I find myself in full agreement with Professor Drake's theory. It is a view that will be looked upon by many as full of social danger. Our forefathers feared democracy because they could not see how popular government, unawed by the divine right of kings, could escape anarchy and mob rule. So today there are many who fear lest the overthrow of an absolutistic morality with its divine sanctions may result in moral anarchy and degeneracy. The fact is, however, that the old moral sanctions are rapidly losing their hold. They fitted fairly well the psycho-social scheme of a pain economy but will not do in an age when science is making man largely master of his world. We now see that this same scientific technique of testing all things and holding fast that which is good will enable us greatly to minimize pain and sacrifice and enlarge the need of satisfactions. The moral life is, indeed, an adventure, but the greatest values go to those who are best informed and most intelligent.

Having thus set forth his general position, Professor Drake proceeds in Part II to fifteen chapters of application of his viewpoint to as many current problems, such as self-indulgence, law-breaking, bootlegging, divorce, irresponsible parenthood, political corruption and many other topics. He always writes sensibly and suggestively. In a final part he discusses moral progress and reform. While the book is full of moral judgments, these are generally free from exaggeration and overstatement. They are, moreover, rendered from the viewpoint of an enlightened, forward-looking and hopeful social outlook. No one could be expected to agree with all of them. Many of them will be offensive to hard-boiled conservatives and obscurantist religionists, but

the younger generation will find them agreeable and suggestive, for the most part.

Those numerous sociologists who have read Wallace's *Passing of Politics* and *The Trend of History* will expect from his *The Scientific World View* a work of honest and penetrating thought. This work discusses three main themes, (1) the implications of the religious world view, (2) the social and psychological values of science, and (3) factors in the new morality. There can be no mistaking his approach. "Religion is commonly regarded as the sole arbiter of morality." "Moral maladjustment is the malady of our times." Why? "Chiefly the fact that we are forced to look to a worn-out religious world view and its appended moral code for spiritual guidance." "To proclaim the marriage of science and religion is either blasphemy or nonsense." "The social order is a human product man-made for man." "Our next task will be to frame a new moral code." "Value is henceforth no longer conferred upon life by the caprice or the will of God. It is inherent in life itself." "Science is creating a new morality of its own." Such is this work in brief epitome, but it scarcely hints at the vigor and illumination of its pages. Writing from assumptions similar to those of Professor Drake, Wallace is much richer in literary, historical, and sociological reference and vastly more trenchant in style. Moreover, he is less smooth and logical in his transitions and in the development of his ideas than is Drake, another trait which makes his pages seem somewhat jerky in style and often opinionated in form. Consequently, he will be accused of dogmatism. Nevertheless, he has written a valuable book. Especially noteworthy are the chapters on "Religion and Morality," "Science and Morality" and those of Part III dealing with the love, war, economic and social motives.

As professor of Christianity at the University of Paris, Charles Guignebert has devoted his life to a study of the rise and evolution of the Christian religion. He has lived in a secure and detached position surrounded by the ideals of objective scholarship. One may, therefore, find in his work a critical and impersonal estimate of the present state of research in this deeply interesting subject. His work is worthy a longer notice than can be given here. New religions are constantly arising. America now has many recent ones. They are all of them compounds of ancient tradition and current thought given a fresh emphasis by some leading spirit and the social context from which they spring. Guignebert repeatedly emphasizes the facts that a religion borrows its primary elements from the social milieu in which it establishes itself, and that it thereafter undergoes a process of evolution in adaptation to the dominant elements of its social environment. Not only so, but the same ostensible religion may take on a variety of forms in the same society, because every class has a more or less differentiated culture. "The populace that has not learned, or does not know how, to reflect always cleaves to religious conceptions and practices which do not correspond exactly either with the teachings of the recognized religion, nor with the mentality of its learned ministrants, nor yet with the conception of its dogmas and tenets which prevails among enlightened believers."

The most difficult problems in this history are those of origins, because of the lack of materials. The author finds it difficult to believe that no one who may be called Jesus actually existed, but admits that proof is lacking. He pictures Jesus as growing up in a simple-minded Galilean community, which was deeply occupied with religious interests and believed that the Jews would some day be delivered

from domination and become masters of the world. Jesus took up the rôle of prophet among his own people. He was born and raised as a Jew and "was, to all appearances, exclusively molded in the Jewish milieu." He never declared himself the Messiah, and would have thought it blasphemy or nonsense to call himself or to be called "Son of God." Feeling that his mission in Galilee had been a failure, he went to Jerusalem. The Romans had had sufficient trouble from "inspired" Jews to be wary of them. Jesus was seized much as an advocate of freedom of speech or of the right to organize would be in many American cities today. "He did not come bearing a new religion, nor even a new rite, but only a conception personal rather than original of the piety embedded in the Jewish religion." Nevertheless, Pilate had him convicted and crucified, but those who afterwards wrote up the story threw the blame on the Jews, for the Romans were still in power. All the signs that Jahveh was expected to give failed to appear. His disciples returned to Galilee disheartened, but there something happened which gave rise to the story of the resurrection and revived their faith. What was it? "To all appearances, there is a vision of Peter, followed by collective visions, an example of mental contagion by no means unique in the history of religions." Jesus himself was believed by some to be John the Baptist risen from the dead. Such a transformation was by no means difficult for popular thought in those days. Yet, "If this faith of the Apostles in their Master's restoration to life had not been published abroad *there would have been no Christianity.*" Italics in original.)

The author then shows how Christianity, having failed among the Jews, was transplanted to alien soils wherein already flourished the myths of such

redeeming gods as Mithra, Osiris, Tammuz and Adonis. It was the syncretism of its original elements with congenial elements of these alien mythologies, a union effected primarily at Antioch before Paul, that prepared the way for the subsequent expansion of Christianity through the Greek and Roman cultures. The author devotes several chapters to Paul and the subsequent Hellenization of Christianity and depicts the final triumph of the Christian faith as the triumph of churchly sacerdotalism. The essence of the original Gospel was lost in these various transformations. Western peoples of the early Christian centuries "never really understood the Christian dogmas, nor have they understood them since." They never have, strictly speaking, been Christians. What finally arose was the imposing structure of pontificalism or Romanism, "as much political as religious."

So much for Part I of this engaging and clear-sighted history. The experts may not agree with it in a few details of fact and inference, but it is obviously an honest effort to explain in rational terms the rise of a great tradition and a powerful organization. In subsequent chapters the history is brought through the Middle Ages and down to the present; and every chapter is as illuminating as these early ones.

One might call this work a study in social relativity, for it is very largely a story of the interplay of social conditions and institutions. The author finds that Christianity yielded on three momentous occasions to the superstitions of the untutored masses, thus gathering back into its bosom the very paganisms it pretended to combat, first, in the fourth and fifth centuries when the populace entered *en masse* into the church; secondly, in the tenth and eleventh centuries, when the fading of its intellectual life opened

the door to ignorant mysticism; and thirdly, in modern times in which orthodoxy has turned its back upon science. "Soon, no doubt, the only 'right-thinking' people will be the believers who do not think at all, or think only in terms of the past." Protestantism may succeed in meeting the crisis of modernism better than Catholicism, for the latter "can no longer evolve."

These brief glimpses may serve very inadequately to give some measure of the nature of this remarkably fascinating book. It is certainly a work of scholarship of the very highest order. No sociologist interested in the origins, evolution and nature of fundamental social institutions can afford to miss it.

The foregoing history and *Religion Coming of Age* seem to me by all odds the best works in the above list. Professor Sellars is already known to sociologists through his advocacy of evolutionary naturalism as the soundest philosophical viewpoint for the modern age and by his translation of Bougle's *Evolution of Values*. He has here applied the fundamental principles of his thinking to the primary theological and religious questions of the day. He has produced an interesting and a profound treatise. Even to the sociologist who is already familiar with the theory of emergent or creative evolution and has learned to think of nature (including man) as the sole reality, Sellars will prove absorbingly interesting and suggestive. Such a reader may find little that is very novel in these pages, but he will be intellectually and emotionally delighted to have the views which he has come to hold so beautifully and effectively developed. Readers less familiar with advanced philosophical and sociological opinion will find the book a genuine revelation.

We cannot give here even an adequate outline of his presentation. Writing calmly, with tolerance and without

dogmatism, he reaches a purely naturalistic and secular view with respect to all the great issues. He points out the narrowness, thinness and insularity of traditional Christianity and yet, at the very end, thinks the churches do more good than harm and that they might become enormously more useful than they are. If there be no God and no immortality of the so-called soul, how can there be religion at all? Professor Sellars replies, as have Fosdick and other advanced ministers, that religion is loyalty to life's values. And what are these values? They are those aims, interests and even means whereby human life is made more secure, and more complete, more beautiful and true. They can only be discovered by experience and knowledge and will change with the social context of life. Just as the values in life are to be found in life itself, so is the meaning of life to be found in its interests, activities, and achievements.

For the reviewer the quality of the book is somewhat cheapened by the author's continued use of the terms "spiritual" and "living soul." By them he does not mean to imply anything of a spirit nature. Spiritual means ethical and includes the above mentioned values; the living soul is only the individual body-mind with no spiritistic implications. It would seem that the author realized that he was cutting a deep and vital swath in the dense jungle of accumulated traditionalism and wished to hold out a sort of olive branch to the defenders of the faith. While, therefore, his effort to put new wine into the old bottles may be offensive to those who would avoid all ambiguity lest the truth be clouded with fresh errors, one may reconcile himself to this compromise in the hope and expectation that it will serve as a soothing anodyne for the author's major surgical operation.

A SKETCH OF SOCIAL THEORY

READ BAIN

THE RANGE OF SOCIAL THEORY. By Floyd N. House.
New York: Holt, 1929. x + 587 pp. \$3.60.

Social theory is much like philosophy and poetry—tastes and interpretations differ. What one man thinks important, another may minimize or neglect; what one would by all means include, another would omit; what seems a logical classification to one is of doubtful validity to another. Hence it is always easier to allege defects in the work of another than to do a better job oneself. Yet the reviewer who does not attempt to evaluate as well as to tell what is in a book, does only half of his job. The same might be said of one who writes about social theory.

There are two general approaches to the discussion of social theory. The first may be called *historico-biographical*. It attempts to show the development of social theory by discussing in chronological order the works of certain men as influenced by their social and intellectual back-grounds. Lichtenberger's well-known treatise typifies this approach. The second is *conceptual*. It attempts to show how the work of certain men contributes to the development of certain general theories. House and Sorokin belong in this category. The two approaches may be combined as Bogardus and Bristol have done.

Which is the better method depends somewhat upon the purpose of the writer, but in view of the fact that the concepts themselves are often ill-defined or undefined it is the opinion of the reviewer that the first method is the better if one's purpose, as House states his (preface), is to familiarize the student with the literature and its fundamental concepts. If one's purpose, like Sorokin's, is a critical analysis

of the concepts themselves, the conceptual approach is obviously to be preferred. Incidentally, the student will become familiar with the literature and its content.

It is one thing to start with a set of concepts and then try to show how the work of various men has contributed to the development of these concepts. It is quite another thing to examine the validity of a set of concepts. House has apparently done the first; Sorokin, the second.

I get the impression that House is committed, provisionally at least, to a certain set of concepts. Among these are social forces (attitudes, wishes, interests, values, etc.), competition, conflict, accommodation, assimilation, interaction, personality, collective behavior, culture, cultural lag, human ecology, natural history (of typical social phenomena), etc. He tries to show how various men have helped to develop these concepts. For the most part he does not question the validity of the concepts themselves. Sorokin, on the other hand, is concerned primarily with what men mean by certain concepts and theories and also tries to evaluate them by logical and factual analysis. I do not believe that either approach will give the ordinary student a very clear conception of the theoretical contributions of the various men mentioned in the course of such analyses. The man and his times, his dependence upon his predecessors and influence upon contemporaries and successors, and the true organic significance of his work, are all lost in a jumble of disconnected references and allusions. It seems to me that the historical approach, with due attention to the socio-intellectual background of the theorists considered, together with

a critical evaluation of their work in the light of carefully defined modern concepts and facts, is the best way to acquaint students with the literature and range of social theory. Certainly, some such training is a prerequisite for the intelligent reading of such books as Sorokin and House have written.

Sorokin attempts to present and evaluate the *sociological* theories of the last seventy years or so. He finds his 350,000 words or more too short a space. In 200,000 words or less, House attempts to cover the range of *social* theory from the Greeks to 1928. The result is necessarily sketchy. It is true that his attention is primarily upon the contributions of other social theorists to the development of his set of sociological concepts, or the interpretation of their theories by means of his own concepts, but one cannot escape the feeling that his project is far too ambitious for one rather brief volume. We wish that the thirty or more blank pages could have been utilized. The fifty or more pages of fine print quotations, not to mention the many other direct quotations, could have been mostly omitted, since their content is usually paraphrased anyway. Thus, much repetition could have been avoided and much space saved which would have made possible a more adequate treatment of many topics.

The general point of view seems to be what might be called that of a "subjective sociology." Attitudes, wishes and values are used to "explain" so many concepts that they almost take on the character of a "single factor explanation." They play a predominant part in the discussion of religion, social movements, social forces, personality, social disorganization, culture, immigration, recreation and revolution. This point of view runs like a red thread throughout the whole book. This is best illustrated in what might be

called "tendency theory," e.g., "the concept 'attitude' may be regarded as a behavioristic one, the attitude being defined simply as a tendency to act—a tendency which, whenever it is mobilized, is observable by others than the person to whom the attitude is imputed" (196). It would appear that a behaviorist would not *impute* anything to anyone other than the act. If attitude is to pose as a behavioristic concept it must be defined *as an act* or combination of acts or movements of a certain kind.

The book is divided into four parts: Geography and Social Differentiation, Human Nature and Collective Behavior, Conflict and Social Control, and The Trend of Social Theory. It is futile to quarrel with a man's organization of a book of this kind, but it is difficult to see why the chapters on Social Movements, Religion, Conflict and Disorganization, and Conventionality and Fashion should have been placed in Part II rather than in Part III. Likewise, Public Opinion and Legislation, and Revolution and Reform, might have gone into Part II as logically as into Part III. The reason for this is readily apparent. Most of the topics, or "concepts" under Human Nature and Collective Behavior involve Conflict and Social Control and vice versa. There is so much overlapping and indefiniteness in almost all general sociological concepts that any logical, i.e., mutually exclusive, classification, is impossible. The concepts are meaningful depending upon "how you look at it" and what use you are making of them. In Part II, House is evidently "looking at it" from the point of view of the relation of persons to processes and in Part III at the processes themselves.

I suspect the only way out is to develop a set of rigidly-defined discriminative concepts. We must have mutually exclusive concepts before we can have a

scientific terminology. This is no reflection upon House. He clearly states the difficulty on p. 10. All sociologists must recognize the difficulties that arise from our too inclusive and ill-defined terms. All social phenomena may be classified and discussed under such rubrics as contact, communication, interaction, conflict, culturization, social processes, social organization, and a dozen others.

In reading the book, I made forty-nine notations to all of which reference is obviously impossible. Some of them have been mentioned. The remainder were concerned primarily with (1) differences of opinion as to the importance, emphasis and validity of certain positions taken in the text, and (2) with what appeared to me important omissions in reference to the literature. Of course, these are matters in which one man's opinion is as good as another's, or perhaps a little better. I can mention only a few.

Hume is not mentioned as a social theorist, Mill and Veblen barely; in connection with the process of industrialization, Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* is not mentioned nor any of Veblen's penetrating studies. W. S. Thompson is not mentioned in relation to Malthus nor is H. B. Woolston's able though brief analysis of Malthusianism referred to; on morality, Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution*; Bernard, Josey, Kuo, Tolman et al., on anti-instinct theory; and Müller on race and language are not discussed; Ammon-Lapouge on race are merely mentioned; Parker Moon on *Imperialism* is not mentioned nor J. M. Williams on conflict; nor Trotter on public opinion (The Herd); the classical and neo-classical schools of criminology are not mentioned, Lombroso merely, and Goring not at all; the Austinian theory of the state and law are not referred to; in connection with laughter and the comic, Aristotle, Hobbes, Gregory, Sidis, East-

man and Freud are not mentioned; in art, Freud, Lipps and Tolstoy are omitted. One could go on. Of course, space limitations compel some selection of materials, but it seems to me that these and other omissions are more important than many citations and discussions that are included. I close with a quotation from page 144 with which I cannot agree: "Arnold Bennett's *Clayhanger* trilogy, and Knut Hamsun's *Growth of the Soil* are, in a sense, better case studies of personality in relation to social interaction than one can find in any sociological treatise."

From the foregoing, it must not be inferred that this is not a worthwhile book. Within the limits of its space and the difficulties of the conceptual approach, it gives a very satisfactory sketch of the relations between some of the theory of the other social sciences and sociological theory. From its content, the serious student can gain an approach to more intensive study; the superficial student will perhaps get all he needs to know. The first chapter, "Science and Social Policy" and the two final chapters, "Social Change and Social Science," and "The Logic of the Social Sciences," are very well done indeed. In the body of the book, the chapters on Sociology of Religion, Culture and Social Organization, and Theories of Social Evolution are very satisfying. In the last, the contrast between Spengler's and Ellwood's theories is clearly and pointedly set forth. One misses reference to Morgan, however.

On the whole, the book is well written, typographically attractive, adequately indexed, and is well worth reading. Social theory is one of the most interesting forms of intellectual gymnastics known to man and may even be of basic practical importance. It is certain at least that no one will ever be able to write the final treatise or say the last word on this subject. "Time makes ancient theory uncouth."

THE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM

CLIFTON J. BRADLEY

- THE ECONOMICS OF FARM RELIEF. By Edwin R. A. Seligman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1929. 303 pp. \$3.00.
- THE CO-OPERATIVE PATTERN IN COTTON. By Robert H. Montgomery. New York: Macmillan, 1929. 335 pp. \$2.50.
- INTRODUCTION TO AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS. By Fred R. Yoder. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1929. 472 pp.
- AMERICA CHALLENGED. By Lewis F. Carr. New York: Macmillan, 1929. 322 pp. \$3.50.
- AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES. By Whitney H. Shepardson. New York: Macmillan, 1929. 132 pp. \$1.50.

One result of the present public interest in the problems of agriculture has been the publication of a large number of books that treat either of the subject as a whole or of selected phases. The books reviewed below belong to this group. The quality as well as the quantity of agricultural literature has been markedly increased by this accretion of writings. Many men who ordinarily do not write on agricultural topics have done so recently, and several of these initial attempts have been particularly praiseworthy. The first of the books reviewed below belong in this class. Added significance attaches to these books since they appeared as they did on the eve of the assembling of Congress for the consideration of farm relief. The increased general interest in agricultural problems is very stimulating to agricultural students and is, perhaps, indicative of a national desire to treat fairly this great industry.

I

Edwin R. A. Seligman, *The Economics of Farm Relief*. This analysis of the agricultural situation by Dr. Seligman might well be termed a triumph of general economic principles as applied to a particular problem. Dr. Seligman, although not

familiar with either agriculture in general or with its many specialized branches, has brought his profound knowledge of general economic principles to bear on this subject. Result, in this initial effort in the field of agricultural economics, the keenest and most profound analysis to date of the problem now confronting American agriculture.

At the outset, Dr. Seligman recognizes both a relative and an absolute depressed condition in American agriculture today. He contends that the parity maintained during the nineteenth century between agriculture and industry has been destroyed. During that period industry was specially favored by a national policy of protection. Agriculture, on the other hand, possessed an adequate compensating advantage in a developing home market, an abundance of free lands, cheap transportation, and an ever increasing world supply of gold. By 1900, certain of these advantages to agriculture were disappearing, but the incoming tide of immigration so increased the demand for food that this parity remained in effect until the outbreak of the World War.

In the pre-War period of the twentieth century, population was increasing rapidly in relation to the food supply. Now with a decreased birth rate and restricted immigration, population growth has been relatively checked while agricultural production because of several reasons has been markedly increased. First, increased mechanization, second, substitution of tractors and autos for horses thereby releasing feed supplies for other uses, third, greater productivity per unit, fourth, a shift in various parts of the country from less productive to more productive crops, fifth, in the case of

cotton production a shift from worse to better lands, sixth, the ever retreating margin of production, and last the increasing general dependence upon a strict price economy.

"Do we desire the permanent inferiority of the farm to the factory, of agriculture to industry, which may bring with it the replacement of the American farmer by a low-grade cultivator; or do we desire the continued existence of both on an equally high plane?" This is the profound question raised by Dr. Seligman and he answers in the affirmative to the latter proposition.

There are three ways to help bring about this desirable parity. One is by individual action of the farmers themselves, a second is by co-operative efforts among the farmers, and the third is through state assistance along definite lines. Dr. Seligman contends that the state has a special responsibility to assist agriculture at present because of the extreme stimulus to agricultural production by the government during the Late War.

A program of farm relief is outlined including the functions of regulation, of equalization, of education, and of price control. Various topics under these functions are discussed at length, as transportation where the thought is expressed that the government has a definite duty to perform in lowering freight rates on agricultural commodities even to the extent of reimbursing the railroads for any loss incurred by such action.

The farm relief program would be administered through the medium of a Federal Farm Board clothed with wide discretionary powers and duties. Major duties of this board would include the elimination of risk through crop insurance or other means; the decrease of sub-marginal production, possibly by the government buying much of this land; and

price stabilization and price control. Co-operative marketing organizations of farmers would be effectively used in carrying out many phases of this program. The general view expressed as to the outlook for agriculture, if the government chooses to act, is quite optimistic.

II

Robert H. Montgomery, *The Co-operative Pattern in Cotton*. During the last decade the United States has experienced such a development in the co-operative marketing of agricultural products as no other nation of the past or present. This development has consisted of hundreds of movements ranging in size from a few dozens of farmers within a single locality to tens of thousands of farmers living in several states.

In this study by Dr. Robert H. Montgomery, of the University of Texas, we have an analysis of one such movement, namely, the organization and progress of the Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Association. Quite logically the study begins with a survey of the traditional and common method of marketing cotton. A brief review of the historical development of this method is given. Various price data from earlier studies show the varying prices paid for the same grade of cotton the same day and in the same market. Other price data show that higher prices were paid for lower grades of cotton during a single day in a single market. The essential conclusion from price data is the "continuous and complete failure of free competition in securing to the farmer a fair price for his cotton," and that grade and quality have had too little weight in determining the price received by the farmer for his cotton.

The deflation of 1920-21 seriously disturbed industry in general. The cotton industry was in such straits that a con-

vention was called to meet early in 1920 at Montgomery, Alabama, to consider the situation. Aaron Sapiro, who later had so much to do with the organization of co-operative marketing associations in the United States, attended and addressed this convention, presenting what has come to be known as the Sapiro plan of co-operative marketing. A committee was designated at the close of this convention to formulate a plan for later consideration by the convention. Five plans of action were suggested by this committee, but in the end Sapiro's plan prevailed. From influences set in motion at Montgomery the Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Association resulted.

A plan of organization was developed by a committee of twenty-one with the help and guidance of Sapiro and Carl Williams of Oklahoma. After thus tracing the development of a cotton co-operative marketing association in Texas, Dr. Montgomery gives a detailed discussion of the plan of organization and of the contract. Then follows a thorough description of the organization campaign and of the difficulties encountered. From this point Dr. Montgomery launches into a description of the association as a going concern, covering the following topics: The first year, Field Service and Membership, Financial Problems, Marketing Functions, The Contract in Law, and Control. Throughout, Dr. Montgomery reveals an intimate knowledge of the subject about which he writes and also a thorough understanding of the accepted principles of co-operative marketing. Continuous interpretation of the significance of events is given along with the general description.

The study closes with a chapter entitled "The Case for Co-operation." Herein are cited certain economic facts in connection with cotton production. The

author contends that the cotton grower should have an acceptable standard of living, the present one not being so, and that industry should have a regular and adequate supply of cheap cotton. The general run-down, unkempt panorama of the country-side in the cotton region is presented for the reader's consideration. The widely fluctuating income of the cotton farmer is noted with an economic interpretation of its meaning to the people concerned. The paradox of small crops of cotton selling for more than large crops is shown. Attention is called to the lack of sufficient price differentials for quality and grade. Other unsatisfactory features are cited.

The outstanding need of the cotton farmer is succinctly stated as follows:

"What the cotton farmer needs most, and needs most desperately, is not a good average income as a group but a good regular income as an individual."

What the cotton farmer can do is summed up as follows:

"The only thing he can do is to assume the responsibility of consciously organizing his industry with the purpose of regulating production and price. This plan is damned as Utopian, radical, dangerous, illegal, and utterly impossible. Nevertheless, it is the only way. The one agency in existence today that can handle this program is the large-scale co-operative. . . . The old devices will not serve. Neither will the independent state associations. A new scheme of arrangements must be developed. This is the task of the centralized co-operative."

A most valuable study of a truly great movement. Through the medium of such studies a fundamental and necessary knowledge of the problems of co-operative marketing can be developed. Such studies serve as guide posts for present and future co-operative marketing ventures.

III

Fred R. Yoder, *Introduction to Agricultural Economics*. This volume by Dr. Yoder is a

distinct contribution to the literature dealing with agricultural economics. As a college text, it fills a definite need where there is at present an inadequate supply of satisfactory texts. Teachers of agricultural economics should welcome this clear and readable presentation. The author employs a simple clear method of expression coupled somehow with an entertaining style that should go far in popularizing agricultural economics as a subject, even among farmers. A carefully chosen bibliography of supplemental readings is given at the end of each chapter.

The present use of price in equating supply and demand and its peculiar workings as applied to agriculture are emphasized throughout. The conservative or classical theory of economics supplies the basic explanatory principles. A critique of the best available literature in various fields has been made which will allow minimum effort on the part of students for maximum returns. The highly competitive nature of agricultural production and the outstanding need for an articulated production are major premises for constructive suggestions.

Following an introductory chapter on the historical background, Dr. Yoder launches into a rather detailed study of farm population and at the end of this chapter he gives a good review of the characteristic attitudes of farmers involving as he sets them down: conservatism; paradoxically it may seem, radicalism upon occasion; thrift carried to penuriousness; fatalism; suspicion with diffidence to strangers; and inalertness. Also in this chapter there is a discussion of the farmers' standard of living. Here it is shown that the American farmer enjoys a high standard of living when compared with farmers of most other countries, but that this standard is low in relation to other classes in the United States. "Only unskilled

laborers have had a standard of living as low or lower than the American farming class."

Reasons for the condition just cited are given as follows: (1) the average farm income has been low; (2) the farmer has turned much of his surplus income back into his farm and has thereby increased production; (3) old customs and traditions are especially persistent in agriculture, and frontier conditions even yet have not disappeared in American agriculture; (4) being removed from business centers, the farmer has not been so tempted to spend by dazzling show windows, etc.; (5) the farmer has built up an aversion to spending, considering thrift to be one of the primary virtues; (6) and last the former servitude of the Negro in the South.

The book contains twenty chapters, each of which is subdivided. Most of the logical agricultural topics are included. These are in order; historical background; farm population and farm life; agriculture and the price economy; land as a factor in production; land income and values; land tenure; land policies; social capital; farm credit; insurance; farm labor; farm management; marketing of agricultural products; co-operative marketing; foreign markets; agriculture and the tariff; farm taxation; agriculture and price movement; farmers' movements; and farm wealth and income.

Several of the chapters are especially good. Among this number could be included land tenure wherein proper recognition is made of the social relations of the landlord and of the tenant. A similar statement may be made with reference to the chapter dealing with farm labor. The human element receives major emphasis in both chapters. Another chapter has an evaluation of social capital in farming. Here it is pointed out forcibly that the farmer may profit by greater purchasing of material comforts, and

even luxuries, instead of turning so much of his profits back into agricultural production channels. The chapter on co-operative marketing is a splendid general discussion, as is also the one dealing with the tax burden on agriculture.

In the latter chapter, it is shown that farm land, because of the wide-spread reliance in state and local taxation upon the general property tax, is now paying a disproportionate share of such taxes. The suggestion is made that through the state taking over certain public functions as school, roads, health and others, by the tapping of new sources of tax revenue, through property classification and by improved land appraisals a more equitable tax burden for agriculture could result. The discussion of agriculture and the tariff, although sound from one viewpoint, discloses a southern bias, that is, that no good thing has or can come to agriculture through the so-called "protective system." The lack of a definite land policy in the United States in the past, and the need of one at present and in the future, are given due emphasis and explanation in another chapter.

No general summation or lengthy formal conclusions are presented. An optimistic tone permeates the entire volume. The fundamental need for education and more education in assisting the farmer to assist himself is pointed out again and again. As approaches to creating an improved economic condition for American agriculture the author suggests: (1) more effective control of production by the farmers; (2) a more economic land utilization; (3) reduced individual farm costs of production through better farm management and other means; (4) extensive co-operative organizations; (5) equalization in the effects of protective policies as between agriculture and industry; (6) equitable distribution of tax burdens among the

various industries according to the criterion of "ability to pay;" (7) and last greatly increased numbers of and improved educational agencies.

IV

Lewis F. Carr, *America Challenged*. The author affects a journalistic style, tinged with evangelism, throughout. However, a sane presentment of facts only is made. The opening sentence follows: "A certain man—the richest American of his time—was a farmer." The reference is to George Washington as founder of our nation. Then follows a chapter sketch of Washington as a farmer and agriculturist. The book closes with the following paragraph:

"The situation makes for instability, for conflict, for strife and retaliation and compromise. It is the same old conflict that has wrought so much havoc in the past at the cost of many lives and needless destruction. And I, for one, expect the underlying forces of this conflict to continue until some adjustment is made. I think this adjustment can be made by co-operation. I should grieve to think that all classes of the American nation can not co-operate for the common good. But if not, I still think that the adjustment should be made. For I do not believe that a house divided against itself can stand forever. And I do not believe that this nation can exist and be at peace with itself so long as it is half protected and half unprotected, half on a world basis and half on an American basis, half under a laissez-faire policy and half under a policy of regulation and protection. And I believe that when the equality that agriculture seeks shall have been attained, this nation will have a new birth of prosperity beyond our utmost dreams."

The chapter titles are indicative of the author's style. They are: A Sort of Prologue, The Challenge of the Day, Why Bother, Perspective, An Unrecognized Farm Problem, Measures for Improvement, Conjecture, Other Considerations, and Conclusion.

A convincing and unusual array of data is early presented to show that there is actually a farm problem at present and

that agriculture is in dire need of assistance to the level at least of legislative parity. A review of the causes producing this condition is given along with reasons why agriculture cannot organize as most businesses nor cope with industry by using industry's weapons.

Due respects are paid in passing to the relative effects of machine, or large-scale production, of the protective system and of other factors as affecting agriculture as contrasted with industry. The author reviews and criticises all of the current nostrums of farm relief. He is insistent that no one plan is the panacea and also that agriculture alone cannot solve its problems. The importance of the family farm in our past historical development is stressed throughout as are also the possibilities of commercial farming.

The opinion is strongly stated that America must soon choose whether she will become predominantly industrial with only incidental attention to agriculture, or whether a definite, important and permanent place will be assigned to agriculture in the national economy. The author views the former course with misgivings and as unnecessary. He much prefers the latter course and is not wholly pessimistic as to the probability of its adoption. As suggested earlier, the author makes use of many sources of information not commonly used by agricultural writers. This is a refreshing feature of the study. This volume is a distinct contribution to agricultural literature and should materially assist in creating a sympathetic attitude among the general public with respect to agriculture and its problems.

V

Whitney H. Shepardson, *Agricultural Education in the United States*. This volume was originally written as a report on

agricultural education in the United States for the General Education Board. Because of its apparent worth as a critical survey, the original report was set up and printed so as to be available to the general public. Much information is clearly and concisely set forth in this small volume.

A brief history of agricultural teaching of college and university grade since 1862 is given. The difficulties encountered in establishing agriculture at this level of instruction are outlined. Present day agricultural education is discussed under the three divisions, teaching, research, and extension. Colleges and universities now giving instruction in agriculture are divided into two general groups based upon their major emphasis in instructional work. One group in the past and the present has constantly striven to maintain agricultural instruction at the university level of science and education. The second group, largely because agriculture is an applied science, has stressed the vocational function and, in the main, has been "extension minded."

Mr. Shepardson expresses the opinion, substantiated by evidence, that to date agricultural instruction has largely been of the latter general type. He deplors this situation and holds that future agricultural programs of education must stress more and more research for research's sake and must allow the student to make the practical application after leaving the college and university. He also deplors the lack of available scholarships and opportunities for graduate study in the science of agriculture. He is generally critical of the present status of agricultural instruction from the standpoint of scholarship, but thinks that this condition is probably in large measure the result of the short lapse of time since agricultural science has been included in the college and university curricula.

Mr. Shepardson is at the same time optimistic as to the likelihood of changes soon in agricultural instruction towards more and stronger graduate work from the "pure science" standpoint. He thinks that a well rounded program of agricultural instruction is rapidly being developed with due recognition for the economic

and social factors as well as for those having to do with the technique of production.

A stimulating and thought provoking survey of the present status of agricultural education in the United States, students generally should welcome this succinct portrayal of an interesting subject.

SHOULD BEGINNING SOCIOLOGY BE SOCIAL PATHOLOGY?

READ BAIN

SOCIAL PROBLEMS. By John Lewis Gillin, Clarence G. Dittmer, and Ray J. Colbert. New York: Century, 1928. 543 pp.

In the opinion of the authors, the best way to introduce beginning students to the scientific understanding of human phenomena is by studying social problems. They argue that a student "can hardly explore one of these definite and concrete problems without gaining the feel of the texture of social life" (Preface).

I "ha' me doots" of this. I have no idea just what the "feel of the texture of social life" may be, but I am convinced that many people have many "feelings" about social life, without having much appreciation of what is meant by a scientific attitude toward human phenomena. I have elsewhere (*Historical Outlook*, December, 1927, pp. 377 ff; *School Review*, September, 1926, pp. 535 ff; a similar study is under way in Ohio) indicated reasons for regarding the social problem approach to high school sociology as unwise. I believe the same arguments will apply equally well to the first course in college, especially when it is open to freshmen and sophomores as is increasingly the case.

Furthermore, there are always ethical assumptions implicit in any discussion of social problems. These militate against the scientific attitude. Of course, ethical

assumptions are legitimate material for the sociologist, but these should be treated in the same way that other social phenomena are treated by the scientific sociologist, i.e., as data for analysis: observation, classification, clarification, generalization, objectification, and not as justification for recommendation as the social problem solver is implicitly or explicitly compelled to treat them. I fear we are not world-shakingly successful in giving students of the social sciences that objective, experimental, fact-demanding, *natural science* view of social phenomena which must be the aim of those who foresee a day when we shall be able to attack social problems in a truly scientific spirit with a maturely developed (and developing) scientific technique. I hold that the introduction of students to the study of social phenomena by way of social problems is partially responsible for this.

Unlike Gaul, "Social Problems" are divided into four parts, "The Nature of the Social Problem," "Problems of Population," "Problems of the Home and Economic Life," and "Problems of Socialization." Why should Part IV be "problems of socialization" while the other problems discussed are not so denominated? Are not all social problems matters of defective socialization,—defective, at least, in the opinion of the domi-

nant group? Further, "Problems of the Home and Economic Life," should have been divided into three parts, one dealing with "Problems of the Home," one with "Economic Problems" as such, and one with the "Socionomic Factors in the Employment of Women and Children." As it stands, the title is not descriptive of the subject-matter. The two chapters on "Social Hazards of Modern Industrial Life" deal with six classes of socionomic problems, capital and labor conflict receiving only four pages; unemployment, six; vocational adjustment, five and a half; income, five; accident and health, three and a half; old age, four. Labor unions, employer unions, economic waste and exploitation, cooperative efforts, conciliation boards, inequality of wealth and income, labor legislation, and such, are little more than mentioned.

There are a great many points of view presented, especially in the backgrounds section, with which the reviewer disagrees, chiefly because he believes there is evidence to refute some of them, and because some controversial matters are presented as if finally settled. Of course, part of this is due to the attempt of the author to give an introductory course in fifty or sixty pages which makes it impossible to give the bases of the generalizations and to discuss the contradictory interpretations. Some of these questioned positions are as follows:

That Rome "fell because it was morally bankrupt;" the whole "epoch" idea of history; that the common people have continuously been getting more authority; that changes in social structure are somehow divorced from changes in ideas and ideals (p. 3); that modern problems are more "vast and complicated" than formerly (p. 4); that the "four fundamentals" of society are "groups, uniformities, standards, and institutions" (these all

seem aspects of the same thing to me: organic unity or culture complexes (p. 11); the definition of social work (p. 14) makes it cover the whole field of social control; civilization is a moral force that makes man "better" (p. 15). Space forbids going any further than this first chapter, but I cannot omit the old idea that "the family still remains the fundamental group" (p. 8); that modern medicine is dysgenic (pp. 20, 386); the uncritical presentation of the Kallikak data (p. 182); the "would you want your sister?" argument against miscegenation (p. 237); the "education and inter-racial coöperation" solution of the Negro problem (it savors of the Negro in his place), (246-52); that women may "purify politics" (p. 279); that 12 per cent of criminals in institutions are mentally defective—with no clear distinction between feeble-mindedness and "psychopathic personalities" that may or may not be hereditary and no indication that much mental defect is non-hereditary (pp. 425-8).

Enough has been said to raise a serious doubt in the mind of the reviewer, at least, as to whether this is the best method of introducing students to the concept of scientific sociology. The discussion of social problems and suggestions for their solution, even when they are presented under sociological concepts, inevitably is based upon moral assumptions without any adequate analysis of the origin, nature, or mechanisms of said assumptions. One fears that the student will finish the book with a holy zeal to "do something about it" and be quite certain he knows what to do, rather than with the more modest desire to "find out about it," and the more reasonable conviction that we as yet know very little about it. The introductory course ought to acquaint the student with the conditioning factors, characteristics and processes of normal

group life and to inspire him with the critical minded, scientific point of view that regards human phenomena as natural phenomena. Definite attention ought to be given to the methods and spirit of science.

With these reservations, much praise can be given to the book. As an introductory course in "applied sociology," it is excellent in many respects. It is clearly and interestingly written, has many admirable maps, graphs, and schematic arrangements, with a good list of references and exercises at the end of each chapter.

The section on populations is perhaps the best in the book. The only criticism I offer is that it may be too extensive for a general treatise on Social Problems, (about 200 of the 500 pages), all but two of the seventeen chapters are practically undocumented; only three pages are given

to race problems in general as against forty-four to the American Negro Problem. The thesis that "Negro traits" and alleged Negro inferiority are largely the result of the slave culture is presented very forcefully.

Other discussions of exceptional merit are those dealing with the technological basis of modern culture (pp. 19-38); summary and conclusions on population (Chapter 16); the employment of women and children (Chapter 21); and Chapters 27, "Peace and War," and 28, "The Church and Social Problems."

It is refreshing to find a coöperative volume in which the chapters written by each contributor are indicated, though this record should be in the text rather than in the preface. "Social Problems" is a valuable book but not a good beginning text.

CULTURE AND CULTURAL CONTACTS

H. G. DUNCAN

THE BUILDING OF CULTURES. By Roland B. Dixon. New York: Scribner's, 1928. x + 312 pp. \$4.00.

THE GHETTO. By Louis Wirth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928. xvi + 306 pp. \$3.00.

A CHINAMAN'S OPINION OF US AND OF HIS OWN PEOPLE. By Hwuy-Ung; translated by J. A. Makepeace. New York: Stokes, 1927. x + 322 pp. \$3.00.

IMMIGRATION AND RACE ATTITUDES. By E. S. Bogardus. New York: Heath, 1928. xi + 268 pp. \$1.80.

THE BALANCE OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS; VOLUME I: WESTERN AND NORTHERN EUROPE. By Robert R. Kuczynski. New York: Macmillan, 1928. xi + 140 pp. \$2.00.

Professor Dixon is well known to anthropologists, ethnologists, and sociologists through his distinctive book, *Racial History of Man*. This book, *The Building of Cultures*, which "is designed to

treat in brief outline the whole subject of culture origins and development," maintains his previous high standard. In this volume he considers such problems as environment, discovery and invention, primary and secondary diffusion, trait-complex, cultural parallels, and how culture is really built.

The culture of a people is considered as comprising the "sum of all their activities, customs, and beliefs." Of the three main categories, the physical is material, while the social and religious are non-material. Each of these includes a vast number of individual traits. To discover the origin and growth of a culture, therefore, one must be able to discover and trace the traits of which the culture is composed. In this process, three primary factors are involved: environment (climate, topog-

raphy, and raw materials), diffusion, and nationality or race. He does not stress environment as it apparently offers few barriers to the origin and diffusion of culture. Dixon disagrees with Huntington's explanation of why the Indians of the middle west failed to attain a high stage of culture, contending that he neglected to give due weight to other elements which equal if not greatly outweigh the influence of climate. Dixon also disagrees with Wissler's explanation of the Pueblo culture on the basis of physical environment because he finds no reason for believing that similar environments necessarily evolve similar cultures. He thinks it is perfectly possible for two different peoples within the same environment synchronously to make different choices and thus exhibit different cultures. The choice each makes will depend on (1) the cultural status, (2) cultural antecedents, (3) cultural contacts, and (4) national or race psychology.

Dixon is not in complete agreement with either of the two main schools of diffusion. He claims that there are three prerequisites for the discovery of a cultural trait: (1) opportunity, (2) observation, and (3) genius; and that invention rests on genius, need, and opportunity. He thinks that, although a trait may sometimes diffuse independently of rationality or need, as a fashion or fad, to be widely adopted the new trait must be commensurate with the culture of the group, and must meet a need in the new territory. He disagrees with a number of the ethnologists in maintaining (1) that a trait diffuses from the cultural area where it arises at a varying rate, (more like a forest fire than a ripple on a pond), (2) that modifications or specializations often occur in the transition to a new cultural area, (3) that specializations occur on the margins rather than in the nucleus of the

original cultural area and (4) that parallel developments are not uncommon.

In his book, *The Ghetto*, Dr. Wirth traces the historical development of the ghetto; how it developed voluntarily in Europe, later became a compulsory legally restricted area, and then again a place of voluntary settlement. He pictures vividly the sufferings of the Jews in the compulsory ghetto in Europe; and discusses the forces which continue its voluntary existence in Europe and development in America, and also those now bringing about its dissolution. He does not stop with a historical description of the ghetto, but penetrates behind its drab walls and analyzes the psychological and sociological effects of this cultural isolation, which has left its impress upon the behavior of the present Jew. These ghetto experiences have so affected one of the most mixed of racial groups that a so-called type of mind has developed, and thus made a sociological type. Dr. Wirth has given us an excellent analysis of Jewish life in the ghetto and made a distinct contribution to sociological literature.

Hwuy-Ung's book contains a series of letters written to his brother in China by a young educated Chinaman, who was forced to flee from his country to Australia. The barbaric culture of the white race, their politics, their religion, their dress, the freedom of their women, their erratic behavior at ball games, and many other things are brought into vivid contrast with those of China. The book masquerades as fact but impresses one as being fiction. At any rate, it gives an amusing, though apparently exaggerated contrast of Occidental and Oriental cultures, and pictures for us the psychic confusion resulting from a sudden thrust into a different culture.

Bogardus employs the much overworked term, "social distance," in dealing

with race attitudes, their origin, change, variation, and adjustment. The source of the book is the reactions of 1725 native-born educated Americans to 40 different races, and the description by 700 of these of their outstanding experiences where race attitudes originated and underwent change. As personal reactions, these are highly interesting and suggestive, but as data for scientific study they are questionable: (1) It is exceedingly difficult, if at all possible, to distinguish between an attitude and an opinion. Furthermore, reactions are never exactly the same, unless the person is mentally inert. (2) In describing "their outstanding experiences," these persons are asked to weave together highly emotionalized experiences with half-forgotten happenings. (3) The younger middle class, possessing a high school or college education, from whom the data was secured, is hardly an adequate sample of native-born Americans.

In addition, there are some who will object to assuming that all "racial problems are personality problems"; that temperament is an inherited racial characteristic; or that "racial differences in temperament are causal factors in personality clashes." The value of the book lies in the direction of attention toward the almost unexplored field of native racial antipathies, and the abundance of concrete material.

The Balance of Births and Deaths purports to be a new book on the population problem, which merely states the facts without giving explanations. It teaches us that at the present rate "the population of England is bound to die out no matter how low mortality may be reduced." This is true despite the fact that in 1927 England had 655,000 births and 480,000 deaths. This dying out appears to be due to the fact that each woman during

her life-time gives birth to only two children; consequently if the population is to be maintained, each of these children must attain parenthood. Likewise, the population of Northern and Western Europe is dying out. Yet the average yearly number of births increased from 3,481,000 in 1841-45 to 3,916,000 in 1920-26, and in 1926 the number of births (3,613,000) exceeded the number of deaths (2,449,000) by 1,164,000 or 48 per cent. Thus with a birth rate of 19.2 and a death rate of 13.0 the population of northern and western Europe is dying out, because of the age composition of the population, and the reduction in the number of children born per female.

PRIMITIVE ART. By Franz Boas. Oslo: Instituttet for Sammenlignende Kulturforskning Serie B: Skrifter VIII. American Agents, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927. 376 pp.

In this volume Professor Boas has brought together in a revised form his contributions on primitive art written over a period of thirty years, has formulated his general observations and applied them specifically to the art of the North Pacific Coast of North America. Apart from the intrinsic fascination of the assembled data on primitive art, and the distinguished clarity and cogency of the author's exposition, which in themselves make the book a highly important contribution to the literature of culture history, the book contains many general theoretical judgments which though not new are of great moment to sociologists.

In the preface to the book, the author sets forth the fundamental contention which challenges Lévy-Bruhl's much-heralded "prelogical mind" concept:

"... the mental processes of man are the same everywhere, regardless of race and culture and regardless of the apparent absurdity of beliefs and customs. Some theorists assume a mental equipment of primitive man distinct from that of civilized man. I have

never seen a person in primitive life to whom this theory would apply. There are slavish believers in the teachings of the past, there are scoffers and unbelievers; there are clear thinkers and muddle-headed bunglers; there are strong characters and weaklings. . . . Anyone who has lived with primitive tribes, who has shared their joys and sorrows, their privations and their luxuries, who sees in them not solely subjects for study to be examined like a cell under the microscope, but feeling and thinking human beings, will agree that there is no such thing as a 'primitive mind,' a 'magical' or 'prelogical' way of thinking, but that each individual in 'primitive' society is a man, a woman, a child of the same kind, of the same way of thinking, feeling and acting as a man, a woman, a child in our own society. . . . The particular behavior in each is determined by the traditional knowledge at the disposal of the individual."

Following upon this is a concise statement of his well known principle:

" . . . each culture can be understood only as an historical growth determined by the social and geographical environment in which each people is placed and by the way in which it develops the cultural material that comes into its possession from the outside or through its own creativeness."

Boas advocates and applies the familiar technique, associated with his name, of studying culture by means of geographical distribution, but is sharply critical of the conclusions in regard to cultural sequences derived through this method by Spinden, Kroeber, and Wissler. He holds as questionable the views that culture traits of the most limited distribution are always the youngest and that the area of the strongest development is always the center of origin. The methods of Graebner, Peter Schmidt, and Elliott Smith are also dismissed as untenable due to their assumption of the permanence of cultural traits.

The author is not content to deal merely with the distribution of objective, descriptively similar traits as are some of the ethnologists dealing with problems of diffusion, but considers as well the differences in meaning ascribed to traits

externally alike. He shows that the interpretation of a constant form in art as well as in other aspects of culture varies not only tribally but individually. He supplies interesting data on the interrelations of art elements with other aspects of culture demonstrating that there is a close connection between the development of skill in an industry and artistic activity, productive artists being found among those who have mastered a technique, among men when the industries are in their hands and among women when they are devoted to industrial activities. The amount of art products of each people, he declares to be in direct relation to the amount of their leisure which is dependent upon their culture, but refutes Verworn's attempt to assign specific styles to specific levels in culture. Many penetrating pages are devoted to the discussion of the psychological factors determining art forms and their interpretation. The author gives ample evidence to disprove the generally accepted belief in the evolution of art from the symbolic to the realistic by showing that these types arise from different psychological conditions. His discerning discussion of the psychological factors determining the stability of cultural forms, in spite of its brevity, is superior to any previous discussion of this problem in sociological literature.

BERNHARD J. STERN.

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PUBLIC POOR RELIEF IN NORTH CAROLINA. By ROY M. BROWN. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1928. 184 pp. \$2.00.

To the growing list of histories of public poor relief in the several states of the American Union, Professor Roy M. Brown has added an authoritative record for North Carolina. In so doing, he has supplied one more chapter in that historical background, out of which so much of

our understanding of present day problems and present day methods in social work must come.

The story of public relief of the poor is a drab tale, whether it be in the English background, culminating in the report of the poor-law commission of 1909, or whether it be in the American foreground, topped by a few efforts at intelligent case work in out-door aid, and classification in almshouse care.

Here, in Professor Brown's study, we find a temperate account of ugly facts, in no way peculiar to North Carolina, but sufficiently damning to identify the American system of public doles as an evil unmixed with good. The remedy, as this author points out, is the treatment of the out-door poor on a basis of individual case work, through the trained field worker, and the resurrection of the almshouse into a district unit large enough for efficiency, classified by the elimination of children, the insane, the feeble-minded, and those suffering from communicable diseases.

As in Pennsylvania, in Massachusetts, in Indiana, and almost uniformly throughout the country, North Carolina exhibits the neglects and the inadequacies of the public relief system. Professor Brown traces the transfer of the earlier system from the vestries to the overseers of the poor, who began to farm out paupers to the highest bidder. These functionaries were succeeded by County Commissioners, who did little to elevate the system. Altogether, the most hopeful step yet taken has been the Mothers' Aid Law,

which shows a tendency to elevate the standards of ordinary relief to its own higher level.

Indoor care, though helped somewhat by the elimination of the more difficult groups, has never risen above a dead level of incompetency. As late as 1922, insane inmates were still found chained to the floor in county homes. "In general," says Professor Brown, "the county home remains a dumping place for the wrecks of our civilization—a place to which Society can remove from its sight, its failures, and so forget them."

The scheme of development of the work is clear and logical. Professor Brown begins his monograph with an exposition of the English beginnings which stand behind our American practices in public poor relief. Then with our Colonial period as the matrix, out of which our system has grown, he traces the processes of poor relief from the Revolution to the Civil War, under the Wardens of the Poor; and from the Civil War to the present, under the County Commissioners. Two illuminating chapters on present conditions in County Almshouses, and on the administration of outdoor relief, are followed by a short sketch of the history and present status of the care of dependent children. The final chapter is a plea for the district almshouse.

In a selected bibliography, attention is called to forty-five helpful sources of research findings, and critical analyses of the public relief problem.

ROBERT W. KELSO.

The Community Fund of St. Louis.

BOOK NOTES

Zeitschrift für Geopolitik.—Kurt Vowinkel of Berlin, publisher of the *Journal of Geopolitics* combined with the *Journal of*

World Politics and World Economy (*Zeitschrift für Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft*), calls attention to the *Journal* and other

publications of similar character. The Journal, which appears monthly, is now in its fifth annual volume, Volume Four having run to 1096 pages. Each monthly issue contains five sections, as follows: (1) contributions to world politics; (2) geopolitical reports; (3) contributions to world economics; (4) geopolitical researches; and (5) book reviews. The editors of the combined journals are Dr. Karl Haushofer, Dr. Erich Obst, Dr. Hermann Lautensach, Dr. Otto Maull, and (for world politics and world economy) Dr. Kurt Wiedenfeld and A. Ball.

"Geopolitik" is proclaimed in this journal and in other publications, among them *Foundations of Geopolitics (Bausteine zur Geopolitik)*, by Haushofer, Obst, Lautenbach, and Maull (Berlin, 1928), as a new discipline. It derives its name and, in part, its definition, from certain sections of Rudolf Kjellén's *Der Staat als Lebensform*, a fundamental methodological essay which has been issued in German translation by the same publisher. Kjellén was a professor in the University of Upsala, Sweden, who sought to redefine the scope of political science, on the basis of a restatement of the familiar theory that a society is an organism, having a life in some sense independent of that of its members.

The writings of this group of men are thought-provoking, to say the least, and among their research papers one finds illuminating interpretations of political events and politico-geographic situations.

F. N. H.

THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEORIES OF THE HINDUS: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS. By Benoy Kumar Sarkar. Leipzig: Verlag von Markert und Petters, 1927. xxiv + 242 pp.

This is a reprinting of the most useful survey of the political institutions and political theories of India which has thus

far appeared in the English language. The author is, perhaps, the most versatile of the younger group of Indian scholars and publicists and the book brings together in convenient form a mass of important materials otherwise generally inaccessible to American students.

H. E. B.

NEWSPAPER REPORTING OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS: AN ADVANCED COURSE IN NEWSPAPER REPORTING AND A MANUAL FOR PROFESSIONAL NEWSPAPER MEN. By Chilton Rowlette Bush. New York: Appleton, 1929. xix + 406 pp. \$3.00.

PROBLEMS OF NEWSPAPER PUBLISHING: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE COUNTRY FIELD, INCLUDING WEEKLY AND DAILY NEWSPAPERS. By Buford Otis Brown. New York: Harper, 1929. x + 379 pp. \$3.00.

Most books appearing in journalism approach the subject from the business and technical side and these two are not exceptions. Professor Brown in his preface writes, "Journalism aspires to be a profession, but a newspaper is also a business." Since most of the books on the newspaper are written by newspaper men and teachers in schools of journalism, this emphasis upon the business and technical aspects of the newspaper is not surprising. The surprising thing is that no first rate piece of work has appeared in which the newspaper is studied as a social institution. Neither of these two volumes does this; while both are good books, little in them will catch the interest of sociologists.

Professor Bush has written a model text for journalism students. He uses the term "public affairs" to cover the business of the organized community, with which the ordinary citizen comes into contact, and his purpose is to familiarize future reporters with the machinery of government in the local community and to reveal to them news sources so that they may interpret public affairs to the reader more intelligently. The book is

admirably written and should be of inestimable value to the young reporter trying to find his way through the labyrinth of city administrative agencies. He will learn what each agency does, and learn it more vividly than from the orthodox textbook of political science.

Professor Brown tells the newspaper man what he should know of the business side of the paper, and discusses problems of location, financing, equipment, efficient production, advertising, merchandising, and problems of circulation. There are also chapters on official newspapers, and the laws covering advertising and libel. All of these are considered with especial reference to the country paper. The book supplements Thayer's *Newspaper Management*.

M. M. W.

EXERCISES IN STATISTICAL METHODS. By Robert E. Chaddock and Frederick E. Croxton. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1928. 166 pp.

A useful collection of problems for the teaching of statistics by the laboratory method. It is designed to be used in connection with Chaddock's *Principles and Methods of Statistics*, and contains 151 problems on all phases of statistics designed to carry the student through the mathematics of simple correlation and time series. The tables necessary for the clerical work on these problems are published, also useful tables in the appendix, giving the mathematical values of formulae for testing the fit of normal curve, value of ordinates of normal curve, fractional parts of the total area under the normal curve, sums of the squares of the first 100 natural numbers, squares, square root and reciprocal and numbers up to 1000, also tables of logarithms and proportional parts. These supplementary tables make the book a valuable working manual for mathematical statisticians as

well as a collection of problems for the instructor.

T. J. W., JR.

THE HISTORY OF BIOLOGY. By Erik Nordenskiöld. New York: Knopf, 1928. xxvii 629 pp.

One need not be a sworn devotee of "Human Ecology" to find this volume possessed of great value to the sociologist. There is now a strong movement in sociology to work out dependable methods of investigation, and one of the sources of information on the subject is outstanding treatises on the history and methodology of other sciences. Nordenskiöld's work is one of the completest and most scholarly of these treatises, bringing up the story of investigation in biology from the Greeks to the present, with more than half of the volume devoted to fairly recent work. The book is intensely interesting in and for its own content, but modern biology is so closely related to sociology at many points of contact that at least as full a knowledge of its theory as this volume affords is practically necessary to the sociologist.

L. L. B.

THE BASIS OF BREEDING. By Leon F. Whitney. New Haven: Earle C. Fowler, 1928. 260 pp.

This is a very interesting, popular work by the executive secretary of the American Eugenics Society. It is written from the viewpoint and experience of one who has carried on extensive experiments in dog breeding, and is largely addressed to animal breeders in general. It presents a summary of present views regarding the hereditary and the physiological bases of breeding. It is copiously illustrated and contains matter of considerable value to all persons interested in such material.

F. H. H.

THE SLUM PROBLEM. By B. S. Townroe. New York: Longmans, Green, 1928. xi + 220 pp. \$2.50.

This little book gives a summary of the present state of the efforts being made in all parts of Great Britain to eliminate slums. This gigantic task has already cost well over a billion dollars since the war and yet seems hardly begun.

F. H. H.

THE CHILD-CENTERED SCHOOL. By Harold Rugg and Ann Shumaker. Chicago: The World Book Company, 1928. xiv + 359 pp.

What is called the "new" education, that in which an environment is established which will call out spontaneously the self-expression of childhood interests and capacities, has now taken a sufficient variety of forms to warrant an appraisal and criticism. Such is supplied in the above work.

F. H. H.

LIVING INDIA. By Savel Zimand. New York: Longmans, Green, 1928. 280 pp. \$3.00.

An extremely interesting and informing book. By means of vivid kaleidoscopic views the author manages to give the reader outstanding facts of Indian history, social organization, religious belief and turmoil, and political condition. It is obvious that ignorance and superstition are basic evils, but it is equally obvious that generations must elapse before enlightenment can rise very high.

F. H. H.

PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS. By F. B. Garver and A. H. Hansen. Boston: Ginn, 1928. 726 pp. \$3.00.

A beautifully printed and bound text setting forth the underlying principles of economic theory and their application to present-day problems. The material has the advantage of two years' trial at the University of Minnesota.

F. H. H.

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAS. By H. E. Bolton. Boston: Ginn, 1928. 314 pp. \$2.40.

This is a syllabus with maps for a synthetic college course in American history embracing the entire Western Hemisphere from the discovery to the present time. The maps alone are worth the price.

F. H. H.

READINGS IN PUBLIC OPINION. Edited by W. Brooke Graves. New York: D. Appleton, 1928. 1281 pp. \$6.00.

Books of "Readings" are often as difficult to compile as a text-book. They are also more useful at certain stages in the development of a field of research, that is, while the field is new, relatively unorganized and hence full of unclear problems and conflicting opinions. This particular one is an outgrowth of the interest of a professor of political science in the manner in which political parties influence opinion and thus gain control of government. The author, however, broadened the scope of his materials so as to include the manners and methods whereby various organizations and institutions secure desired reactions of the public mind. It even includes some statements as to what various persons and groups think about war, public affairs or the administration of justice. Its 36 chapters and 200 selections are, therefore, comprehensive. Part I is devoted to "The Formation of Personal Opinion"; Part II, to "The Influence of Established Social Institutions"; Part III, to "The Influence of Private Organizations"; and Part IV, to "Government and Public Opinion." There are, at the end of each chapter, "Review Questions" and "Topics for Further Investigation and Discussion." This is doubtless a very timely and useful work, but one feels a lack of materials drawn from social psychology.

F. H. H.

MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF INHERITANCE IN MAN.
By Frank Boas. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928. 340 pp. \$10.00.

Here are published the details of the measurements made in 1909-10 upon which the author's "Changes in the Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants" (1912) was based, together with some additional measurements of Hebrew families made in 1913. It is to be hoped that some one qualified by statistical expertness and anthropological interest will work over these data for any additional light they may throw on the inheritance of the traits here recorded.

F. H. H.

SCEPTICAL ESSAYS. By Bertrand Russell. New York: Norton, 1928. 256 pp. \$2.50.

This work appears to be a collection of brief essays and book reviews arranged so as to achieve a very imperfect continuity. Some of them show Mr. Russell at his best. They are all marked by his singular clarity, mental agility and cleverness, penetrating sarcasm and biting wit. There is often an amazing display of imagination. They constitute a wholesome tonic for all of us who tend to lapse into imitative respectability. There may be very little that is new in these essays, but no one with any capacity for free thinking can read them without a mental titillation which is almost the apex of beatific states. The deflation of Bergson (pp. 65-9) was for me the high point in the book. The essay, "Can Man Be Rational" is excellent. Scepticism is the beginning of wisdom, though it is not all of it; likewise enlightened self-interest may not be the highest morality, but "if it became common, it would make the world an immeasurably better place than it is." The emphasis in this quotation is on the word "enlightened." "The Harm That

Good Men Do" should be read by all parsons and pharisees. The essays on freedom, especially that on "Free Thought and Official Propaganda" is good reading for conservatives and reformers alike. While, however, these essays are good antidotes to taking ourselves and our foibles too seriously, it must be said that Russell often makes his points by overstatement, by over-simplification, by strained analogies, and by half-truths.

F. H. H.

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF SOME GREAT THINKERS OF THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION. Edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw with a preface by Ernest Barker. New York: Bretano's, 1927. 216 pp. \$3.00.

This volume is the fourth in a series based upon public lectures delivered in King's College and is, with the exception of the lecture on Luther by Professor J. W. Allen, the work of members of the staff of that college. The lectures, which are scholarly and which furnish within brief compass the essential ideas of the thinker, deal with Nicolas of Cusa, Sir John Fortescue, Machiavelli, Sir Thomas More, Erasmus, Martin Luther, and Calvin.

G. G. J.

OUR GREAT EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Carl Becker. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927. ix + 332 pp.

Our Great Experiment in Democracy, first printed in 1920 under the title, *The United States: An Experiment in Democracy*, was written as Dr. Becker himself states "to suggest very mildly" that American "democracy" was, and still is, an experiment. Written in the author's usual readable style, the volume sets forth briefly the progress of events in the social, industrial, and political life of the United States, and concludes with the warning

that the people of the United States must turn from national complacency to a consideration of the subtler realities of human relations if America is to continue to be "a fruitful experiment in democracy."

G. G. J.

MARCHING WITH SHERMAN. Edited, with an introduction, by M. A. DeWolfe Howe. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927. 332 p. Illustrated. \$4.00.

This volume is, as the sub-title indicates, "passages from the letters and campaign diaries of Henry Hitchcock, major and assistant adjutant general of volunteers, November, 1864-May, 1865" and is not a faithful reproduction of all the Hitchcock letter and diaries. The editor indicates the liberties which he took with the material as follows: "For the purposes of publication it has seemed best to treat letters and diaries alike, giving the preference to passages of relatively greater human and historic value, and, in the interest of fluent reading, generally to substitute the complete for the abbreviated word." Hitchcock accompanied Sherman on his Georgia and Carolina campaigns and his personal account of them, hitherto unpublished, throws an interesting light on that march which has left to this day intensity and bitterness of feeling.

G. G. J.

ECONOMIC BASIS OF DISUNION IN SOUTH CAROLINA. By John G. Van Deusen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928. 360 pp. \$6.00.

This excellent monograph, assuming economic causation of political action, traces out the real and fancied economic wrongs which finally led South Carolina to the point where she was willing to leave the Union. In as many chapters Dr. Van Deusen recounts the state's background of nullification, fight for free trade, conflict over the bank and sub-

treasury, and agitation over direct trade with Europe, railroad development, diversification of industry, and revival of the slave trade. A most interesting chapter in the one on South Carolina's attempt to calculate the economic value to her of the Union. The greatest lack in the book is an adequate treatment of soil exhaustion and geographic backgrounds.

R. B. V.

THE NEW EXPLORATION: A PHILOSOPHY OF REGIONAL PLANNING. By Benton MacKaye. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1928. \$3.00.

In a happy phrase Benton MacKaye has characterized regional planning as the new exploration. He takes it to mean the conservation of natural resources, the control of commodity flow, and the development of the environment considered as terrain. He will be remembered as one of the prime movers in the project of the Appalachian Trail—a continuous wilderness footpath from Maine to Georgia. In the outflow led by the covered wagon, the inflow led by the skyscraper, and now the backflow forced by pressure from the skyscraper, the author sees the need of applied geography in regional and city planning. Twenty-five maps lend concreteness to the presentation.

R. B. V.

A SHORT HISTORY OF WOMEN. By John Langdon-Davies. New York: Viking, 1927. 382 pp. \$3.00.

THE HERITAGE OF WOMEN. By Alice Ames Winter. New York: Minton, Balch, 1927. 303 pp. \$3.00.

The history of women, even a cross-section of this history, has yet to be written although at least two books were published in 1927 making some pretention toward this claim. Both Langdon-Davies' *Short History of Women* and Mrs. Winter's *Heritage of Women* are books designed to

stimulate, the one to stimulate conjecture about the future of the family and the other to stimulate women to activity.

Langdon-Davies, lecturer and journalist, after briefly tracing the history of the concept, *Female Character*, in primitive society, in ancient civilizations, in the early Christian church, in the middle ages, in modern times, proceeds to a prediction of what the concept will be in the future. In America he sees "the country most like the future of the whole capitalist world." Women prefer the tyranny of the factory to the tyranny of the home and they regard the first as the lesser of two drudgeries. The family is disappearing; women are demanding what men have always taken; the control of maternity is setting women for the first time on a level with men. Finally, there will be discovered a concept, the *Male Character*, and the male human animal will find himself hidden and forgotten. Nothing can stop this process unless a means can be found to prevent any woman being educated and to render birth-control a forgotten observation of ancient history. Such are Mr. Langdon-Davies' conclusions.

It would seem that Mrs. Winter's book is almost a refutation of the foregoing. Mrs. Winter, who from 1920 to 1924 was president of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, has evidently planned her *Heritage of Women* as a stimulant for lethargic clubwomen, for it is a book for women's clubs written in an inspirational, colloquial style. She has described a selected group of women here and there in history ranging in time "from Sarah in her tent to Mme. Curie in her laboratory" in the effort to prove that women have accomplished things in the past and to show that women will accomplish things in the future. After viewing this array of women, she concludes that "it's a long, long way to the millennium," and advises

women that "in the meantime, about the most joyous thing anyone can have is a big hard job every day."

G. G. J.

IMPATIENT GRISELDA. By Dorothy Scarborough. New York: Harper, 1927. 456 pp.

Dorothy Scarborough, best known to sociologists as the author of that fascinating collection of Negro songs *On The Trail of Negro Folk-Songs*, has again written a novel delineating social conditions in her native state of Texas. If she was qualified to write about the economic pressure on tenant farmers in the Texas cotton belt in her earlier novel, *In the Land of Cotton*, she is even better prepared to depict the social problems of a village preacher's family because of the close identification of her own family with the ministry. *Impatient Griselda* is essentially a description of Texas village life in which the Baptist minister of the town is one of the local potentates.

G. G. J.

MEN WITHOUT WOMEN. By Ernest Hemingway. New York: Scribner, 1927. 232 pp. \$2.00.

One of the works of fiction much talked of recently is *Men Without Women*, a collection of thirteen stories by the author of *The Sun Also Rises*. These stories, of which the most startling are perhaps, "Fifty Grand," "The Undefeated," "Today Is Friday," "The Killers," and "*Che Ti Dice La Patria*," have drawn comment from stylists because of their terseness and economy of words, from sociologists because of their striking presentation of social situations as varied as prostitution in Italy and bull fighting in Spain.

G. G. J.

MY HEART AND MY FLESH. By Elizabeth Madox Roberts. New York: Viking, 1927. 300 pp. \$2.50.

The second novel by Elizabeth Madox Roberts, author of *The Time of Man*, is even more interesting than the first to sociologists and psychologists who keep abreast with recent fiction. *My Heart and My Flesh* is the detailed record of the mental life of a young girl to maturity. Theodosia Bell lived an isolated life, isolated in the beginning because of the social superiority of her family in the village where she was born and later by her voluntary seclusion after the loss of the family fortune. She was an intravert, suffering the agonies of her type, and at one time was driven to delusions by illness, starvation, and confinement in the country house of her insane aunt. The novel would have been more readable had

the author not weighed it down with philosophical jargon.

G. G. J.

FLAMINGO. By Mary Borden. Doubleday, Page, 1927. 418 pp.

Mary Borden's latest novel, notwithstanding advertisements to the contrary, is not a daring one of the private life of New York's higher social set. It is a very laborious novel, in fact, in which New York City, as the author states, is the central theme—the hero, heroine, and setting all in one. It is a confused picture of sky scrapers, Harlem cabarets, and the offices of big business.

G. G. J.

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

MAN AND SOCIAL ACHIEVEMENT. By Donald C. Babcock. New York: Longmans, Green, 1929. 546 pp. \$3.00.

LET TOMORROW COME. By A. J. Barr. New York: Norton, 1929. 269 pp. \$2.50.

THE BAHÁ'Í WORLD, 1926-1928. A Biennial International Record. Vol. II. New York: Baha'í Publishing Committee, 1928. 300 pp.

THE NURSE IN PUBLIC HEALTH. By Mary Beard. New York: Harper's, 1929. 217 pp. \$3.50.

THE ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE. By Henry Evelyn Bliss. New York: Holt, 1929. 433 pp. \$5.00.

THE WILDERNESS OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY. By LeRoy E. Bowman. London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1929. 36 pp. Sixpence net.

TEACHING HEALTH IN FARGO. By Maud A. Brown. New York: Commonwealth Fund Division of Publications, 1929. 142 pp.

PERSONALITY AND THE SOCIAL GROUP. Ed. by Ernest W. Burgess. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929. 230 pp. \$3.00.

BUSINESS AND IDEALS. (A Syllabus of Discussion Outlines for Groups of Business Employees.) New York: The Inquiry, 1929. 91 pp.

THE SAINT-SIMONIAN RELIGION IN GERMANY. (A study of the young German movement.) By E. M. Butler. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1926. 446 pp.

AMERICA CHALLENGED. By Lewis F. Carr. New York: Macmillan, 1929. 322 pp. \$3.50.

OUR ENVIRONMENT. By Harry A. Carpenter and George C. Wood. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1928. 3 vols. I. Our Environment: Its Relation to Us, 234 pp.; II. Our Environment: How We Adapt Ourselves to It, 391 pp.; III. Our Environment: How We Use and Control It, 704 pp.

CHINA AND JAPAN IN OUR UNIVERSITY CURRICULA. Ed. by Edward C. Carter. New York: American Council Institute of Pacific Relations, 1929. 183 pp.

UNTIL PHILOSOPHERS ARE KINGS. By Roger Chance. Foreword by H. J. Laski. New York: Oxford University Press, 1929. 293 pp. \$4.00.

MEN AND MACHINES. By Stuart Chase. New York: Macmillan, 1929. 354 pp. \$2.50. Illustrated.

THE EXPERIENCE VARIABLES. By J. O. Chassell. Rochester, N. Y.: Author, 1928. Paper bound monograph. \$.75.

HENRI BERGSON. By Jacques Chevalier. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 351 pp. \$2.50.

THE MOTIVES OF MEN. By George A. Coe. New York: Scribner, 1929. 265 pp. \$2.50.

GUIDEPOSTS OF PROBATION. By Edwin J. Cooley. Albany: N. Y. State Dept. of Correction, Division of Probation, 1929. 10 pp.

THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER. By Verner W. Crane. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1929. 390 pp. \$4.50.

- TOLSTOY AND NIETZSCHE.** By Helen E. Davis. Foreword by John Dewey. New York: New Republic, 1929. 271 pp.
- HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATION: A CAREER.** By Michael M. Davis. New York: Author, 1929. 97 pp.
- CHARACTER AND EVENTS.** (Popular Essays in Social and Political Philosophy.) By John Dewey. Ed. by Joseph Ratner. New York: Holt, 1929. 2 vols., 861 pp. \$5.00.
- REMINISCENCIAS SOBRE ARISTÓBULO DEL VALLE.** By Elvira Aldao de Diaz. Buenos Aires: Talleres S. A. Casa Jacobo Peuser, 1928. 271 pp.
- THE ART OF THINKING.** By Ernest Dimmet. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1929. 216 pp. \$2.50.
- REPERCUSIONES DEL LIBRO REMINISCENCIAS SOBRE ARISTÓBULO DEL VALLE.** By E. Aldao De Diaz. Buenos Aires: Talleres S. A. Casa Jacobo Peuser, 1929. 77 pp.
- RACE AND POPULATION PROBLEMS.** By Hannibal G. Duncan. New York: Longmans, Green, 1929. 424 pp. \$2.50.
- PLAY DAYS FOR GIRLS AND WOMEN.** By Margaret M. Duncan and Velda P. Cundiff. New York: Barnes, 1929. 87 pp. \$1.60.
- UNA ÉPOCA DEL TEATRO ARGENTINO.** By Juan Pablo Echagüe. Buenos Aires: Talleres Graficos Argentinos L. J. Rosso-Belgrano 475.
- LECCIONES POPULARES DE HISTORIA DE LA CIVILIZACIÓN.** By Félix R. Escobio. Buenos Aires: Talleres S. A. Casa Jacobo Peuser, 1928. 205 pp.
- DE LA MUJER CASADA Y EL NUEVO REGIMEN MATRIMONIAL.** By Alberto Escudero. Buenos Aires: J. Lajouane and Cia, 1928. 60 pp.
- YOUNG LUTHER.** By Robert H. Fife. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 232 pp. \$2.00.
- JUAN PABLO ECHAGÜE.** By Alfredo Monla Figueroa. Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos Argentinos de L. J. Rosso, 1927. 78 pp.
- PRIMITIVE ECONOMICS OF THE NEW ZEALAND MAORI.** By Raymond Firth. Preface by R. H. Tawney. New York: Dutton. 505 pp.
- THE CHILD, THE FAMILY, AND THE COURT.** (Part I, General Findings and Recommendations.) By Bernard Flexner, Reuben Oppenheimer and Katharine F. Lenroot. Children's Bureau Publication No. 193. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1929. 87 pp.
- ECONOMICS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR.** By P. Sargant Florence. New York: Norton, 1929. 95 pp. \$1.00. (New Science Series.)
- SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF CHILDHOOD.** By Paul Hanly Furley. New York: Macmillan, 1929. 288 pp. \$2.25.
- PRESENT DAY LABOR RELATIONS.** By Paul F. Gemmill. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1929. 312 pp. \$3.00.
- THE MIGHTY MEDICINE.** By Franklin H. Giddings. New York: Macmillan, 1929. 147 pp. \$2.00.
- HOMBRES e IDEAS.** By Juan Pablo Echagüe. Ed. by M. Gleizer. Buenos Aires: M. Gleizer, 1928. 215 pp. \$3.00.
- TEACHING IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY.** By Carter V. Good. Baltimore: Warwick and York, 1929. 557 pp.
- AN ANTHOLOGY OF REVOLUTIONARY POETRY.** Ed. by Marcus Graham. New York: The Active Press, 1929. 353 pp. \$3.00.
- EMOTION AND DELINQUENCY.** By L. Grimberg, M.D. New York: Brentano, 1929. 147 pp. \$3.00.
- WHOLEDSOME PARENTHOOD.** By Ernest R. Groves and Gladys Hoagland Groves. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1929. 320 pp. \$2.00.
- LABOR MANAGEMENT.** By J. D. Hackett. New York: Appleton, 1929. 681 pp. \$5.00.
- WHAT DO WORKERS STUDY?** By John J. Hader and Eduard C. Lindeman. New York: Workers Education Bureau Press, 1929. 66 pp.
- RURAL SOCIOLOGY.** By Augustus W. Hayes. New York: Longmans, Green, 1929. 598 pp. \$3.50.
- SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.** By Joyce O. Hertzler. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1929. 234 pp. \$2.50.
- INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE.** By Major R. W. G. Hingston. New York: Macmillan, 1929. 296 pp. \$2.50.
- COUNTIES IN TRANSITION.** By Frank W. Hoffer. University, Virginia: Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, 1929. 255 pp.
- OUTLINE WORKBOOK FOR AMERICAN HISTORY.** By Nelle L. Holmes. New York: Holt, 1929. 250 pp. and maps.
- A PAGEANT OF THE SEASONS.** By Ethel E. Homes and Nina G. Carey. New York: Barnes, 1929. 23 pp.
- RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES.** Report of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes, of the President's Conference on Unemployment, Herbert Hoover, Chairman including the reports of a special staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1929. 2 vol., 950 pp. \$7.50.
- ROUSSEAU ET L'ENCYCLOPEDIE.** By Rene Hubert. Paris: Librairie Universitaire, J. Gamber, Editeur, 1929. 137 pp.
- CARDINAL IDEAS OF JEREMIAH.** By Charles E. Jefferson. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 220 pp. \$2.00.
- RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE.** By Gerald W. Johnson. New York: Minton, Balch, 1929. 278 pp. \$3.50.
- FRONTIERS OF HOPE.** By Horace M. Kallen. New York: Horace Liveright, 1929. 452 pp. \$3.00.
- PROGRAMS FOR SPECIAL OCCASIONS.** By Marion Kennedy and Katharine I. Bemis. New York: Barnes, 1929. 104 pp. \$1.50.

- POVERTY.** By Robert W. Kelso. New York: Longmans, Green, 1929. 374 pp. \$2.00.
- COUNTY MANAGEMENT.** By Wylie Kilpatrick. Virginia: University, 1929. 46 pp. \$2.50 for ten copies.
- SCHOLARSHIPS FOR CHILDREN OF WORKING AGE.** By Esther Ladewick. (Social Service Monographs No. 7.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929. 104 pp. \$1.50.
- MODERN ARCHERY.** By Arthur W. Lambert, Jr. New York: Barnes, 1929. 306 pp. \$3.00.
- CHRISTIAN AND JEW.** (A symposium for better understanding.) Ed. by Isaac Landman. New York: Horace Liveright, 1929. 374 pp.
- THE HEROIC LIFE OF ST. VINCENT DE PAUL.** By Henri Lavedan. Tr. by Helen Younger Chase. New York: Longmans, Green, 1929. 279 pp. \$2.50.
- VILLAGE FAMILIES IN THE VICINITY OF PEIPING.** By F. C. H. Lee and T. Chin. Peiping: Social Research Dept., China Foundation, 1929. 65 pp.
- INVESTIGACIONES AGERCA DE LA HISTORIA ECONOMICA DEL VIRREINATO DEL PLATA.** By Ricardo Levene. La Plata, Argentina, 1928. 2 vol., 324 pp. each. (Biblioteca Humanidades.)
- A PREFACE TO MORALS.** By Walter Lippmann. New York: Macmillan, 1929. 348 pp.
- SOCIAL RESEARCH: A STUDY IN METHODS OF GATHERING DATA.** By George A. Lundberg. New York: Longmans, Green, 1929. 380 pp. \$3.00.
- EMMA WILLARD: DAUGHTER OF DEMOCRACY.** By Alma Lutz. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1929. 291 pp. \$4.00.
- HISTORIA DE LA FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS MEDICAS.** By Dr. Felix Garzon Maceda. Cordoba, Argentina: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1927, 1928. 3 vols., 483, 493, 365 pp. (Official Publication.)
- SOME ASPECTS OF RELIEF IN FAMILY CASE WORK.** By Grace F. Marcus. New York: Charity Organization Society of New York, 1929. 140 pp.
- NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.** By Frank Abbott Magruder. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1929. 595 pp.
- THE SEXUAL LIFE OF SAVAGES.** By Bronislaw Malinowski. Introduction by Havelock Ellis. New York: Horace Liveright, 1929. 2 vol., 603 pp. \$10.00. Illustrated.
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